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Abstract 
This study investigates the extent to which equity in the distribution of health and 
health care has been achieved in Portugal. It draws on economic methodology from 
various sub-areas of the discipline, namely health economics, inequality measurement 
and economic philosophy. The study is divided into five main parts. The first provides 
background information necessary to an understanding of the health-equity problem in 
Portugal. The second part addresses the issue of normative specification of equity 
objectives. Part 3 presents methodology designed to measure inequity in the domain of 
health, focusing specifically on indices derived from the concentration curve approach. 
Part 4 is devoted to empirical analysis of income-related inequity in Portuguese health 
and health care. Finally, Part 5 provides further conceptual analysis with a view to 
future empirical research. 
The study's core contribution is in developing the concentration curve approach 
to measurement of health domain inequity. The normative and statistical properties of 
indices used in previous work are clarified and a number of indices that are new to 
health economic research are developed. The new measures include generalized 
concentration indices that allow for a representation of alternative social judgements on 
equality preference, and an index of horizontal inequity in the delivery of care based on 
the correspondence of rank positions in the utilization and morbidity distributions. The 
study also presents a rationalization of a family of indices that measure the level of 
social welfare associated with the health distribution. These indices permit a qualified 
trade-off between distributional and aggregative goals, and may be seen as a step toward 
integrating equity and efficiency measurement. At the empirical level, the thesis 
provides a wider range of applications than is currently available; and examines 
extensively the impact of methodological choices on the degree of measured inequity, 
an area where past work has been largely silent. 
Other themes developed in the thesis are the application of Sen's capabilities 
framework and Grossman's demand for health model to the study of health domain 
inequity. 
The empirical analysis draws on three separate portuguese informational bases: 
a large scale health interview survey, routine mortality statistics and two family budget 
surveys. The results show, inter alia, that the distribution of ill-health is generally 
unfavourable to poorer income groups; that the degree of inequity in infant mortality is 
currently much lower than it was in the 1970's; and that, throughout the 1980's, the 
distribution of family health care payments evolved from being overall progressive to 
overall regressive. 
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Chapter I 
Introduction 
1.1 Purpose, scope and limitations 
This study has two main objectives. First, it aims to investigate if, and to what 
extent, there exists inequity in the distribution ofportuguese health and health care. As 
in other countries, policy makers in Portugal have repeatedly shown concern that 
fairness obtains in the field of health. In 1979, a National Health Service was created 
with the expressed aim of guaranteeing access to health care for all citizens, 
independently of their social and economic status (Assembleia da Republica, 1979). 
Subsequent governments have maintained this and related commitments. For example, 
in 1990 a Law setting out basic principles of health policy considered "equity" to be a 
"fundamental objective" (Portugal, 1990); and in 1986, the Secretary of State for Health, 
whose party has held power over the last decade, declared that "it will not be as a result 
of the Government's inaction that a 'Portuguese Black Report' is published in the year 
2000" (Baptista Pereira, 1986). Despite these manifestations, there have been relatively 
few studies that measure the extent to which health-equity objectives are being 
achieved. ' Furthermore, the research that exists is limited in a number of respects. 
Empirical investigation is seldom based on sound theoretical analysis, making it difficult 
to extract policy implications; measurement techniques are often crude and 
uninformative; and the range of questions that are addressed appear to be simply guided 
by ready availability of empirical elements. 
The present study aims to redress the lack of suitable information about health 
domain inequity in Portugal, by developing and applying a research strategy based on 
11 use the term "health-equity" as shorthand for "equity in the domain of health", thus englobing 
objectives that pertain to the distribution of either health or health care. 
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economic methodology. It begins by tracing out a normative framework that clarifies 
concerns expressed in portuguese policy statements. From this framework an agenda 
of positive analysis is developed. Actual empirical application is circumscribed to 
certain key aspects of the agenda, namely the economic distributions of morbidity, infant 
mortality and family payments towards the health service. These analyses draw on three 
distinct informational bases: a large scale health interview survey, routine mortality 
statistics and two family budget surveys. They provide evidence previously unavailable 
to portuguese policy makers and also some elements that may be useful in other 
contexts (eg. a before and after comparison of the degree of inequity, following changes 
in the structure of health care financing of the type being considered by other countries). 
Those aspects identified in the normative framework as requiring positive analysis, but 
for which empirical measurement is not carried out, are not left completely unattended. 
The final part of the thesis specifies conceptual frameworks that permit a further two 
issues to be addressed in future research: namely, the level of social welfare associated 
with the health distribution and the degree of horizontal and vertical inequity in the 
delivery of care. 
The second, but no less important, objective of the thesis is to contribute to 
economic analysis of inequity in the domain of health. A number of developments are 
made, which complement previous work in the health economics, income inequality and 
economic philosophy literatures. The core contribution is the application of the 
concentration curve approach to measurement of health-inequity. The key features of 
this approach are: (i) a focus on health and health care inequalities related to economic 
status, which appears to be the equity issue which most preoccupies observers, and (ii) 
the construction of index numbers that quantify the degree of inequity and facilitate 
comparisons of the large amounts of information that are often employed in 
distributional studies in the field of health. The methodology was introduced to health 
economic research by Wagstaff, Van Doorslaer and Paci (1989) and later refined in, 
inter alia, Wagstaff et al (1991c) and Van Doorslaer et al (1993). In reviewing this 
work, Henry Aaron (1992) argued that "as with any pioneering effort, observers can find 
issues that are left hanging or that are subject to challenge. Indeed, the essence of 
seminal contributions is that they spawn additional research to correct, modify and 
extend the initial effort" (p. 467). The present thesis takes up this challenge by 
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providing both conceptual and empirical extensions. 
At the conceptual level, the study clarifies the normative and statistical properties 
of indices used in previous work. It also presents a number of indices that are new to 
health economic research. This is the case of the so-called generalized concentration 
measures, which incorporate alternative social judgements on the degree of equality 
preference; and of the new index of horizontal inequity in the delivery of care, based 
on the correspondence of rank positions in the utilization and health status distributions. 
At the empirical level, the thesis provides a wider range of applications than has hitherto 
been the case (eg. the measurement of inequity in infant mortality making use of 
geographical and economic data, and a time comparison of inequity in health care 
financing which avoids problems of data comparibility that pervade cross-national 
studies). The study also computes generalized concentration measures, which as far as 
I am aware have not been the subject of empirical application elsewhere in the literature. 
Perhaps the most important contribution is, however, the examination of the impact of 
methodological choices on the degree of measured inequity. Given the notoriety of 
measurement problems in health-inequity analysis, it is surprising that previous research 
has been largely silent on this issue. The present study carries out sensitivity analyses 
on a number of controversial choices (viz. family equivalence scales, ability to pay 
proxies, aggregation of inequality at different points of the distribution, etc. ). Such 
analyses improve the robustness of conclusions that are drawn and provide useful 
information to future empirical work, whether in Portugal or abroad. 
Other contributions to the application of economic methods in the study of health- 
inequity are also made. First, a normative framework based on Amartya Sen's (1982) 
concept of capabilities is proposed as a means of organizing empirical research and 
policy formulation. This proposal comes in the sequence of various other economic 
contributions aimed at disentangling the complex definitional issues raised in health- 
equity analysis [eg. Mooney and McGuire (1987), Le Grand (1987,1991a), Culyer 
(1990,1993) and Culyer and Wagstaff (1993)]. 2 These studies have contributed to the 
2 As Gavin Mooney argued in an early article, without more explicit consideration of normative 
issues the debate on equity in health and health care would remain "confused and confusing" [Mooney 
(1983, p. 179)]. 
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emergence of what is arguably a new paradigm in economics: the 'extra-welfarist' 
perspective (Culyer, 1989). The development of Sen's notion to the health sphere can 
be seen as a further addition to this line of enquiry. 
Second, the thesis provides a rationalization of a family of indices that measure 
social welfare in the domain of health. An important development in recent research 
has been the attempt to integrate equity and efficiency measurement in health policy 
evaluation [eg. Culyer (1989); Wagstaff (1991)]. This work has concentrated on 
probing conceptual issues. The research reported in this study aims to provide a bridge 
to empirical application. Drawing on the concentration curve approach and little known 
work by Kakwani (1986) and others, indices are developed that allow for a qualified 
trade-off between equity and health maximization objectives. 
Finally, in an appendix, the study proposes a modest extension to existing demand 
for health models. Building on the work of Grossman (1972), Muurinen (1982a, b) and 
Williams (1988a), a theoretical framework is presented which aims to adapt those 
models to better examine the relationship between economic and social inequality and 
inequality in the distribution of health. The distinguishing feature of the model is the 
introduction of an independent stock of education capital which permits a clearer 
understanding of the relationship between wealth and knowledge and of their impact on 
health and health care. This research seemingly shifts the ambit of the analysis from 
measurement of the extent of inequity to explanation of how particular distributions 
come about. However, it is an integral part of positive analysis suggested by the 
normative framework, which places emphasis on inequity in the transmission process 
from goods (such as health care) to health outcomes. 
Inevitably, the thesis has a number of limitations. One of these is that empirical 
analysis is not carried out for some issues identified by the normative framework. It 
should not be presumed that these questions (examined conceptually in the latter part 
of the thesis) are less important than those for which empirical measurement is provided. 
Their exclusion reflects the delicate trade-off between exiguity of space and the need 
to examine particular questions in sufficient detail. Given that a choice has to be made, 
empirical investigation is aimed at those issues that are currently the subject of debate 
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in Portugal but for which available information is sparse. 
Another limitation is that the study concentrates almost exclusively on violations 
of fairness that are related to economic status. There are important reasons for this, 
provided by both the normative framework and portuguese policy statements. However, 
there are other potential sources of inequity, such as those related to place of residence, 
age, race or gender. The examination of these might have implications for the policy 
conclusions to be drawn. Thirdly, despite an attempt to introduce tools that 
simultaneously measure the attainment of distributional and maximizational goals, the 
question of how health-equity objectives might be traded-off against other desiderata is 
left largely unresolved. Finally, the thesis has limitations in terms of the data it is able 
to call upon. Some issues which appear conceptually straightforward, become hazed 
once attention is turned to data analysis. Therefore, a significant amount of space is 
given over to identifying data deficiencies and in signalling due caution in the 
interpretation of results. 
1.2 Outline of the study 
The thesis is divided into five main parts. Part 1 provides background information 
necessary to an understanding of the health-equity problem in Portugal. The second part 
addresses the issue of normative specification of equity objectives. Part 3 presents 
methodology designed to measure inequity in the domain of health, focusing specifically 
on indices derived from the concentration curve approach. Part 4 is devoted to 
empirical analysis of income-related inequity in Portuguese health and health care. 
Finally, Part 5 provides further conceptual analysis with a view to future empirical 
research. 
Given that the thesis focuses on the problem of health domain inequity in Portugal, 
it begins by presenting relevant background information about that context. The first 
three sections of Chapter 2- where the information is presented - draw attention to 
distinguishing features of portuguese economy and society, the health of its population 
and the finance and delivery of health care. The description does not aim to be 
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comprehensive, concentrating instead on key issues that characterize the portuguese 
situation when compared to, for example, the european context. The final two sections 
examine the various health-equity objectives imprinted in legislative and policy 
statements and the manner by which portuguese authors have previously addressed the 
problem of inequity in health and health care. Generally, the chapter serves to identify 
key questions that are addressed in later conceptual and empirical analysis. 
Chapter 3 deals with the specification of equity objectives in health policy. Prior 
to empirical analysis one needs to establish which attributes ought to be measured. This 
entails asking the question "what does equity in the domain of health signify? " In the 
present context, the answer ought properly to be given by portuguese policy statements. 
However, as in other countries, these are insufficiently precise (and sometimes 
confusing) to allow positive analysis to be undertaken. Consequently, the chapter begins 
by critically appraising a number of distribution principles that might suitably be applied 
to the sphere of health and shed light on concerns expressed by portuguese policy 
makers. Six well-established approaches to defining equity - egality, entitlement, the 
decent minimum, utilitarianism, Rawlsian maximin and envy-free allocations - are 
discussed. Each is found wanting in terms of previously laid out assessment criteria. 
More recent formulations suggested by health economists are also reviewed. Though 
these provide useful insights, they too are shown to fall short of the basic requirements 
that a definition of health-equity ought to meet. An alternative conception based on 
Sen's notion of equality of capabilities is then put forward. After examining its 
application to health space, a simple diagrammatic framework is used to highlight 
questions that ought to be the correct focus of empirical analysis. Two main issues are 
identified: the actual level of the functioning 'good health' that particular individuals 
obtain, described as their achievement; and the experience of individuals in the space 
of commodities that are instrumental to the attainment of the desired functioning, their 
advantage. The chapter then proposes the manner by which these attributes are to be 
measured, adopting an indicative pluralistic approach that seems in tune with the 
multiplicity of health-equity objectives implied by portuguese legislation. 
Having discussed the normative basis of the analysis, the study moves on to the 
establishment of tools for measurement. This task is divided between Parts 3 and 5, 
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with the distinction that those presented in the former are the subject of extensive 
empirical application in Part 4, whereas the latter are examined only at the conceptual 
level. Chapter 4, which makes up Part 3 of the study presents various indices which 
permit measurement of the two main issues of analysis: inequity in health and inequity 
in health care payments. Taking income-based indices of inequality as the point of 
departure a choice is made to focus on concentration curve based measures, namely the 
illness concentration index and the Suits and Kakwani progressivity indices. 
Generalized versions of these measures, allowing for the parameterization of alternative 
social judgements concerning the degree of equality preference, are also presented. 
Finally, the chapter discusses methods of estimation and provides empirical information 
on the statistical bias inherent in linear approximation methods. 
Moving to Part 4 of the study, Chapter 5 provides estimates of inequity in 
morbidity based on data from the 1987 National Health Survey. This is the only 
nationally representative data source which allows data on illness to be systematically 
linked to the demographic and socio-economic characteristics of individuals. Strong 
evidence is found showing that the distribution of ill-health is generally unfavourable 
to poorer income groups. There are, however, some exceptions to the rule (viz. certain 
types of morbidity and particular age groups). The chapter also establishes the 
relationship between equivalence adjustments to the income variable and the degree of 
measured inequity. It is shown that this issue cannot be overlooked in future research. 
Chapter 6 measures the time-trend of inequity in infant mortality. Given 
qualitative limitations in the socio-economic data available on birth and death 
certificates, the analysis relies on geographical observations ranked by an index of 
economic position. The results suggest that the degree of inequity is currently much 
lower than it was in the 1970's. However, there are some noticeable counteracting 
trends, such as in the distribution of post-neonatal deaths where the degree of inequity 
appears to be increasing. 
Chapter 7 measures inequity in the distribution of health care payments among 
families with differential ability to pay. The analysis makes use of two Family Budget 
Surveys carried out in 1980/81 and 1989/90. The main result is that, throughout the 
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1980's, the distribution of health care payments evolved from being overall progressive 
to overall regressive. This change is shown to be robust in terms of a wide range of 
methodological choices. This part of the analysis is particularly relevant to research in 
other countries since it explores questions over which there is uncertainty with regard 
to empirical specification. 
Chapters 8 and 9 explore measurement tools for examining other health-equity 
issues in future research. Chapter 8 tackles the question of social welfare associated 
with the health distribution. A mathematical rationale is provided for a family of indices 
that take due account of the size of health output and the way this output is distributed 
among different income groups. The measures permit a qualified trade-off between 
distributional and maximizational goals on the basis of variation in a single parameter. 
Furthermore, the analysis shows that health concentration indices are ethically-admissible 
measures in the context of social welfare. The chapter also includes empirical 
illustrations drawing on the health survey data used in Chapter 5. 
Chapter 9 discusses indices of concentration aimed at measuring vertical and 
horizontal inequity in the delivery of health care. It builds on the work of Wagstaff and 
van Doorslaer, reinterpreting their analysis as measurement of the vertical equity 
component in the goal of health care utilization according to need. The claim that their 
method examines horizontal inequity can only be accepted under restrictive data-related 
assumptions that are unlikely to command widespread agreement. Accordingly, a more 
general index of horizontal inequity is developed, based on the correspondence of rank 
positions in the utilization and morbidity distributions. 
Chapter 10 provides an overall conclusion to the study. A summary of the main 
findings is presented, with attention being drawn to the research and policy implications 
of the results. The chapter also identifies areas for future investigation. 
Finally, a number of Appendices are included that present complementary material 
to the research reported in the main body of the thesis. Appendix 1, however, is of a 
different character since it provides a self-contained analysis of the question of 
modelling health related behaviour. This work is an implicit requirement of the 
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underlying ethical theory chosen for the study, which suggests that measurement of 
health domain inequity must also consider the process whereby goods, such as health 
care, are transformed into health functioning. However, it uses techniques that are 
somewhat different to those employed throughout the thesis and is quite evidently of an 
exploratory nature. Unlike Chapters 8 and 9 where the route to empirical application 
is straightforward, further specification remains to be accomplished in future research. 
The appendix begins by appraising Grossman's health investment model as an aid to 
health-equity research, and then presents an alternative specification that aims to remedy 
the identified weaknesses. The new model is solved by means of optimal control theory 
and has the potential for allowing a clearer understanding of the relationship between 
income and education and of their impact on health and health care. 
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Part 1 
BACKGROUND 
Chapter 2 
Health, Health Care and Equity in Portugal 
"It will not be as a result of the Government's inaction 
that a Portuguese 'Black Report' is published in the 
year 2000. " 
A. Baptista Pereira, Secretary of State for Health (1986) 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents background information relevant to the study of health 
domain inequity in the particular context of Portugal. Besides providing the reader with 
basic descriptive elements that are little-known outside the country's borders, the chapter 
also helps to identify specific research questions that need to be addressed and allows 
later empirical results to be usefully interpreted. 
The organization is as follows. Section 2.2 describes the main contours of 
Portuguese demography, economy and society. Data are presented in a form which 
permits ready comparison with other European countries. In section 2.3, statistics on 
population health (mainly mortality) are examined. It is shown that despite important 
changes in recent decades, Portugal continues to reveal health patterns that are distinct 
from those of its european partners. Section 2.4 describes basic aspects of the finance 
and delivery of health care. Special emphasis is given to features which distinguish the 
health care system from those in comparable countries, rather than providing a detailed 
examination of administrative structures, coverage, resources and utilization patterns. 
It is argued that the claim that portuguese health care conforms to the NHS model is in 
some respects misleading. Particular attention is then paid, in section 2.5, to the legal 
and political specification of health-equity objectives in an effort to extract the precise 
yardsticks by which policy should be monitored. Section 2.6 examines how Portuguese 
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researchers have tackled the measurement of inequity in health and health care and 
reveals the type of information presently available. Finally, section 2.7 brings together 
the various strands of information invoked in the chapter. 
2.2 Demography, economy and society 
Portugal is a small country on the periphery of Europe with a population not much 
larger than London's. Throughout the post-war period it has lagged behind Western 
Europe in terms of economic and social development and is generally acknowledged to 
be the second poorest member of the European Union (formerly EQ, which it joined 
in 1986. 
Table 2.1 reports various demographic, social and economic indicators for Portugal 
and contrasts them with corresponding figures for the UK and the twelve EU countries 
as a whole. Since 1970, Portugal's population ýhas grown by 18 per cent, to over 10 
million. With birth and death rates not much different from those of other EU nations, 
it seems that natural demographic phenomena explain only a part of the increase. Far 
more important are the influx, between 1974 and 1976, of over 600 000 residents from 
Portugal's former colonies and the regular stream of returning emigrants from N. W. 
Europe. A further characteristic is that, despite recent population growth being 
circumscribed to the western-most urbanized regions of the country, Portugal's residents 
continue to live predominantly in rural settings: indeed more so than in any other 
country within the World Health Organization's European Region, including Ireland, 
Greece and Turkey (WHO, 1985a). 
Portugal's economy registers a relatively poor performance in the European 
context and is reckoned to be "structurally deficient" (OECD, 1984). Purchasing power 
parity comparisons of GDP per head show the figure for Portugal to be 51 and 54 per 
cent of the UK and EU averages, respectively. Added to this, the cost structure of GDP 
reveals strong characteristics of a less-developed economy, namely low proportions 
attributed to wages and salaries and to investment. The rate of inflation too has 
systematically overshot trends in richer countries. 
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Table 2.1: Background data on Portugal, United Kingdom and the EU 
1990 or nearest available year 
Indicator Unit Portugal U. K. E. U. 
1. Population 
Total population 1000 10337 57409 327 137 
Population density Per Sq Km 112.1 234.5 144.7 
Population aged 65 +m Per cent 5.3 6.2 6.0 
F 7.7 9.4 8.7 
Birth rate Per 1000 11.7 13.8 11.0 
Death rate Per 1000 9.5 11.4 11.2 
2. Economy and Finance 
GDP per capita Current PPP's 9452 18402 17229 
Cost structure of GDP Per cent 
- Compensation of employees 44.1 
55.6 50.7 
- Taxes minus subsidies 13.6 
14.2 11.1 
- Consumption fixed capital 4.3 
11.0 11.6 
- Net operating surplus 37.9 
19.0 26.7 
Consumer price index 1985 = 100 170.9 133.3 123.0 
3. Employment & Living Standards 
Employment by sector Per cent 
- Agriculture 
18.9 2.2 7.0 
- Industry 35.3 
29.5 32.5 
- Services 45.7 68.4 
60.6 
Average length working week Hrs. per week 41.3 37.3 37.6 
Unemployment % labour force 8.8 11.4 10.8 
Average wages of manual Gross hourly, 6.8 14.8 - 
workers in industry current PPS 
Current expenditure on Per cent of GDP at 17.0 22.1 25.3 
social protection market prices 
Private motor vehicles in use Per 1000 popul. 227 366 394 
Number of students in Per cent of 62 62 72 
full-time education 5-24 age group 
Source: EUROSTAT, Basic Statistics of the Community, 28th Ed., Office Official Publications of 
European Communities, 1991. 
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In the years since joining the EU, Portugal's econon-dc performance has improved: 
inflation and unemployment have decreased and there has been a period of sustained 
growth. This improvement, however, "owes much to factors that may not be repeated 
and policies that cannot be sustained" (OECD, 1988). Structural problems in the 
economy remain, many of which are likely to affect overall production of health. 
Nineteen per cent of the work force continues to be engaged in agriculture, largely in 
the North of the country where land is fragmented into small holdings of scattered plots 
from which proprietors eke out a living at subsistence level. Average wages in industry 
are only 46 per cent of those in the UK when expressed in purchasing power standards. 
There are wide disparities in income between regions and population groups, while 
poverty is more pronounced than in other European countries (O'Higgins and Jenkins, 
1989). 
A picture of the distinct make-up of Portuguese society can be gathered by 
applying the General Household Survey classification of socio-economic grouping (SEG) 
to data drawn from the Portuguese National Health Survey (see Table 2.2). ' The 
percentage of persons in each SEG is radically different between the two countries. The 
distribution in Portugal is heavily weighted towards manual work with relatively low 
proportions in the higher grades that tend to find employment in the service sector. The 
strength of SEG IV reflects higher percentages of subsistence farmers and 
small-shopkeepers rather than skilled industrial workers. 
Official statistics may, however, overestimate the degree of inequality. There is 
a flourishing underground economy and double employment is pervasive particularly 
among families in the rural communities of western-most districts, who complement 
industrial wages with subsistence agriculture or small-scale entrepreneurship. In 
themselves, these factors have an important bearing on family health production and 
serve to counteract low levels of collective social provision, which in expenditure terms 
amounts to only 17 per cent of GDP compared with an average of 25 per cent in the 
European Union. 
' The National Health Survey is a cross-sectional household interview survey covering the non- 
institutionalized civilian population. It is described in detail in Chapter 5, where it is used to examine 
the extent of income related inequity in morbidity. 
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Table 2.2: Socio-economic group of head of household 
in Portugal and the U. K., 1987 (Percent) 
Socio-economic Group Portugal U. K. 
Male Female Male Female 
Professionals, employers and managers (I & H) 11 5 30 9 
Intermediate and junior non-manual (111) 14 13 15 38 
Skilled manual & own-account non-professional (IV) 49 37 37 9 
Semi-skilled and unskilled manual (IV & V) 26 45 18 37 
Never worked na. na. 0 6 
Sample size 11173 2560 7610 2525 
Sources: Computed from: National Health Survey, 1987, MS-DEPS, Lisboa. 
OPCS, General Household Survey 1987, HMSO, London, 1989 
The general impression from the figures reported here is that despite being a 
country fully integrated in the european economic system, Portugal remains very much 
a peripheral society. The population has distinctive features, close no doubt to much 
of Spain's, Southern Italy's, Ireland's or that of Greece, but radically different to the rest 
of Western Europe; patterns of employment and production are outmoded, inefficient 
and sometimes ambiguous; and living standards, in general, are poor and reveal extreme 
inequalities. These important factors must be borne in mind in an analysis of the equity 
attributes of the health care system, since they inevitably influence the nation's 
production of health. 
2.3 Health of the population 
In recent decades, portuguese mortality patterns have undergone profound changes. 
Though in many respects they now approximate the experience of the more developed 
parts of Europe, there are still signs of late socio-economic development. Evidence of 
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Table 2.3: Indicators of length of life in Portugal and the UK 
1970 1980 1990 
UK Por UK Por UK Por 
Infant Mortality 
Infant 
Neonatal 
Post-neonatal 
Perinatal 
Life Expectancy at Birth 
Men 
Women 
Potential Life Years Lost 
All causes 
Tuberculosis 
Lung cancer 
Ischaernic heart disease 
Road accidents 
18.5 55.1 12.1 24.3 8.4 11.0 
- 25.4 7.7 15.4 4.4 7.0 
- 32.6 4.4 8.9 4.0 4.0 
23.8 37.0 13.9 23.9 8.3 12.6 
68.6 64.1 70.4 67.5 72.7 71.1 
74.9 70.3 76.5 74.6 78.2 78.2 
7922 16028 6309 10746 4929 7755 
34 446 11 110 5 48 
408 102 313 156 220 165 
1315 422 1279 463 854 359 
603 1083 531 1317 420 1154 
Notes: 'Potential Life Years Lost' are defined as the years lost due to premature death before age 65 
(OECD, 1993). The figures shown refer to males and are expressed per 100 000 population. 
Sources: - Minist6rio da Sadde, Portugal - Sadde - 1990, DEPS, Lisboa, 1992. 
- OECD/CREDE§, OECD Health Data. A software package for the international comparison o 
health care systems OECD/CREDES, Paris, 1991. 
this can be seen in Table 2.3 which compares, for Portugal and the UK, the post-1970 
evolution of infant mortality rates, life expectancy at birth and potential life years lost. 
In Portugal, this period has witnessed the most impressive gains in lives previously lost 
prematurely. Take, for instance, the case of infant mortality. In 1970, one in eighteen 
portuguese children died in their first year of life. In the ten years to 1980 this figure 
was reduced by 56 per cent and then by a further 55 per cent to 1990. Despite this 
impressive decline, the infant mortality rate remains 31 per cent higher than that of the 
UK, which is close to the EU average. Some commentators have also drawn attention 
to the existence of extreme regional inequalities. Northern districts such as Braganqa 
and Vila Real show rates twice as great as those in the south where they are generally 
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below 9 per thousand .2 Disparities are even wider 
for post-neonatal mortality, the 
component of infant deaths most often associated with socio-economic environment. 
In this case almost three times as many children die in the two northern districts 
(Caffilho, 1985). 
Table 2.4 provides a comparison of 'potential life years lost' (PLYL) for males 
in European Union countries. The aggregate figures shown in column 9 indicate that 
rates of premature death are highest in Portugal. There is a 23 per cent excess with 
regard to the second placed country (Luxembourg) and 87 per cent vis-a-vis the country 
with the lowest rate (Netherlands). Disaggregation by selected causes of death shows 
a distinct pattern for Portugal in that it tends to be placed at the extremes of variance. 
The number of male PLYL due to tuberculosis, which the previous table showed to have 
declined rapidly in Portugal in the last two decades, are still much higher than in other 
countries (eg. more than six times greater than France, Greece or Italy). Premature 
deaths due to cancer tend to be comparatively low. Lung cancer PLYL, for example, 
is at the bottom of the EU league and even then only 73 per cent of the next lowest 
country (Ireland). However, as the figures in the previous table suggest, the situation 
in Portugal has been steadily worsening over the past two decades. This trend is likely 
to continue given that consumption of tobacco is still increasing and because of the long 
interval between exposure to tobacco and development of cancer. 
Premature deaths attributable to diseases of the circulatory system show a mid- 
ranking position in the EU table, but their composition is striking. PLYL due to 
ischaernic heart disease are the second lowest in the Union; but PLYL due to 
cerebro-vascular disease are the highest (65 percent higher than Spain, the second placed 
country). Though the asymmetries may in part be explained by variation in diagnostic 
practice between countries, they also reflect differences in diet and exposure to harmful 
substances such as tobacco. 
2A map of Portugal, showing geographic divisions by regions and districts, is presented as 
Appendix 2. Reference is made to these delimitations throughout the thesis. 
3 Given that persisting inequities in infant mortality and its components have recently been the 
source of some concern in Portugal [see, eg., LeitAo (1987)], Chapter 6 is dedicated to analysing this 
problem. The objective is to examine whether the rapid decline in overall rates has been distributed 
fairly between rich and poor. 
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Two other specific causes of death have caused alarm in recent years. Firstly, 
mortality due to liver cirrhosis which, in common with other wine producing countries, 
is extremely high. The figures for Portugal are once again the highest (more than four 
times greater than than the UK's, for example). Secondly, deaths due to motor vehicle 
accidents, where Portugal is only surpassed by Luxembourg in terms of male PLYL. 
It is also noticeable that, unlike the UK, the situation has worsened over the past 20 
years (see Table 2.3). 
Although mortality statistics are useful for comparative purposes they provide an 
incomplete picture of the health of a population. Indicators of morbidity for the 
country as a whole only became available recently through the National Health Survey 
for 1987. Figure 2.1 reports some information computed from the Survey which 
complements the data on mortality. " The prevalence of disability (days off work or 
school and restricted activity) is broken down by the main types of illness. The 
National Health Survey is useful for this purpose in that a rigorous attempt is made to 
classify illness by pathology, as well as its chronic, acute or symptomatic nature. In 
1987 the principal reported pathology referred to illness of the muscoskeletal system 
with chronic conditions being the most important. The strength of this type of illness 
is not apparent if one considers mortality statistics as proxies for health status. Chronic 
circulatory and acute respiratory illness also accounted for important proportions of 
disability, while lesions and digestive system illness show up strongly as they do for 
mortality. 
Despite being the only nationally representative data source with information on 
morbidity, the 1987 National Health Survey has scarcely been used in past research. 
One of the main contributions of the present thesis is to draw on the data base to 
examine income related inequity in the distribution of morbidity (Chapter 5). In so 
doing, new information is produced that helps to understand the health profile of the 
portuguese population. 
4 Due to differences in practice between health surveys in different countries it is not advisable 
to provide a cross-national comparison. 
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Figure 2.1: Morbidity indicators. Type of illness reported by persons 
with disability in a two-week reference period 
(National Health Survey, 1987 - Own computation) 
2.4 Finance and Delivery of Health Care 
The portuguese health care system is often described as conforming to the classical 
National Health Service model (eg. WHO, 1981; Urbano et al, 1993). This model is 
characterized by universal coverage of the population, generality of benefits, national 
tax financing and national ownership or control of factors of production (OECD, 1987). 
In 1979, a National Health Service was indeed created with a political commitment that 
it become the preponderant mode of health care financing and provision. Yet the 
available evidence suggests that the system as a whole departs significantly from those 
of other countries usually accepted as conforming to the NHS model (eg. the UK, 
Denmark or Italy). ' 
' Of course, no specific country's health system is fully described by the NHS model. The point 
made in this section is that finance and delivery of health care in Portugal departs from the classical 
paradigm in more respects than other systems. The importance of this observation is the implications 
it holds for the nature of incentives to economic and social agents and, ultimately, for the distribution 
of health and health care. 
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Although the NHS claims to be universal there coexist a number of occupational 
insurance schemes - overwhelmingly non-voluntary and in the public sector of the 
economy - which tend to cover better-off socio-economic groups. In terms of fan-dly 
income, more than half of the top 5 per cent of earners and a mere 3 per cent of the 
bottom decile enjoy such coverage (Pereira, 1988). Evidence from various sources 
shows that around a quarter of the population are effectively outside the NHS 
(Freixinho, 1990; Pereira and Pinto, 1990). The delivery and payment of care in the 
insurance funds is similar to that in other countries: users are free to purchase care 
wherever they wish; most use the private sector or contracted services for ambulatory 
care and the NHS for non-elective surgical interventions; and the funds pay contracted 
services on a fee-per-itern basis and reimburse patients or co-finance the use of privately 
provided care. 
The insurance part of financing is also similar to that in other countries in that 
employees contribute a small proportion of their income, but with an important 
qualification. This is that, effectively, an important proportion of expenditures are 
part-financed by state taxation, due to the insurance funds operating overwhelmingly in 
the public sector of the economy. The major occupational scheme (ADSE) is destined 
for public servants and has the extraordinary implication of providing incentives for 
NHS workers not to use the NHS. A significant proportion of other insured individuals 
are covered by schemes run by public sector bodies or nationalized industries. Since 
employee contributions are generally insufficient to cover expenditures, the deficits are 
covered by taxation or foregone revenue, and effectively, by other sectors of the 
economy with greater proportions of lower paid workers. Private insurance, as such, is 
a negligible part of total health care financing. The precise distributional implications 
of such financing arrangements are not known. 
One of the empirical exercises undertaken in this study is to measure how family 
payments to the NHS, insurance schemes and directly to providers are distributed 
according to ability to pay (Chapter 7). This analysis is important since there is an 
ongoing debate in Portugal over the future of health care finance, with both leading 
political parties apparently committed to enhancing the role of direct payments and 
private insurance (Mendo, 1993; Campos, 1990). 
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With regard to the NHS providing a general service of health care to patients the 
evidence is inconclusive. There exists a perennial under-utilization of equipment, either 
because of shortages in the supply of human resources or laxity in administrative 
controls on providers who work simultaneously for the NHS and the private sector. 
Physicians are plentiful by international comparisons but there are extreme shortages in 
some specialities (eg. dentistry and ophtalmology). Nurses are few, with scarcely one 
for each doctor, compared to a ratio of 6: 1 in the UK (OECD, 1985). There is also a 
wealth of evidence showing an unequal spread of human and material resources 
throughout the territory (Campos, 1987). 
From an equity perspective the fulfilment of the 'generality' objective requires that 
all types of care are readily available within the NHS. If there are extreme shortages 
of personnel or equipment in the provision of a particular mode of care and these imply 
prolonged and persistent queuing which leads people to seek treatment in the private 
sector then arguably the objective is not being met. There is a widely held belief that 
this situation is in fact the case, but admittedly very little evidence. 
An indication that the NHS may not provide the sufficiently wide range of 
services it promises is indicated in Table 2.5. It shows that the NHS is predominant in 
the provision of hospital stays and GP and mother and child care but takes a minor role 
in specialist and dental consultations as well as diagnostic services, where it commonly 
reimburses private providers. Although such information raises more questions than 
it answers, it is fair to assert that private provision plays an important role in the 
delivery of health care in Portugal and that it does so where the NHS has willingly or 
unwillingly failed to carry out its intended general role. 
The idea that the Portuguese health care system is free at the point of use and 
overwhelmingly financed by taxation is not totally borne out by the evidence. Table 
2.6, shows the percentage of total and public health expenditure in GDP for the twelve 
EU countries. When public expenditure is expressed as a proportion of all expenditures, 
Portugal is shown to have the lowest share in the Union. In 1980, almost 30 per cent 
of all expenditures were out-of-pocket (rising to almost 40 per cent in 1990), figures 
which are significantly higher than those of other countries acknowledged to conform 
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Table 2.5: Health care utilization by sector in Portugal 
Percent. 1987 
Type of care NFIS Private 
All consultations 67.0 33.0 
GP consultations 76.5 23.5 
Dental consultations 15.5 74.5 
Specialist consultations 47.8 52.2 
Family planning consultations 61.7 38.3 
Ante-natal consultations 61.9 38.1 
Child delivery 87.6 12.4 
X-rays 47.5 52.4 
Laboratory tests 29.5 70.5 
Hospital stays 72.8 27.2 
Notes: - All consultations refer to the last visit within a three month reference period, except for 
fan-dly planning consultations which are the last consultation with no reference period, and 
ante-natal visits, which refer to the last child born and currently under 5 years of age. 
- Diagnostic utilization refers to the last use in a three month reference period. 
- Hospital stays have a one year reference period and are taken from the 1985 National 
Health Survey, which was circumscribed to the Lisbon region. 
Source: Ministdrio da Sadde, Inqudrito Nacional de Sadde - 1987 (National Health Survey), 
DEPS, Lisboa. Own computation. 
largely to the National Health Service model (eg. the UK or Italy). One would expect 
with this evidence, and other things being equal, that money prices of health care have 
a stronger rationing role in Portugal than in other countries where care is designated to 
be free at the point of consumption. It is true that a high share of out-of-pocket 
expenditures may simply reflect the strength of the insurance funds but there is evidence 
that NHS users also face significant money prices. On the one hand, the figures on 
which the proportion of public expenditure, shown in Table 2.6, is based include the 
public servants insurance fund (ADSE), thus leaving a small proportion of the 
population to account for a relatively large percentage of private expenditure. But more 
importantly, it is known that most individuals using the NHS face flat-rate co-payments 
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Table 2.6: Total and public health expenditure as a percentage of GDP 
in EU countries 
1980 1990 
Total Public Public as Total Public Public as 
% of total % of total 
Belgium 6.6 5.4 81.8 7.4 6.1 82.4 
Denmark 6.8 5.8 85.3 6.2 5.2 83.9 
France 7.6 6.2 81.6 8.9 6.6 74.2 
Germany 7.9 6.2 78.5 8.1 5.9 72.8 
Greece 4.3 3.5 81.4 5.3 4.0 75.5 
Ireland 8.5 7.8 91.8 7.1 5.8 81.7 
Italy 6.8 5.6 82.4 7.6 5.9 77.6 
Luxembourg 6.8 6.3 92.6 7.2 6.5 90.3 
Netherlands 8.2 6.5 79.3 8.1 5.9 72.8 
Portugal 5.9 4.2 71.2 6.7 4.1 61.2 
Spain 5.9 4.4 74.6 6.6 5.2 78.8 
United Kingdom 5.8 5.2 89.7 6.1 5.2 85.2 
Source: OECD/CREDES, OECD Health Data. A software package for the intemational comparison o 
health care systems. OECD/CREDES, Paris, 1991. 
for consultations and diagnostic tests and pay a large and rising proportion of the cost 
of drugs. ' The latter payment varies with the therapeutic value of the drug in question 
with exemptions operating only in relation to the product (ie. if it is perceived to be 
life-saving) rather than patient characteristics (eg. age or income). 
The final piece of the puzzle in explaining patterns of finance and delivery of care 
is provided by information on the ownership and control of the factors of production. 
With regard to human resources the NHS has guaranteed either by design (in the case 
of doctors) or shortfalls in supply (nurses) the full employment of the principal providers 
of health care. These same professionals, however, are not required to exercise their 
r' In 1980 NHS consumers paid on average 29 per cent of a drugs cost, a figure which had risen 
to 40 per cent by 1985 (Pinto, 1988). 
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duties on a full-time basis and tend overwhelmingly to work for the NHS in the 
morning, as salaried civil servants, and in private practice in the afternoon, on a 
fee-per-item of service or contractual basis. Autonomous market or NHS provision is 
negligible. Individuals who consult doctors in a private setting, either because they have 
insurance coverage or are willing to pay the rates set by the market, will be seen by the 
same practitioners who in the morning provided the same types of care in a public 
institution. The incentives generated by these circumstances go some way to explaining 
the utilization and expenditure patterns previously described. Due to laxity in 
regulation, doctors are motivated to supply minimum standards of care in NHS 
work-settings in order to augment the potential market share of private practice. 
The NHS owns a sizeable majority of physical resources involved in the delivery 
of care, though as we have seen, provision in a private setting is far from negligible. 
Eighty eight per cent of hospital beds are in the public sector and there is a 
comprehensive network of integrated health centres and extensions in primary care. The 
NHS legislation decreed that private practice should complement public provision, in the 
sense of operating in areas where the latter was deficient, but all available evidence 
points to the contrary. In the hospital sector, for example, private provision is heavily 
concentrated in those regions where NHS supply is more extensive, while a comparative 
analysis of case-mix shows that it tends to produce routine, low-cost treatments where 
there is no obvious shortage of supply in the public sector (Campos, 1987). It is in 
ambulatory care, however, where financing is open-ended that we find the more striking 
departure from the NHS model. The provision of medical acts arising from NHS GP 
visits is dominated by the private sector. The private supply of pharmaceutical drugs 
is, of course, a feature of many NHS type systems, but in Portugal a large and rising 
proportion of diagnostic tests and treatments are contracted from the private sector, 
rather than being carried out in NHS hospitals. 
In summary, although Portugal is commonly believed to have a system of the NHS 
type, the incentives built in to this structure are such that it tends to operate in a fashion 
not dissimilar to countries where there is collective provision of a basic level of care 
complemented by private individual purchase. 
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2.5 Health-equity policy objectives 
Having outlined the principal characteristics of society, health and health care in 
Portugal, attention is now turned to health-equity objectives imprinted in legal and 
policy statements. This question has been examined in detail by Pereira (1990a, b), 
where it is argued that three seemingly distinct objectives have emerged. In the 
Constitution (Portugal, 1989), there seems to be implicit an objective in terms of equal 
opportunity to maximize health potential, through the access of all citizens to health 
promoting goods. This rather ambitious goal has not been clarified in subsequent 
documents, where the emphasis has been on health care, rather than health per se. 
Nevertheless, the Constitutional text is important to the extent that it recognizes that the 
key objective is the "right of all to the protection of their health" (ibid. ) and that this 
right depends on equal access to both health care and other health promoting 
commodities. 
A second objective is to be found in the National Health Service Law (Assembleia 
da Repdblica, 1979). Article 4 says explicitly that "access to the NHS is guaranteed to 
all citizens, independently of their economic and social status" (ibid. ). Given that in the 
justification for the Law it is also suggested that the NHS should have "universal 
characteristics, in which all citizens have access, in equality of circumstances" (ibid. ), 
the equity objective seems best interpreted in terms of equality of access to NHS care, 
irrespective of social and economic circumstances. 
The third objective identified in Pereira (1990a, b) was similar to the preceding 
one, but appeared to widen the ambit of application to health care in general (rather 
than simply the NHS). The distinction is related to the government's intention of 
subsidising the private insurance market so that patients are able to freely choose 
between the public and private sectors. Thus, a Law setting out basic principles of 
health policy declared that "it is a fundamental objective that citizens obtain equality of 
access to health care, irrespective of their economic condition or the place where they 
live" [Portugal (1990, p. 3452)]. 
Recent policy statements have added yet other equity objectives. For instance, a 
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document defining policy options for 1993 stated that the health care system should 
"aim to guarantee ... delivery of care according to population needs ... whether 
in the 
ambit of the NHS or in the private sector" [Portugal (1992, p. 5980)]. The equity 
objective in this case appears to be delivery of health care in relation to medical need. 
There have also been, for the first time, explicit pronouncements with regard to health 
care financing. The present Minister of Health recently stated that: "In general, the 
poorest members of the population ... have to be supported entirely by the State, and 
richer individuals - for reasons of social justice, equity and social solidarity - have to 
make a financial effort towards the maintenance of [health] services. ... That, for me, is 
the great principle of health care financing" [Mendo (1993, pp. 10- 11)]. This seems to 
be a commitment to the egalitarian principle that payments for health care should be 
related to ability to pay. 
Therefore, portuguese legislative and policy statements point to at least five 
different definitions of equity in the domain of health. ' Though these are obvious 
yardsticks for monitoring the extent of health-inequity in Portugal, they raise a number 
of questions for applied work. For example, how may the definitions be given suitable 
empirical content? How are terms like 'related to' and 'equality' to be interpreted? 
How should key variables like health, access or economic status be defined? Prior to 
these issues, however, there are others that require investigation. For example, are some 
definitions more compelling than others? Can the concerns expressed in the different 
objectives be organized according to some underlying ethical base? If so, what does the 
normative framework suggest with regard to positive analysis? It is this second group 
of questions that command our attention in Chapter 3, leading to the adoption of Sen's 
capabilities framework as the normative base within which to organize applied research. 
2.6 Previous Portuguese studies 
Research aimed at measuring inequity in health and health care in Portugal is very 
limited and dates back no further than the beginning of the 1980's. Virtually all 
applied work is directed at examining the issue of geographical inequalities [see, eg. 
' As is well known, such diversity is common to other health systems [see, eg., Le Grand (1982) 
and Mooney (1983)]. 
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Carrilho (1985), Kannisto (1986), Pereira et al, (1987), Giraldes (1988a, b) and Mantas 
et al (1991)]. The evidence from these studies points to the existence of widespread 
disparities in both health and health care. For example, Pereira et al (1987) showed that 
despite an accentuated decline in child death rates between 1972 and 1982, regional 
inequalities had scarcely improved and actually worsened in the case of perinatal 
mortality. The variation in death rates was found to be negatively correlated with 
indicators of wealth and income (though only post-neonatal mortality showed a 
statistically significant association), and with indicators of health care resources, 
utilization and expenditure. The same study also carried out an analysis of the spatial 
distribution of public health care. This revealed coefficients of variation in the order of 
2.1 for hospital stays, primary health care consultations and prescribed medicines. As 
one would expect, NHS expenditure per capita showed similar disparities: on average 
almost twice as much is spent on patients in northern areas than those who live in the 
south. The variation in the number of prescribed diagnostic tests per head was 
conspicuously large: nine times greater in the Lisbon region than in the northern district 
of Vila Real. 
Giraldes (1988a, b) carried out a comprehensive study of the allocation of NHS 
expenditure in the primary care sector, with a view to establishing an explicit 
equity-promoting distribution mechanism. If the mechanism were to be applied, 
Giraldes shows that a substantial reallocation of current expenditure from southern to 
northern districts would have to be undertaken. The picture for capital expenditure 
shows no clear North/South divide but also points to a need for extensive redistribution 
of investment resources. 
A recent international review of applied research on socio-economic inequalities 
in health and health care (Mielck and Giraldes, 1993) found only two such studies in 
Portugal. 8 Lucas (1986) examined inequalities in mortality, morbidity and health care 
utilization according to occupational class. In the first case he used a sample of total 
deaths in 1981 to estimate male adult mortality rates. The results reveal a rising 
gradient from manual to non-manual workers, which is at its steepest in younger men. 
' The issue of socio-economic inequalities has of course been the main focus of research in other 
countries and, as the previous section showed, often crops up in portuguese policy documents. 
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In the 25-34 age group an agricultural worker faces a risk of death 4.8 times greater 
than a high-level public or private administrator. This pattern was also found for 
virtually every cause-specific death rate. In the case of morbidity, data drawn from the 
1983 National Health Survey (confined to the Lisbon Region), showed occupational 
class gradients for absence from work and confinement to bed due to illness in a 
two-week reference period. Manual workers were three times more likely to report 
illness than professionals, employers and managers. This pattern is more pronounced 
in younger age-groups and applies for both men and women. Finally, based on the 
same survey, Lucas showed that health care utilization by occupational class was 
roughly uniform for both men and women (eg. physician visits by manual workers only 
exceeded those of non-manual by between 10 and 30 per cent in different age groups). 
He argued that if these figures were corrected for need, as measured by self-reported 
morbidity, a class gradient in favour of higher occupational would emerge (though no 
actual evidence was presented). 
Pinto (1988) measured the distributive impact of public provision of health care 
in the Lisbon region. The study used two data sources -a sub-sample of the Family 
Income and Expenditure Survey (1980-81) and the National Health Survey (1985). It 
computed economic benefits accruing to five socio-economic groups (determined by the 
educational level, occupation and main source of income of the head of the family). 
Comparing both years of reference, Pinto found roughly similar results: the incidence 
of benefits was characterised by a U-shaped pattern, signifying that the lowest and 
highest socio-economic groups derive greater amounts of economic benefit from the 
NHS. The 1985 data were also corrected for 'need', by considering only those 
individuals who reported illness in a two week reference period (see Table 2.7). Once 
again the U-shaped pattern was found, and it was shown, by disaggregating the types 
of care consumed, that the co-financing of drugs by the NHS was the principal factor 
in determining the overall incidence profile. Unfortunately, the author failed to age- 
and sex-standardize the benefit/need ratios, so that, in effect, the socio-economic 
groups are not strictly comparable. Given that there are a disproportionately higher 
number of older people in lower socio-economic groups, an age- and sex-standardized 
distribution might well have thrown up a pattern more clearly favourable to better-off 
individuals. 
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Table 2.7: Economic Incidence of Benefits in NHS care 
by socio-ecOnomic grouR, 1985 
SEG No. in Aver. benefit Incidence 
sample. p/adult equivalent index 
V. (lowest) 383 53.1 159 
IV. 2174 28.9 86 
111.724 19.6 59 
11.277 37.4 112 
1. (highest) 11 36.4 109 
Total / Aver. 4069 33.4 100 
Notes: Estimated benefits = average costs of consumed care + reimbursement 
by NHS of privately consumed care. 
Source: Pinto (1988) 
Besides being relatively few in number, portuguese studies dealing with health 
domain inequity are limited in three major respects. The work reported in this thesis 
is largely aimed at redressing these shortcomings. First of all, existing research is 
seldom based on sound normative analysis, either of explicit objectives of portuguese 
health policy or of a more general nature (eg. drawing on the wealth of knowledge 
available in the sub-branch of welfare economics). Theoretical analysis of concepts such 
as inequality, health or access - which has underlined the inequality in health debate of 
recent years - has scarcely been touched on, with researchers adopting a pragmatic 
attitude that in a country with an under-developed information system the priority must 
be to extract the maximum descriptive elements available. Indeed, in some cases the 
work is guided by the simple objective of making available the type of information 
reviewed by the Black Report. The result is that it is often difficult to extract policy 
implications from the available research. 
Secondly, the measurement techniques that are employed are often crude and 
uninformative. For instance, by far the most used inequality measure is the range 
which as Wagstaff et al (1991a) argue does not consider inequality in intermediate 
groups and takes no account of sizes of the groups being compared. Standardization for 
relevant intervening variables, such as age and sex, is also rarely found; and the 
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potential of econometric techniques to explain the persistence of inequalities has not 
been tapped. Given the controversy that surrounds measurement in the field, it is also 
surprising that no sensitivity analyses aimed at improving the robustness of conclusions 
have been reported. 
A final problem is that existing research does not seem to have made adequate use 
of available data sources. For instance, the lack of country-wide information on health 
and health care inequality related to socio-economic status does not seernjustified, given 
that a national health survey has existed since 1987. Furthermore, there have been 
scarcely any attempts to measure the evolution of health domain inequity, even though 
comparable data exists for recent periods. 
Since Mielck and Giraldes' (1993) review, a further study concentrating on socio- 
economic inequality has been published. Pereira and Pinto (1993) measured inequity 
in the finance and delivery of health care, as part of an international research effort now 
known as the Mity study. 9 This research interpreted equity in financing as the 
distribution of health care payments according to ability to pay and equity in delivery, 
as the distribution of access to care (proxied by utilization) according to need, rather 
than economic status. As the previous section showed, both interpretations are reflected 
in portuguese policy statements. Pereira and Pinto used data from the Family Income 
and Expenditure Survey (1980-81) and the National Health Survey (1987), and 
computed a variety of summary measures based on the concentration curve approach. 
They concluded that the "financing of portuguese health care is ... slightly progressive" 
and that in the delivery of care there is "inequity favouring the rich" (pp. 197-198). The 
research reported in this thesis is, in part, a development of the analysis carried out in 
Pereira and Pinto (1993). For instance, the finance-side analysis is updated with a 
newly available sample survey and improved by considering various empirical 
specifications that minimize the uncertainty surrounding theoretical concepts. The 
analysis of inequality in health, produced in the ECuity study as a by-product of 
measurement of inequity in the delivery of care, is here given a central role. These 
extensions mean that a number of new results are produced. Finally, the measurement 
9 The term Mity derives from the fact that the study was financed by the EC, now European 
Union. 
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tools used by the ECuity researchers are brought under close examination leading to 
improved understanding of their normative and statistical properties and opening up new 
avenues for application. Thus, although the Pereira and Pinto (1993) study was able to 
amend some of the more obvious limitations of previous portuguese research, this thesis 
tries to show that the methods it used can be further improved and thoughtfully applied 
to data sources in Portugal, thereby enhancing knowledge of the extent of health- 
inequity in that country. 
2.7 Concluding comments 
In Portugal, as in other countries, the problem of equity in health and health care 
has attracted growing attention by researchers and policy makers. The work reviewed 
above shows that, in Portugal, inequalities in health care utilization and health 
outcomes do exist and that the patterns are similar to those found in other European 
countries. Though this research has been useful in highlighting the problem, it suffers 
from a number of limitations. Like much of its counterpart internationally, it is not 
based on the sound theoretical analysis. It also lacks technical rigour and is often 
guided by the ready availability of empirical elements. It is hoped to show, in 
subsequent chapters, that economic analysis has an important contribution to make in 
the resolution of these drawbacks. 
A particular question which requires urgent consideration is the specification of 
equity objectives themselves. Section 2.5 showed that there are distinct goals proposed 
in various legal and policy statements. This presents obvious but not irreconcilable 
problems for researchers. In Chapter 3 the usefulness of economic analysis in clarifying 
societal equity targets is shown. This normative work also provides a guide to eventual 
monitoring of objectives through positive analysis. It offers, therefore, much of the 
theoretical support which previous work has lacked. 
Finally, much of this chapter has been taken up in describing Portugal's socio- 
economic environment and the observed patterns of its health and health care systems. 
The main reason for this is that Portugal reveals distinct characteristics in relation to the 
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european countries to whom it is most often compared. The features that have been 
highlighted (eg. a predominantly rural population, the transitional nature of health 
problems, the importance of direct payments in health care finance, etc. ) need to be 
borne in mind when interpreting later empirical results. Indeed, as will be seen, they 
also have a role in determining the very questions that are addressed. 
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Part 2 
NORMATIVE SPECIFICATION 
Chapter 3 
What does Equity in Health Mean? 
" So I must confess that the outcome of the discussion is 
that I know nothing. After all, if justice still remains 
undefined, I can hardly know whether it is in fact a 
virtue or a vice. Nor can I know whether the just man 
is in fact happy or miserable" 
Plato, The Republic 
3.1. Introduction 
A significant feature of the health inequality debate is that, until recently, it tended 
to produce a wealth of empirical facts while at the same time disregarding the precise 
specification of equity objectives. This was unfortunate, given that normative 
investigation is an essential prerequisite for understanding the reasons why people care 
about social justice in the field of health; the extent to which specific types of inequality 
are compatible with equity; how the concept should be measured; and how rational 
policies may be formulated and monitored. 
Economists were early to see that without more explicit consideration of normative 
issues the debate on equity in health and health care would remain "confused and 
confusing" (Mooney, 1983). A limited amount of work was initially undertaken on 
specifying egalitarian health policy objectives (Le Grand, 1982; Mooney, 1983). 
Notions such as equality of public expenditure on health services, equality of access to 
health care and equality of health itself were discussed, yet there was a failure to locate 
these specific objectives in theories of society and public policy or to relate them to 
existing economic definitions of equity. 
More recently, a number of authors have reassumed the difficult challenge of 
disentangling normative issues in the health-equity debate (eg. Mooney and McGuire, 
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1987; Le Grand, 1987; Culyer, 1990). Their work is an encouraging, if belated 
contribution, clarifying the definitional steps that should precede a rigorous positive 
analysis of the problem. The present chapter, whilst addressing itself primarily to the 
interpretation of portuguese policy objectives, tackles these same questions. In essence, 
it searches for rules that are capable of shedding light on equity concerns in the field 
of health and that may serve as an ethical guide to later empirical measurement. The 
main argument is that Sen's notion of equality of capabilities, strangely ignored by 
health economists in the past, provides such foundation. Moreover, it seems a useful 
interpretation of the Portuguese Constitutional objective, from which presumably other 
national targets pertaining to the distribution of health care are derived. 
The chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 sets out criteria for assessing the 
various distribution rules under review. Section 3.3 critically appraises six 
well-established approaches to defining equity - egality, entitlement, the decent 
minimum, utilitarianism, Rawlsian maximin, and envy-free allocations. Each of these 
is found wanting in some respect when applied to the health sector. Section 3.4 turns 
attention to two alternative formulations recently proposed by health economists - equity 
as choice and health maximization! Despite providing some interesting insights these 
too have limitations. Section 3.5 describes the capabilities approach and applies it to 
the specific domain of health. Section 3.6 discusses measurement implications of the 
Sen approach and proposes an agenda of positive analysis for studying inequity in health 
and health care based on the underlying ethical framework. This agenda is followed in 
remaining chapters. Finally, section 3.7 concludes the analysis. 
3.2 Assessment criteria 
Suggestions with regard to standards for evaluating equity proposals abound in the 
literature [see, for example, the contributions of Rawls (1971), Pazner and Schmeidler 
' It will be noted that the discussion omits the important recent contribution of Culyer and 
Wagstaff (1993) and other related papers by the same authors. The reason for this is that the Chapter 
was prepared, and published, before these articles appeared. I have opted to leave the discussion more 
or less in its original form. It may be noted, however, that Culyer and Wagstaff's analysis has some 
points in common with Sen's specification (viz. the emphasis on ultimate entities of concern and the 
implication that empirical analysis must consider inequality in the distribution of health and in the 
distribution of those factors, such as health care, that contribute to it). 
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(1978), Le Grand (1984) and Baumol (1986)]. Some writers stress that we should 
merely look for clarity and specificity while others propose complex mechanisms such 
as the Rawlsian "social contract", whereby from a hypothetical "original position" 
individuals establish an acceptable equity criterion. Others still, propose more restrictive 
criteria such as the argument that a two-step approach which distinguishes equity from 
efficiency decisions is logically untenable or that only individual preferences, in contrast 
to third-party values, should count in judging the equity of a particular distribution. 
In this chapter four fairly obvious requirements that an acceptable formulation of 
equity in the field of health should meet are put forward: (i) a conception should be 
easily comprehensible so that it allows the widest interdisciplinary discourse and 
deduction of clear policy solutions; (ii) it should be specific and rigorous, in order that 
concepts are not left so vague that they generate misunderstanding in application; (iii) 
the formulation should be readily susceptible to empirical verification; and, (iv) the 
definition should be intuitively and widely acceptable for the problem at hand. 
The final criterion can obviously be given various interpretations. I shall take it 
to mean that an equity formulation should not disaccord with the concerns revealed by 
health-equity policy statements in Portugal (see Chapter 2). 2 Roughly stated, some key 
ideas defended in those statements are as follows. There is, first of all, a distinct 
concern for distribution, separate from other explicit or implicit targets like efficiency, 
maximization of survival or consumer choice. Second, equity appears to require 
equalization of specific parameters across socio-economic groups rather than a basic 
minimum of provision. Finally, the processes of health production and health care 
delivery are an important element in reaching decisions on whether equity is being 
achieved. 
Besides the criteria above, other themes that have been raised in the literature are 
used here as a means of highlighting the differences and implications of proposed 
formulations. For instance, one might want to know whether a formulation bases itself 
2 Given that portuguese health-equity objectives are remarkably similar to those of other countries 
in W. Europe (see the contributions in Van Doorslaer et al, 1993), this is not as restrictive as it seems. 
Consequently, many of the implications of the analysis are applicable in a wider context. 
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on aggregation of individual preferences or if there is a remittance to external 
judgements? What variable is chosen as the metric for judging the equity of a particular 
distribution: health, health care or utility? Or if any priority is afforded to equity 
decisions over those which concern efficiency: that is, whether the two objectives are 
accomplished in a single step or separately? Though some authors have taken particular 
aspects of these questions to constitute a priori assessment criteria it should be noted 
that here they serve no other purpose than that of contrasting different equity 
conceptions. 
3.3 A critique of traditional approaches to conceptualizing equity 
There are six well-established conceptualizations of equity in the literature that 
may be considered relevant for the health inequality debate: egality, entitlement, the 
decent minimum, utilitarianism, Rawlsian maximin and envy-free allocations. Virtually 
all emanate from the discipline of political philosophy, but they share the characteristic 
of having drawn significant interest from economists. Their status in the literature as 
specifications of what equity generally entails is not in doubt, but it will be argued that, 
when applied to the health sphere, they reveal particular shortcomings. I begin with 
what constitutes the most direct philosophical foundation for the type of policy 
objectives identified earlier for Portugal: the theory of egality. 
3.3.1 Egality 
Egality is sometimes taken to mean equalizing individual net benefits (eg. health 
status) or, once it is admitted that some attributes cannot be physically distributed, 
equalizing individual opportunities for such benefits. In an influential discussion, the 
philosopher Ronald Dworkin (1981) has distinguished between the two key notions of 
equality of welfare and equality of resources, arguing that any ethically supportable 
egalitarianism must call for equalizing the resources available to people, not their 
welfare or utility. Equality of welfare holds that: "a distributional scheme treats people 
as equals when it distributes or transfers resources among them until no further transfer 
would leave them more equal in welfare. " Equality of resources, in contrast: " treats 
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them as equal when it distributes or transfers so that no further transfer would leave 
their share of the total resources more equal. " (Dworkin, 1981, pp. 185-186). Important 
as they are, these distinctions only raise further questions. For instance, does equality 
of welfare in the health field require equality of health or attainment of equal levels of 
utility? Does equality of resources require simply equality of access (or opportunity of 
access) or does it require the use of resources in equal quantities? Should the 
definitions be applied in relation to State provided health care or across all resources, 
public and private? 
Lengthy discussions of the distinctions Possible within this approach and the 
competing policy objectives which they imply have, of course, been a feature of recent 
contributions to the health and social policy literature. Mooney (1983) and Le Grand 
(1982) proposed a number of interpretations which might be used as guides to health 
policy? Their definitions may be classified under three separate headings. Those 
which are formulated in terms of their impact on supposedly homogeneous populations, 
without regard to differences in health status or need for health care (eg. equality of 
public expenditures per capita); those which relate equity to people's need for care (eg. 
equality of treatment for equal need); and those which focus on the outcome of health 
care activities (eg. equal distribution of health itself). 
Though this early work was useful in highlighting the varied interpretations that 
might be given to the objective of achieving equality in the health domain it failed to 
relate policy definitions to their economic or philosophical base. Significantly both 
Mooney (1987) and Le Grand (1987) later argued that the definitions suffer from a 
number of analytical and practical problems and may in some cases conflict with 
commonly held views of what is just and fair. Indeed, one cannot help but feel that the 
lack of rigorous and consistent health-related analyses, within the traditional egality 
perspective, is due to it remaining too elusive a concept as a principle of distribution. 
Arguably, much of the applied work which implicitly draws on the egalitarian 
view is too permissive to be useful for policy recommendations. The Black Report 
See also, in this contexý the more general discussion by O'Higgins (1987). 
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(DHSS, 1980), for example, concentrates overwhelmingly on inequalities in health 
without clarifying any logical or policy basis for health equality being pursued. The 
reason seems to be that egality as an equity formulation simply lacks the specifity 
required, allowing researchers to imbue their own, or the information system's, values 
into the monitoring process. Furthermore, the concept fails to establish coherently why 
equalization of any type should in fact be accomplished. This vagueness and lack of 
development have been sorely felt by defenders of NHS-type arrangements in the 
inequality in health debate, which is all the more disheartening since, as will be shown 
later, an approach is available that can resolve many of the pitfalls which a referral to 
egality can engender. It does so by analysing thoughtfully the transmission process from 
resources to outcomes, which in the final analysis is the principal oversight in the egality 
account. 
3.3.2 Distribution according to entitlement 
Perhaps the best known rejection of equality has been provided by the libertarian 
philosopher Robert Nozick (1974) in his theory of distribution according to 
9entitlement9. Its core position is that one is entitled to what one possesses provided it 
was acquired justly: that is, through earnings, through inheritance or through 
redistribution by government of holdings acquired illegally. It is, therefore, a procedural 
theory: whether or not a specific distribution is considered equitable depends entirely 
on the path used to reach it. While this is arguably a desirable characteristic of an 
equity formulation, its implications for distribution in the health domain are manifestly 
out of step with the concerns found in portuguese policy statements. 
It would seem that both health and health care are suitable metrics for assessing 
equity within the entitlement framework. The only important empirical question, in this 
context, would be to determine the manner by which these two commodities were 
acquired. It is not difficult, however, to think of examples where its application would 
lead to outcomes widely regarded as inequitable. Consider the case of health, 
specifically where a child is born with a congenital deformity. Since the condition was 
inherited a strict application of 'entitlement' holds it to be fair. Nozick does refer to the 
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possibility that in the case of "catastrophic moral horrors" entitlement rights might be 
compromised, but it is not at all clear how his theory would accomodate such waiving 
of rights, in the absence of formulation of other competing bases of moral judgements. 
So generally it may be said that the theory attaches no weight to the unfortunate: it is 
essentially a matter of fate that some are born in a healthy condition and others are 
plagued with chronic medical problems. 
With regard to health care Nozick's approach is similarly restrictive. It suggests 
that no one citizen has a right to health care unless it has been acquired through the 
market. Attempts at redistributing resources, even if they were aimed at providing 
incentives for those who use health services less efficiently (eg. the less educated and 
the poor) would in themselves be considered an injustice. Nor is there recognition of 
sentiments of caring or generosity by the well with regard to the unwell, often given 
practical expression in the subsidization of health care services (Culyer, 1980). Finally, 
it fails to consider either the role of possessions which are received as social goods or 
the pervasion of externalities and consumer ignorance in the health care market. It 
matters not, therefore, that the conception is clear and specific, since its pursuit would, 
in all likelihood, lead to a distribution highly unfavourable to the poor and the sick. 
3.3.3 The 'decent-minimum' 
Given the extreme consequences of Nozick's principle of distribution for social 
or health policy other Libertarians have suggested a role for some sort of safety net, viz. 
a standard below which individuals should not be allowed to fall. Such an approach - 
often designated the decent minimum - should, if applied rigorously, simply pertain to 
final outcomes of a process (ie. health itself). Invariably, however, it is specified as 
the provision of a minimum standard of health care, and points towards a configuration 
of services strongly weighted towards the private sector, with the State providing a 
limited and minimal level of care for the poor. Given that the Portuguese health care 
system aims to achieve equity through universal coverage of citizens and general 
coverage of benefits, it is doubtful whether the present approach could be considered 
suitable for that particular system. 
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It could be argued that by circumscribing the demands of equity to the provision 
of a 'decent basic minimum' the procedure is strong in terms of practical applicability. 
This is somewhat misleading since the key to its operationality is that it requires a value 
judgement as to what constitutes the decent or social minimum. Perhaps in recognition 
of the problems involved, its proponents have been reluctant to define exactly what it 
is. In the health field only Enthoven's (1980) discussion of a Consumer Choice Health 
Plan comes close to doing so. He suggests a list of "basic health services" which Health 
Maintenance Organizations (HMO's) should provide. But it is far from clear that at the 
end we are left with a clear idea of what constitutes a decent minimum, since what are 
accepted as "basic services" may differ across time and contexts and because he 
provides no sound reason as to why certain types of care should be left on or off the 
list. Ultimately, the distinction Enthoven makes between high and low option plans 
suggests that we can-choose the 'decent minimum' by reference to average costs for 
actuarial categories. This seems a somewhat unjust principle for allocating health care. 
Loewy's (1987) specification of the decent minimum is different in that he points 
to criteria rather than supplying a list of items. Although recognizing that specifying 
a decent minimum is conditional on historical and cultural contexts he is willing to 
suggest certain minimal conditions which "all would hold to be self evident" (ibid). 
Certain 'things' should be provided: namely those necessary to save life; ameliorate 
suffering; restore function of vital parts; and prevent future problems by public health, 
immunization and sanitation. In effect, this view brings us no closer to a rigorous 
specification of the decent minimum, although there is more than a suggestion that it is 
approximated by the traditional medical model and its views on the ethics of health care. 
But as Kennedy (1983) argues a concern for the community values of equity or justice 
surely implies the abandonment of such a model. 
All this goes to suggest that the definition of an acceptable minimum standard is 
a complicated exercise. But suppose for the sake of argument that one were to be 
found: what would be the implications for applying the concept? It would seem that 
two measurements are required: the number or proportion of individuals not achieving 
the standard and the total quantity of the good required to raise all those below to the 
level of the accepted minimum. Posed in this fashion the problem appears as simply 
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a supply-side phenomenom: redistributing health care resources from individuals above 
the minimum to those below. But if the supply of health care is less than perfectly 
inelastic it may be more productive to influence other inputs (eg. education or income) 
into the health production function, thereby increasing the demand for health care of 
those individuals below the minimum. By providing a simple uni-dimensional view of 
the equity question, the decent minimum approach overlooks this possibility. It appears 
then that a rule of allocation along these lines offers little scope for operationality, 
acceptability or precision. 
3.3.4 Utilitarianism 
The goals of utilitarianism are commonly summarized as "serving the greatest 
good for the greatest number. " In economic terms this implies a decision rule where 
resources are allocated so as to maximize aggregate utility. Quite why utilitarianism 
should be seen by so many as a theory of equitable distribution is difficult to perceive. 
Possibly it has to do with the well established result that an egalitarian distribution will 
result under classical utilitarian principles when there exist identical preferences (Culyer, 
1980). But there is no logical connection between greater equality and greater equity. 
There is, however, a stronger argument, brought out in Sen's (1973, p. 16) well known 
comment that "maximizing the sum of individual utilities is supremely unconcerned with 
the interpersonal distribution of that sum. " The activities or individuals to which 
resources are allocated at the margin depends simply on comparisons of utility. Thus, 
if a rich individual responds better to a given course of treatment than a poor one, the 
utilitarian decision rule requires that more resources be attributed to him. The resulting 
distribution may well be efficient but it is unlikely that it will conform to most people's 
conception of equity. 
Though it could be argued that such a reaction is simply the super-imposition of 
an alternative (non-explicit) moral judgement, it is based on most solid grounds. There 
are essentially three principles which underpin utilitarianism (Sen, 1987a). They are: 
welfarism, which implies that extra-utility information (such as individuals needs, 
capacity for mobility and so on) is either irrelevant or only indirectly relevant as a 
causal influence on utilities; sum-ranking, which asserts that the goodness of a collection 
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of utilities is simply their sum, thus eliminating the possibility of concern over 
inequalities in their distribution; and consequentialism, whereby all choice variables are 
judged simply in terms of the goodness of their respective consequences. In the health 
domain only the latter is defensible - in the sense that it excludes the acceptance of 
health care activities that do not promote the ultimate goal of good health. The other 
principles are simply too restrictive as basis for forming equity judgements. 
There are also various technical problems associated with utilitarianism, all 
inevitably linked to the impossibility of measurement and interpersonal comparisons of 
utility. Indeed, the identification of a just utilitarian distribution depends upon such a 
wealth of empirical facts which are so difficult to obtain that it seems unproductive to 
attempt to apply it to health and health care. Furthermore, these factors are not directly 
deducible from the principle itself, which further complicates the exercise. It seems, 
then, that an appropriate conceptualization of health-equity concerns must be sought 
elsewhere. 
3.3.5 Rawlsian maximin 
Another prominent philosophical discussion of social justice, which has attracted 
the attention of economists, is John Rawls' (197 1) theory of maximin. It makes justice 
an uncompromising aim in suggesting that social policy, rather than maximizing net 
benefit in society, should seek to maximize the position of the least well-off. Rawls 
considers a set of goods whose production and distribution, he suggests, should not be 
left to individuals themselves. These 'primary social goods' include basic liberties; 
freedom of movement and choice of occupations against a background of fair 
opportunities; powers and prerogatives of office; income and wealth; and the social 
bases of self-respect. Rawls then hypothesises an 'original position' where all 
individuals operate under a 'veil of ignorance. ' In such a context rational men would 
be risk averse and choose as a preferred arrangement a situation where the worse off 
have their position maximized. What drives them to such a choice is not a concern for 
the least advantaged but a fear that they themselves might turn out to be, once the veil 
of ignorance is uncovered, the worst-off citizens in society. 
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According to Le Grand (1987), the application of Rawlsian maximin to the health 
field requires that inequalities in either health or health care be justified only if they 
operate to the benefit of the least advantaged. He criticizes such a rule as a guide to 
health policy on two grounds. First, because it raises a number of theoretical and 
practical difficulties. For instance, are the least advantaged to be defined in terms of 
their overall consumption of primary goods or in terms of health or health care? 
Furthermore, is it realistic to suppose that we can readily distinguish those inequalities 
that benefit the least well-off from those that do not? One could add that the principle 
implicitly suggests that an equitable distribution would be that where all individuals 
have the health status of the sickest person. The second objection, has a libertarian 
strain. It is that maximin would lead to redistribution to those whose poorer health, 
inadequate consumption of health care or actual poverty were the result of their own 
decisions. Arguably, however, Le Grand's direct application of the Rawlsian principle 
to the health field is too ambitious, for neither health or health care were designated as 
primary social goods by Rawls himself. Indeed, including either health or health care 
would imply trade-offs with other primary social goods such as income and wealth and 
inevitably interpersonal comparisons of utility which Rawls is keen to avoid (Arrow, 
1974). 
Daniels (1981) has suggested that the most promising strategy for extending 
maximin theory to the health domain is to include health care services among the 
background institutions involved in providing for fair equality of opportunity. This is 
justified in the sense that health care is necessary for normal species functioning. 
However, such an approach merely has the effect of collapsing the definition of equity 
into one of equality of opportunity of access to health care for equal need. 4 Therefore, 
although this interpretation appears in tune with the concerns of Portuguese health policy 
it has the unfortunate effect of making the theoretical structure redundant. We are left 
with no more than a simple interpretation of equity, which is problematic in terms of 
specificity, and no idea as to how the concept may be applied in positive analysis. 
4 Daniels himself readily admits that his account "does not pressupose the acceptability of Rawls' 
theory" (Daniels, 1981). 
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3.3.5 Envy-free allocations 
The theoretical and practical problems associated with utilitarianism and maximin 
have led to a number of economic discussions which seek to provide a more rigorous 
grounding for equity concerns. The dominant approach concentrates on defining the 
essential characteristic of an equitable distribution. This is best described, it is 
suggested, by the criterion of non-envy: that is, where a person's relative advantage is 
judged by the standard of whether he or she would have preferred to have had the 
commodity bundle enjoyed by another person (Varian, 1974; Pazner and Schmeidler, 
1978; Baumol, 1986). To illustrate the concept, in the context of a simple exchange 
economy, consider any allocation xg (g--l to n; i=1 to m) of n goods to each of m 
individuals. Suppose these individuals have preferences represented by the ordinal 
utility function U, (x, ) (i=l to m) of each individual i's own consumption vector xi. 
Then individual i is said to envy j if U, (x) > U, (x, ). An equitable distribution is 
defined formally as that where U, (x, ) ý: U, (x) for all pairs of individuals i andj. 
Defenders of the approach have argued that it provides an easily comprehensible 
and specific formulation of equity; that it avoids the arbitrariness of external moral 
viewpoints by judging the desirability of a distribution exclusively in terms of the 
preferences of individuals affected by it; and that it lends itself well to the standard 
constructions of the economist (ie. indifference maps and utility theory). This much 
is true. The theory has indeed been used with considerable formal elegance to establish 
the conditions under which allocations are simultaneously equitable and Pareto-optimal 
(so-called "fair" allocations), and hence provides a theoretical insight into the trade-off 
between efficiency and equity. 
However, despite its attraction to economists it is doubtful whether the non-envy 
approach could be suitably applied as a guide to equitable health policy. On the one 
hand, it is well-established in the technical literature that the pursuit of non-envy can 
lead to some peculiar and unpalatable results (Feldman, 1987). When agents are more 
or less symmetrical the concept seems to work quite well; yet if one or more agents 
5 Baumol (1986) has more recently introduced the term "superfair" to describe simultaneously 
equitable and Pareto-optimal allocations. 
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happen to be, say chronically sick, there is no opportunity for exogenous compensation 
within the framework. Similarly, it could not account for a case where a kidney 
patient's demand for dialysis takes precedence, by general agreement, to a tennis 
player's demand for rackets; or less trivially, to an occasional headache sufferer's 
demand for analgesics. What is missing then is a view of what others might regard as 
equitable and not simply oneself. By concentrating exclusively on individual 
preferences the concept overlooks that generally, when making a judgement concerning 
the justice of a situation, one would wish to allow for differences in tastes, needs and 
so on. In this more common situation the appropriate comparison in determining what 
is inequitable becomes: whether Uj (xj) > Uj (xi); rather than, as the non-envy 
account suggests, if Uj (xj) > Uj (xj). 
Should one insist on overlooking these most obvious drawbacks and proceed to 
apply the concept to health policy it seems that only health care should be considered 
as a metric, given that health itself is indivisible. But even then the approach is 
uninformative since it fails to provide a more or less complete ranking of alternative 
states, which clearly appears necessary in the health field. It gives only an answer as 
to what constitutes a fair distribution; should no such feasible allocation be found (as 
seems to be the case in many situations in the technical literature, particularly when 
production is introduced) one is left with no suggestions as to how decisions should be 
taken. Finally, it is doubtful whether a formulation founded on the idea of "envy" could 
gather wide acceptance as a measure of equity in health care. This may seem a strange 
comment when much of economics is built around the deadly sin of "greed", but 
arguably, a concern for health-equity derives precisely from the desire not to allow self 
improvement to override community interests (Mooney, 1986). Certainly this is the 
picture which emerges from health policy statements in Portugal and other european 
countries and thus non-envy must also be rejected as a suitable normative framework for 
considering the attainment of health-equity objectives. 
3.4 Approaches from health economics 
Given the assessment criteria formerly laid out, each of the five traditional 
conceptualizations of equity discussed above have been found wanting in some respect. 
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Recently, alternative health-specific equity concepts have also appeared in the literature. 
I shall concentrate on the two approaches which have attracted the greater attention by 
researchers in the field: one, a formulation advanced by Julian Le Grand which is 
centred on the role of choice in determining inequalities, and another associated with the 
York school of health economists, which if adopted holds considerable implications for 
the way equity is interpreted and monitored (the health maximization account). 
3.4.1 Eauitv as choice 
Le Grand's guiding principle is stated as follows: "if an individual's ill health 
results from factors beyond his or her control then the situation is inequitable; if it 
results from factors within his or her control then it is equitable. " (Le Grand, 1987a). " 
Formally, the representative individual is said to be faced by a choice set which he seeks 
to maximize subject to constraints. These are defined as the factors beyond individual 
control and obviously limit the range of possibilities over which a person can make 
choices. In this context, an equitable situation is that which is the outcome of 
individuals choosing over equal choice sets. What matters here, then, is not the end 
result but the history of a specific situation. In this sense, equity as choice hearkens 
back to Nozick's (1974) entitlement formulation. 
Figure 3.1 (reproduced from Le Grand, 1987a) illustrates the general argument. 
An individual's health status (h) is plotted against the quantity of a health-harming 
activity (q), such as smoking, drinking, or working in a stressful environment. It is 
assumed that a trade-off is possible between h and q. Le Grand considers two 
individuals, A and B, whose choice sets between h and q are identical and portrayed by 
the frontier RT. Both derive utility from the health harming activity and from health 
itself, but individual A derives greater pleasure from q relative to h, when compared to 
individual B. These assumptions are incorporated in the position of the indifference 
curves U. and Ub. A's equilibrium point (determined where Ua is tangent to RT) implies 
a lower level of health (h,, ) than individual B's (hb). According to Le Grand's 
conception this situation is not inequitable since both A and B have made informed 
See also Le Grand (1984,1991a) for further discussion of the approach. 
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Figure 3.1: Le Grand's eguality of choice sets 
decisions, exercised over the same range of choices and based on their own particular 
preferences. 
A third individual, C, is now introduced into the analysis. His preference ordering 
is the same as B's, but given that he faces a different choice frontier (RX), his 
equilibrium health level turns out to be below B's at h,. The shape of RX, according 
to Le Grand, incorporates the assumption that individual C is poorer and less able to 
withstand the effects of the health-harming activity. The differences in health between 
B and C are not held to be equitable, since they arise from different feasible choice sets 
rather than from dissimilar preferences. Therefore, distributions are only equitable if 
they are the outcome of individuals making choices under equal constraints. 
Le Grand's notion of equity has obvious counterparts in the general economics 
literature, particularly conceptions which stress the importance of claims over 
commodity bundles and resources (eg. Archibald and Donaldson, 1979). The question 
here, however, is whether it is a suitabli formulation of equity concerns in the field of 
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health? It has some obvious advantages. On the one hand, by paying due respect to 
a distribution's history it serves as a useful reminder that information on end-states may 
not provide a sufficient basis for making equity judgements: it is equally as important 
to know how a particular distribution came about, whether it be health or health care. 
Equity as choice also reveals promise for application in positive analysis. In 
Grossman's (1972) model of the demand for health it has a ready made framework of 
individuals exercising choices regarding health investment and consumption decisions 
within constraints. Equity under that model could be interpreted as equalizing the 
present cost of health investment for all individuals. Intuitively such an approach 
appears remarkably similar to equalizing the constraints People face. Furthermore, 
though Le Grand does not directly point to it, there seems to be no reason why the 
concept should not be used to study inequality in health care rather than inequality in 
health. Once again our interest would seem to be better directed at the process of health 
care consumption (eg. time spent in a waiting-room, out-of-pocket payments, etc. ) 
rather than its output (eg. utilization rates or overall expenditures). If the former are 
differentially burdensome it can reasonably be argued that choices are not being 
exercised under equal constraints. Here too there are examples in the literature with 
regard to empirical analysis [eg. Sloan and Bentkover's (1979) equality in process 
variables approach]. 
Unfortunately, the equity as choice account is also open to a number of criticisms. 
It is far from clear, for example, that Le Grand has established, as he contends, a 
definition of equity which commands wide agreement in society. Some might argue that 
in the field of health, where uncertainty and consumer ignorance prevail, individuals are 
simply not in a position to make informed decisions. This problem is particularly acute 
in the case of medical care, while addiction to health-harming activities, as Le Grand 
accepts, poses related difficulties. In short, the assumptions of autonomous preferences, 
complete certainty and perfect information appear rather extreme in the health context. 
While on the one hand, this is not a crucial argument since relaxing the assumptions in 
positive analysis could make the account more relevane, inevitable problems remain 
' ne introduction of uncertainty into the Grossman model as in Dardanoni and Wagstaff (1987) 
is a case in point. 
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in deciding what precisely is to be ascribed to choice and what is not. So far the 
arguments put forward have done little to dispel the fear that such a task is likely to be 
accomplished in a less than rigorous manner. 
Consider, for example, Le Grand's (1987a) discussion of policy implications. One 
cannot help but be surprised how from an individualist framework arise fairly 
conventional egalitarian arguments. Although this is, of course, not inherently 
impossible there is a problem in so far as the latter are not intuitively derivable from the 
theoretical construct but depend at various stages on the introduction of further value 
judgements. It begins with the ruling out of equity as choice as a guide to allocation 
of treatment, because health professionals are judged not to be able to undertake such 
decisions. Rather, it is suggested that the criterion should only be applied to decisions 
on individual or community financing of treatment. It is shown that in this case 
applying equity as choice would yield the development of a perfectly competitive 
insurance market as the optimal policy. Confronted by the extremeness of this 
implication, which would leave the poor and the risk-averse uninsured, Le Grand 
suggests a role for exogenous compensation and opts for a pragmatic solution where a 
government agency levies a uniform charge on all individuals. None of these steps are 
logically derivable from the account. They are simply the result of further value 
judgements being introduced, because the probable outcomes are viewed as inequitable! 
This problem arises, of course, because the concepts of choice and constraints have been 
vaguely defined. Thus it is possible to transform what is apparently a precise 
conception into one where at every stage new value judgements are introduced if 
outcomes appear unfair. The dividing line between variables over which individuals can 
exercise choice and those which constitute constraints must, therefore, be the subject of 
careful definition in future. 
Another problem with the approach is brought out in the diagrammatic exposition. 
A rigorous application of the concept would seem to point to choices being exercised 
simply over commodity bundles or resources (Archibald and Donaldson, 1979). Le 
Grand, however implies a trade-off between an activity (which in the example is no 
more than consumption of the good tobacco) and an individual's health status. 
Supposedly this is justified in so far as 'smoking' and 'health' are fundamental 
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commodities in the household production theory sense (Becker, 1965; Lancaster, 1966). 
But this may be a slightly over-ambitious interpretation with confusing policy 
implications. In health production individuals do not directly trade-off health-harming 
or health-producing activities with health itself. They 'choose' their health levels by 
trading-off the activities against each other: either investing or disinvesting in their 
health stock; in the former case through consumption of health care or education, in the 
latter through consumption of insalubrious lifestyle or nutrition commodities. The final 
product - healthy days - is the result of trade-offs between these commodities. 
Therefore, although it is undoubtedly an advance on traditional formulations when 
applied to the field of health, some groundwork would appear necessary if Le Grand's 
concept is to serve as an appropriate guide to positive analysis. 
3.4.2 Maximization of health 
The other important principle to have emerged in the health economics literature 
is conveniently summarized by the phrase that a distribution is equitable if and only if 
it serves to maximize the health of the community. From a somewhat circumspect 
beginning the criterion has arguably become the principal focus of debate on the 
normative aspects of equitable health policy in the UK. 8 It is fair to say that, relative 
to other specifications, its principal distinguishing feature is that it affords primacy to 
efficiency; distributional questions are only important when judged in terms of their 
contribution to that goal. ' This has exposed the maximization thesis to the obvious 
criticism that its proper domain is the assessment of total good rather than thefairness 
of a situation (Broome, 1988). Dismissing the account on these grounds seems, 
however, altogether premature since a case can be made for interpreting health 
maximization as the logical corollary of a particular type of distributional concern. 
Rather than appealing directly to a general principle of justice or defining what 
8 Indeed, a recently published volume (Bell and Mendus, 1988) is almost entirely dedicated to the 
question of whether health maximization is a suitable equity rule. 
9 Culyer (1988) asserts categorically that "equality matters ... only when it serves the cause of 
efficiency. " 
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constitutes an equitable distribution, health economists have traditionally looked at what 
motivates individual concerns for fairness in health. One group of writers have 
formalized such an approach through what is commonly termed the 'caring externality' 
[Lindsay (1969); Culyer (1971,1980)]. Individuals are held to be concerned not only 
with the bundle of goods and services they are to receive but also with that to be had 
by others. In this sense, generosity, sympathy or caring are explicitly incorporated into 
the analysis through the mechanism of specifically interdependent utility functions 
developed by Hochman and Rogers (1969). This is in stark contrast to the non-envy 
approach which has dominated economic discussions of equity. There, individuals 
consider the consumption bundles of others merely for the effects of comparison. 
Culyer (1971) postulates that it is the quantity of suffering rather than its distribution 
which forms the basis of the externality relation. This suggests that a preference for 
increased consumption of health care should be an argument in the utility functions of 
the well-off, rather than equality of health care consumption as in Lindsay (1969), for 
it is actual under-consumption by the needy (implicitly associated with greater suffering) 
which imposes an external disutility on others. 
Although this research was originally conceived as an explanation of widespread 
support for public financing of health care, indirectly, it holds important implications for 
the type of equity which should guide health policy. In particular, there are three key 
insights suggested by the approach: health status as the focus of concern; an absolute 
rather than relational objective; and a role for exogenous compensation. Strangely few 
writers have picked up on the implications of these aspects for equitable health policy. 
One reason why this might be so is that the account belongs to a completely separate 
literature. Equity is about fairness or justice, it refers to what people are due as of right; 
compassion refers to a desire to provide help to others regardless of their 'due'. This 
argument, however, misses the point that the two are simply alternative forms of 
justifying redistribution. One may wish to appeal to a general principle (as in the 
approaches discussed beforehand) or rely on the exercise of charitable compassion as 
foundation. The crucial point is that the compassion/caring approach itself suggests 
criteria for redistribution. 
Some confusion appears to have developed in the literature regarding the actual 
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definition of equity which derives from the caring externality approach. Mooney (1987) 
suggests that it is 'equality of utilization for equal need. ' Culyer (1976) himself, argued 
that it "leans towards an egalitarian notion of 'equally available care for equally sick' 
or 'communism in health'. " None of these conceptions accomodates adequately what 
is perhaps the most important insight of Culyer's (1971) analysis: the health status of 
the 'needy' as the source of concern. Individuals care for others not because they are 
poor or materially deprived but because they are sick. Although in practice it may well 
be the rich who feel compassionate towards the poor there is no intrinsic reason why 
compassion and hence generosity should not be addressed to the rich sick person. This 
urges that health status be made the focus of distribution rather than income, welfare, 
commodities or primary social goods. Yet health is not a tradeable commodity, so how 
is one to develop a consistent definition of equity? It seems that only two routes are 
logically sustainable. On the one hand, considering a distribution as equitable if 
consumption of commodities which affect health is optimized and on the other, viewing 
any arrangement which maximizes health in the community as inherently equitable. In 
both cases the emphasis is on maximization/optimization rather than distribution; on 
absoluteness rather than relativity. 
The second approach has been taken up by economists at York University. 
Drawing on the development of the Quality-Adjusted-Life-Year (QALY) measure of 
health, it has been suggested that general maximization of that metric is the most 
suitable means for achieving distributional goals. Hence, health maximization is treated 
implicitly as an equity principle in itself (Williams, 1988; Culyer, 1988,1989,1990). 
It should be noted that these authors have not sought support for the rule in the caring 
externality framework, even though it appears to provide a case for pursuing community 
health maximization. Instead, justification has been offered on essentially 
instrumentalist grounds: namely, that health services exist to promote health and hence, 
given scarcity of resources, one should strive to maximize the benefits accruing to the 
community (ie. health itself). The incorporation of specifically distributional concerns 
is then achieved by attaching weights to outcome data. It seems, therefore, that an 
appraisal of the account in terms of its suitability for informing the health inequality 
debate rests on the appropriateness of three related ideas: the QALY metric itself, 
which is the preferred outcome measure, the belief in health maximization as an 
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embodiment of equity concerns and the notion of attaching distributional weights to 
outcome measures. 
QALY maximization remains a controversial topic among health professionals 
(Smith, 1987), social scientists (Harris, 1987; Caff-Hill, 1988) and even among 
economists (West, 1986; Broome, 1988; Loomes, 1988). Besides furnishing the 
literature with a seemingly endless string of titles which are puns on the term "QALY", 
these works have raised some apposite objections to the measure, particularly those that 
base their critiques on the importance of risk and uncertainty or the unrepresentativeness 
of existing QALY valuations. This is not the place, however, in which to detail these 
criticisms; merely to highlight that, were the health maximization view of equity (in its 
present form) to be adopted, considerable effort would have to be expended in making 
the QALY metric more sensitive and robust as a measure of health status. In any case 
the equity account does not pressupose acceptance of QALY's as a measure of health 
outcome. That its proponents have pointed to the measure as a suitable way forward 
is purely coincidental; what is really at stake is the idea of health maximization as an 
embodiment of equity concerns. 
Opponents of the maximization view have consistently argued that it ignores the 
distributional concerns of public health care systems such as the NHS. Maximizing the 
sum of individual health states, after all, tells us nothing about the interpersonal 
distribution of that surn. ' Culyer (1990) has faced up to this criticism with a largely 
consequentialist rationalization. He urges the reader to: 
"... allow that the sickest in society are by and large those for whom the marginal 
product of health care in terms of QALY's is highest, that these are also the 
poorest, and that when (ceteris paribus) health service per capita rises, the 
marginal product in terms of health falls... [Then]... it evidently follows that 
efforts to equalize the geographical distribution of resources, to channel more of 
them to the sick and more of them to the poor, might be seen not as distributional 
policies to be justified by equity arguments but efficient policies justified by 
10 The philosophical objection to this sum-ranking approach inherent in QALY maximization has 
been made most forcibly by Broome (1988), Lockwood (1988) and Harris (1988), in the Bell and 
Mendus (1988) volume. 
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health maximization. " (p. 55) 
This counter-argument is intellectually appealing, not least for the fact that it points to 
an avenue for incorporating equity and efficiency objectives within a single policy 
procedure. It depends, however, on essentially empirical judgements which if proved 
wrong undermine the whole case. In particular there is not much evidence available that 
shows the marginal product of health care in terms of QALY's to be greater for the 
poor. Intuitively it may be quite the opposite. Consider the not implausible case of 
Anthony (who is relatively rich, well educated and well nourished) and Brenda (poor 
and relatively ignorant of efficient health production methods). Both suffer from the 
same ailment and both undergo the same treatment. Yet because of his personal and 
environmental characteristics Anthony is able to better respond to treatment and thus 
gains a greater number of QALY's. Should health policy then redistribute resources to 
individuals like him? Clearly few would agree with such a principle, since it implies 
that Anthony somehow merits the better health improvement because of his socio- 
economic position. At the most basic level, therefore, health maximization does not 
seem to embody the equity concerns inherent in the portuguese or most other health 
care systems. 
The reason for unpalatable results arising when simple health maximization is 
followed is that a unit of 'health' is treated as being of equal value no matter who gets 
it. Proponents have generally accepted this fact and now suggest that distributive 
weights are built into outcome measures. If these are correctly applied, in the sense that 
all the accepted features of distributional equity are incorporated, then there is no 
technical reason for treating equity independently of efficiency in research or policy 
formulation. Williams (1988a) has begun to tackle this question by finding out what 
distributional views are actually held by surveyed individuals. This is a promising line 
of research, but it is worrying that the utilized survey actively encourages respondents 
to opt for some type of discrimination as to which groups of people should receive 
treatment (eg. the young, the old, those who have been careful with their health, the 
deprived, etc. ). The justification offered is that scarcity of resources means that 
discrimination will effectively operate. Despite this, as many as forty per cent of 
individuals in the pilot-survey opted for none of the discriminations presented -a 
number far greater than for any one particular type. Such neutrality might well have 
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been greater had the interviewees been invited to present their own distribution rule. 
One suspects that these people actually do have some type of rule in mind - for 
example, that everyone should have the opportunity to be able to benefit from health 
care if it will do them some good. Curiously, Williams' analysis is rather dismissive 
of the non-discrimination argument, opting to ignore the reasons why such a view is 
adopted by such a large proportion of his sample. This is unfortunate for if the view 
were widely held the maximizing approach would seem to be on shaky ground, since 
a great many people are apparently willing to forego efficiency gains in order to assure 
that individual claims are equally or proportionately satisfied. 
This brings us back to criticism of the very idea of health maximization as the 
prime objective of health systems. Of course, it would take a courageous stretch of the 
imagination to believe that it should not be an aim or indeed that technically, it is not 
the best way to proceed. Yet health systems consistently reveal other aims as 
paramount: the demonstration of caring or the non-exclusion of patient groups, for 
example. Non-discrimination is certainly an important feature of Portuguese health 
policy objectives. It may be that the overall aim of medical care is indeed health 
maximization but that specific provision arrangements (such as an NHS) have adjacent 
objectives (such as guaranteeing equal access) which take precedence in any eventual 
trade-off. For the maximizing view to be accepted it must be shown that, generally, 
suitably weighted QALY maximization will yield results which are harmonious with 
equity concerns and that unpalatable outcomes are not a significant feature; and 
ultimately, it must prove its ability to incorporate what are effectively perceived as rights 
within the outcome measure. 
Wagstaff (1991) has argued that equity considerations might be incorporated into 
the health maximization approach by means of an appropriately specified Social Welfare 
Function (SWF). Essentially, it is proposed that resource allocation decisions be based 
on maximizing community health weighted by a parameter describing society's aversion 
to health inequality. This is a promising area for future research. However, Wagstaff's 
approach is not free of drawbacks. For example, it assumes that society preoccupies 
itself with differences in health status per se, whereas what generally motivates concern 
is the fact that such inequalities are systematically related to socio-economic status. 
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Furthermore, the concern for inequality in Wagstaff's SWF derives from the process of 
aggregating health levels, whereas most modem societies reveal an explicit and 
autonomous concern for distribution. Indeed, a key feature of Wagstaff's argument in 
the same paper is that health maximization and equity are distinct objectives. There is 
no doubt, however, that Wagstaff's contribution is an important one since it shows a 
way of integrating equity and efficiency measurement. Therefore, I return to it in 
Chapter 8, as a point of departure for rationalizing a family of 'health social welfare' 
indices that embody autonomous aggregative and distributional goals. 
More recent work by Culyer (eg. Culyer and Wagstaff, 1993; Culyer et al, 1992) 
implicitly acknowledges that health maximization is not in fact an equity criterion and 
that its proper domain is in the analysis of aggregative (as opposed to distributional) 
goals. In this work, the ultimate focal variable of equity concern continues to be health, 
with equality in that attribute being defended as the most appropriate criterion. The 
authors do not dismiss equity objectives in the space of health care, but argue that they 
must be seen as derived from the more ultimate concern. As will be seen, the approach 
presented in the following section has some similarities with this view, and in terms of 
manageable empirical analysis has more or less the same implications. 
3.5 Capabilities and equity in health 
This section argues that, relative to the work reviewed previously, a more 
promising formulation of equity concerns in the field of health is to be found in Sen's 
concept of equality of capabilities [Sen (1980,1985,1992)]. It provides a clarification 
of the debate on whether resources or welfare should be the object of equitable policy 
by examining thoughtfully the transmission process from commodities (resources) to 
final outcomes (welfare) and arguing that it is the capability people have to carry out 
human functionings (such as being able to work or to enjoy good health) which matters. 
The approach has been shown to be useful for the study of poverty issues (Sen, 1983) 
and more generally for the definition and measurement of the standard of living (Sen, 
1987a). Here it is suggested that 'capabilities' is a novel way of understanding health 
equity objectives, how we should go about attaining them and how progress should be 
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monitored, while at the same time sharing some common themes with mainstream health 
economics. It thus warrants much closer attention by economists with an interest in the 
health inequality debate than has hitherto been the case. Furthermore, the approach may 
be seen to be a faithful reflection of the equity concern inscribed in Portugal's 
Constitution, which implies that individuals should have equal opportunity to maximize 
health potential. 
It should be noted that the Sen approach is not a necessary condition for the 
measurement methodologies adopted later in the thesis. Each of the empirical analyses 
could quite reasonably be derived from other normative foundations, including the 
statements inscribed in portuguese legislative and policy statements. However, I hope 
to show that the capabilities approach does provide a coherent intellectual framework 
for interpreting the health-equity issue and for identifying the entities of ethical interest. 
Though other normative bases may point in similar directions, particularly when 
confronted with deficiencies in available data, the Sen framework is a plausible rationale 
for the empirical analyses reported further on. 
3.5.1 The capabilities approach 
Sen's rationalization for focusing equity analysis on capabilities actually derives 
from weaknesses inherent in the Rawlsian and Utilitarian approaches. The first is said 
to suffer from goods fetishism: a focus on the goods rather than what they can do for 
people. To take the example of health care, it is generally acknowledged that people 
do not demand the good in itself, but rather for what it may contribute to health. It is 
the opportunities it provides for pursuing a healthy life that matters. Utilitarianism is, 
of course, concerned with what goods do to people but it uses a measure which overly 
focuses on mental and emotional reactions to those goods. Arguably, non-utility 
information is equally as important and this requires that the central focus of analysis 
be on a much wider range of variables which explain what commodities do for people 
and how people use them to produce human activities. 
The argument can be exemplified through Figure 3.2 which shows the chain from 
goods to utility. On the left hand side is the world of commodities which has been the 
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COMMODITIES PEOPLE 
Goods --- Characteristics --->--- Functionings -->--- Utility 
Figure 3.2: The chain from goods to utility 
[Source: Sen (1982, p. 30)] 
traditional focus of economics when discussing questions of distribution (eg. the 
non-envy approach). These commodities are transformed into more fundamental 
intermediate products, which Sen in common with Lancaster's (1966) pioneering 
approach calls characteristics. A focus on characteristics would lead one to interpret the 
demand for health care as a demand for factors such as clinical efficacy, caring by the 
GP and so on. Moving to the world of people, how individuals use characteristics of 
goods to produce human activities is described by Sen as functionings (eg. earning 
one's living, following leisure pursuits, being in good health, etc. ). " 
Most economists would typically regard the link from functionings to utility as 
unproblematic. Sen disagrees, arguing that although higher levels of utility are 
associated with better functionings the connection is by no means straightforward. For 
instance, suppose we were faced with the problem of distributing resources between Ann 
who despite being physically disabled has an invariably optimistic disposition and Bob, 
who suffers from no particular ailment, has a high marginal utility of income, but is 
essentially pessimistic at heart so that in terms of total utility he is actually worse off 
than Ann. Focusing on utility would lead to a preferential allocation to Bob which does 
not seem very fair. The reason is, of course, that what most would acknowledge to be 
Ann's greater needs no-where figure in the analysis. Concentrating on functionings, on 
the other hand, makes the interpretation of need paramount and allows it to be 
11 Culyer (1990) has also defended the reasoning of Sen's approach. He argues that a more useful 
terminology is to express functionings as being the 'characteristics of people'. 
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incorporated as non-utility information. There are echoes here of the long standing call 
by health economists that needs must be seen as instrumental to the accomplishment of 
a desired end-state (in the example above, being able to move from one place to 
another) and that the success of health policy should be measured "in terms of changes 
in individual attributes" (Culyer, 1980). Indeed, Sen's approach may be seen as 
providing a rationalization for a good deal of work in the health-economics discipline 
that adopts the so-called "extra-welfare" perspective (Culyer, 1989). 
Sen further argues that in terms of equity our interest is less in whether a person 
is functioning in a certain way and more on whether that individual has the capability 
to do so. Hence the guiding equity principle being 'equality of capabilities'. A focus 
on functionings could imply that a person should be continuously using medical 
services, whereas the crucial idea is that they should be able to, when they choose so 
to do. This choice element is held to be generally important, although far less so in the 
universe of basic capabilities in which Sen includes such things as abilities to meet 
one's nutritional requirements, to be clothed and sheltered and, significantly for our 
purposes, to enjoy good health. In economic terms this suggests that it is the extent of 
people's opportunity set rather than simply the point in it that happens to be chosen 
which is important. Thus, there are similarities with Le Grand's equity account, the 
significant distinction being that whereas Le Grand defines choices over goods, the 
present approach emphasises what the goods can do for people and what people are able 
to do with them. " 
Sen's formulation also has much in common with models of household production 
which derive from Becker (1965). This work has considered the importance of inputs 
such as time and environmental constraints in the production of fundamental 
utility-yielding commodities. In Grossman's (1972) model of the demand for health 
individuals produce durable health capital which may be accumulated and at the same 
time may require maintenance through investment in non-genetic human characteristics 
and the characteristics of goods. The fundamental commodities produced by households 
" It may be noted that Sen's framework clarifies the weakness highlighted in Le Grand's 
diagrammatic exposition. Since health is best seen as a functioning, commodities or their characteristics 
are what are required to alter that functioning should its distribution be judged inequitable. 
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- being able to work, to enjoy life, etc. - coincide for all intents and purposes with Sen's 
functionings. In household production models fundamental commodities are produced 
from market goods, environmental inputs and personal characteristics, which are 
effectively the source of the capability set. What distinguishes the two approaches is 
that writers in the human capital tradition would not normally consider the link from 
functionings to utility as problematic. Sen on the other hand, emphasises that any two 
individuals, or the same individual at different times, may make identical choices when 
faced with the same capability set and yet may experience quite different utility levels. 
Therefore our focus should be on the capability set. Muellbauer (1987, p. 47) argues 
that in empirical analysis this problem is not unsurmountable : "What is important is 
that the relationships determining the capability set are relatively universal and that the 
determining variables and the chosen functionings are relatively observable". 
3.5.2 Equality of health capability 
A clearer impression of what the capabilities framework implies for equity in 
health can be gathered with the help of some notation and specification. Assume the 
partial equilibrium space of the particular functioning "good health" and consider 
Xi = the vector of health-related commodities possessed by the representative 
individual i, 
CM =a function converting a commodity vector into a vector of characteristics of 
those commodities, 
fj (*) =a production possibility function transforming characteristics into health 
functioning, 
Fi the set of production functions fi, any one of which may be chosen by 
person i. 
If i chooses fj (*), then given x, the achieved health state is given by hi, 
hi = fi [c(xi)]. (3.1) 
Equation (3.1) provides an indication of the individuals health status. Similarly, a 
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summation of all h, 's would provide the community health index. I assume 
for 
simplicity that all dimensions of health status can be conveniently valued through a 
scalar measure. 
For a given commodity vector xj, feasible functionings are defined by the set Pi (xi), 
hi I hi =f lc(xdl, for some fi (*) c= Fi ) (3.2) 
If the person's choice of commodity vectors is restricted to the set Xj, then his/her 
functionings are given by the set Qj (Xi), 
Qj (Xi) =I hi I hi = fi lc(x, )], for some fj (*) e F, and for some xi r= X, ) (3.3) 
Equation (3.3) represents the freedom or opportunity that a person has in choosing the 
functioning 'good health', given his/her personal features, F, , and command over 
commodities, X,. Therefore, Qj may be interpreted as the capability of person i to 
generate the desired function. If one is interested in the equity of a particular 
distribution the task for positive analysis becomes the identification of set Q, compared 
with Qj, the capability set of person j. If Qj = Qj then a situation is considered 
equitable. 
Figure 3.3 presents a simplified diagrammatic framework of the arguments above 
which provides further insight into the question of equity in the domain of health. " 
In quadrant I, h and g are, respectively, the levels of health functioning and of another 
functioning. 14 The frontier OAA portrays the capability set, which shows the various 
levels of feasible functioning available to the individual. Assuming that he does the 
best that he can for himself, and given own preferences depicted by the functioning 
indifference curve (IC), point h* will be chosen as the equilibrium level of health. This 
13 The framework has obvious similarities with Wagstaff s (1986a) exposition of the Grossman 
model. As noted above, Sen's approach is not unlike that of household production models. 
"' The functioning measured by g may be viewed as a composite of all valued beings and doings 
other than health (eg. being well nourished, being well educated, etc. ). 
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Figure 3.3: A simple diagrammatic framework of the capabilities approach 
IV 
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particular value, and indeed all feasible levels of health status, are however, dependent 
on the constraints shown in quadrants H to IV. Quadrant 11 depicts a production 
relationship between health investment goods (i), such as medical care, food, heating 
or education and the level of health functioning (h). The curve fj (j, is the 
transformation function described above (avoiding for simplicity the intermediate 
category of characteristics of goods). It shows how much health can be obtained from 
a given quantity of health related goods inputs for a given set of personal characteristics 
(eg. age, sex, family size, etc. ). The range of points along thef (. ) function that can be 
chosen will depend on the budget constraint (1ý depicted in quadrant III. This shows 
the various attainable combinations of health related goods (x) and other goods (z) input 
to the production of the composite functioning (g); and may be viewed as representing 
the extent of choice over commodity bundles that is available to the individual. Finally, 
quadrant IV shows the production relationship for the composite functioning, drawn to 
reflect decreasing marginal returns of goods input, as in the case of fi (J. 
This diagrammatic framework permits the establishment of ceteris paribus 
predictions with regard to equity in the domain of health. In Figure 3.4 a further 
individual, B, is now introduced. She is identical in every respect to the one 
considered previously, except for the fact of being older. It is conjectured that this 
makes her less efficient in producing health functioning from a given level of 
commodity ownership. The health functioning production function is now given by 
fj 6), which will mean that the capability set is restricted to OBA. Therefore, B's 
opportunity for achieving a desired level of health is necessarily reduced when compared 
to that of the first individual. Given identical indifference maps, the best that she can 
do for herself is an equilibrium level of health status below h*. 
Consider next the case of a third individual, C, whose only difference in relation 
to A is that his income is lower. The possible combinations of x and z commodities that 
he can attain are given by the constraint Y. Given the fj (. ) function, the range of 
feasible functionings is reduced to the set OCC. Naturally, identical indifference maps 
will once again imply an equilibrium level of health status below h*. Thus, the extent 
of health capability (and the actual level of functioning) is reduced by virtue of 
differences in commodity ownership. 
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III 
Figure 3A: The effect of changes in determining variables 
on the extent of health capability and level of health functionillg 
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There are two points worth noting about this analysis with implications for what 
is to follow. First, capability is defined in terms of the same focal variables as 
functionings. This means that measurement of health capability might, as a second-best 
solution, concentrate on chosen or observed functionings. There is some information 
loss but the evaluative space is the same. Moreover, if freedom (or opportunity) in the 
domain of health is judged as having only instrumental importance for a person's well- 
being and no intrinsic relevance (as seems reasonable), then the value of the chosen 
functioning provides a suitable basis for examining inequality in health capability. 
The second point is that differences in health capability stem from a variety of 
sources, some of which may be of more ethical interest than others. For instance, the 
contraction in health capability brought about by person B's age may not be viewed as 
important as C's reduced opportunity to acquire the means for promoting health 
functioning. Therefore, judgements on the capability enjoyed by different persons need 
to be complemented with empirical information from evaluative spaces other than that 
of functionings. One needs information, for example, on the extent of choice in the 
space of commodities, on the disposition of health related goods and on the elements 
that determine the production functions. 
3.6 Measurement implications of the capabilities approach 
Although the capabilities approach has attracted a good deal of discussion 
concerning its underlying ethical structure", the implications it holds for measurement 
have so far remained largely untapped. In particular, there have been no studies that 
concentrate specifically on the capability for healthy living nor any attempts to 
operationalize the distinctive equity arguments which the approach entailS. 16 Ideally, 
15 See, for example, Basu (1987), Williams (1987), Arneson (1989), Cohen (1990), Daniels 
(1990) and Sugden (1993). 
16 Researchers have instead confined application to measurement of the overall living standard. 
This has been viewed as strictly comprising direct evaluation of the capability set by means of the 
value of functioning vectors (what Sen calls "elementary evaluation"). For examples see Slottje (1991), 
Schokkaert and Van Ootegen (1990) and Kakwani (1993). The capabilities approach also seems to 
be the guiding theoretical structure behind the UN's attempts to measure 'human development' as a 
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assessment of equality in health capability should be carried out through a measure that 
describes both the value of the chosen element in a given set and thefreedom of choice 
which the set allows. I believe that in empirical analysis this task may prove overly 
ambitious given the lack of suitable information for all variables in the sets F,, Fj, Xj, 
X,, identified in equation (3.3). However, one may reasonably opt for a partial analysis 
that concentrates on identifying particular aspects of the capability set. For the valuation 
to have content it need not necessarily be complete. It would make a great deal more 
sense to accept a partial analysis than to insist on logical completeness and be left with 
complete lack of information. As Sen (1992) argues the important point is "to keep the 
underlying motivations clearly in view and to see practical compromises as the best we 
can do under the circumstances [of data limitations]" (p. 135, emphasis added). 
One potentially useful strategy that may provide considerable insights into 
inequality in the capability for healthy living is to separate actual functioning levels 
from the disposition of health related goods that permit their attainment, and to relate 
the relevant variables to key factors determining opportunity in health functioning space. 
This approach, to be followed in the thesis, is not in fact dissimilar to previous work 
that sets out to measure socio-econon-tic inequalities in health and health care. The 
difference is that here it is derived from a global ethical theory rather than being guided 
by a variety of seemingly unrelated egalitarian objectives. As will become clear, some 
important matters are left unresolved but the approach has the advantage of requiring 
only commonly available data. One essentially needs access to empirical elements on 
health status (h), use of health related goods (x), command over resources (1), and the 
factors that determine the production function fi (. ), all of which are relatively 
observable. 
A possible objection to this approach is that empirical application is based on 
point comparisons of realized functionings, rather than comparisons of capability sets. 
The traditional view in economics is that set evaluation requires measurement of 
opportunities; whereas point estimates will reflect the interaction of opportunities and 
preferences. By implication, the case for Sen's approach as an ethical rationale for 
multi-dimensional entity comprising longevity, knowledge and decent living standards [Griffin and 
Knight (1989); UNDP (1990); Desai (1991)]. 
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health-equity empirical analysis would appear weakened. However, the habitual 
contrasting of opportunity and preference can often be deceptive (see Sen, 1991). In 
general, it is hard to see how set comparisons can be independent of the preference 
ordering over the elements of the respective sets. Information on individual preferences 
must also be taken into account when evaluating the freedom to choose, the principal 
reason being that simple measurement of the extent of choice says nothing of the value 
individuals attach to the elements included in the set. From this perspective, 
concentrating on realized functionings would appear to provide useful information to the 
underlying objective of health capability comparisons. This does not mean that there 
is no information loss. Measuring the extent of choice in an adequate manner is 
obviously a key question for health-equity research. However, a partial indicative 
answer is provided in the thesis (based on readily available data), by virtue of the 
proposed two-step approach to measurement. 
The two tasks suggested for empirical analysis will be referred to as evaluating 
achievement and advantage. The measurement of achievement concerns the actual level 
of the functioning 'good health' that a particular person obtains. Measuring advantage, 
on the other hand, involves examining the experience of individuals in the space of 
commodities that are instrumental to the attainment of the desired functioning. Though 
the former is clearly the more important attribute from the point of view of Sen's 
approach, measurement of advantage cannot be overlooked. Commodities are what is 
required to enable people to achieve their health potential. If health care is considered 
important in this respect, then it is natural - and indeed necessary - to enquire about 
its distribution. " 
The analysis will concentrate on inequality related to the extent of choice over 
commodity bundles. As the diagrammatic framework of 3.5.2 suggests, this is a crucial 
contributory factor to opportunity in health functioning space. Obviously, choice over 
commodities is not the only factor affecting the capability set; production possibilities 
also constrain individual freedom to achieve desired levels of health functioning. 
17 Culyer, van Doorslaer and Wagstaff (1992) make basically the same point when they write: 
it is the distribution of health which is ultimately of interest. But the means by which the desired 
distribution of health is to be achieved is health care. Ibus one can talk about an equitable 
distribution of health care: it is one that gives rise to an equitable distribution of health" (p. 209). 
69 
However, it is also the case that personal characteristics affecting production functions 
tend to be less amenable to policy intervention. Moreover, as shown in Chapter 2, the 
notion that health and health care distribution should not depend on command over 
resources underlines equity concerns in portuguese policy statements. Therefore, it 
seems useful to measure the degree to which relevant health domain variables are related 
to economic position. Obviously, one needs to control at the same time for factors that 
determine the configuration of health production function (eg. age and sex). If this is 
done, a partial, but significant, view of inequality in health capability becomes 
available. " 
The primary empirical task in evaluating achievement will be to measure the 
distribution of health in relation to potential command over resources. Further 
conceptual analysis relative to this issue is carried out in Chapter 5 with actual empirical 
application being addressed in Chapters 6 and 7. Some empirical innovations are 
introduced such as the explicit incorporation of varying social judgements concerning 
the degree of equality preference. However, the overall procedure is the same as that 
adopted by many studies that measure socio-economic inequalities in health. This 
means that the results may easily be compared. It is important to note, however, that 
previous efforts rarely provide an ethical rationale for measuring inequality in the space 
of health, leaving them open to criticism that equality of health outcomes is not an 
objective of health systems (eg. Mooney et al, 1991). The capabilities framework 
provides this foundation, suggesting that measurement of health inequality associated 
with command over resources is a partial (but nevertheless important) evaluation of 
people's opportunity to realize health potential. 
The above task does, however, place total emphasis on the question of distribution, 
disregarding aggregative objectives (eg. maximizing the community's health). It is 
difficult to see how a satisfactory evaluation of achievement can be made without 
contemplating its actual size. Consider, for example, communities A and B, each made 
18 One important element in which the analysis is partial is that a somewhat restrictive view is 
taken of the "health production function". I shall control only for demographic factors ignoring, for 
example, the role of education in enhancing production possibilities. This limitation is acknowledged 
in the work reported in Appendix I where a comprehensive model of health related behaviour is 
developed. 
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up of two persons. Admit also that health states are cardinally measurable and that they 
are distributed in the following manner: A= (4,6), B= (7,15). Community B 
reveals the greater inequality and yet both its citizens are in better health than those in 
community A. What this example shows is, of course, that even if our overriding 
concern is equity-motivated, evaluation of achievement based solely on distributional 
assessments is likely to be incomplete. What is needed is a measure that balances 
aggregative goals with distributional considerations. An attempt at designing such a 
measure is reported in Chapter 8. The approach is described as evaluating the social 
welfare associated with health, and unsurprisingly, is similar to the economic concept 
of social welfare. Just as social welfare is a representation of the 'goodness' of the 
social-state, so health social welfare embodies the 'goodness' of a community's health 
state, defined over the two major aims of policy, equity and efficiency. The Chapter is 
primarily aimed at laying the foundations of future research, but empirical illustrations 
drawing on portuguese data are also presented. 
Logically, measurement of advantage should consider all goods that are 
instrumental in realizing health potential (eg. housing, nutrition, social services, etc. ). 
The focus of the thesis is, however, on one element - health care. The obvious 
objection is that other goods in the x-commodity vector might have a relatively higher 
marginal impact on health achievement. But in public policy, there is no doubt that 
health care is generally seen as the single-most important instrumental variable affecting 
health. Thus, policy objectives invariably relate simply to the distribution of health care 
(recall once again Chapter 2). In this context, it seems appropriate to pay particular 
attention to this one commodity. 
As with achievement, evaluation of advantage can also be viewed in an absolute 
or relative sense, but only the latter need concern us here. The one aspect in which the 
absolute level could be important is if we were to concentrate on the size of commodity 
bundles required to attain a given level of functioning. Clearly, even then some element 
of distributional analysis would be required as opposed to mere evaluation of the overall 
size. Such an approach does, however, imply the specification of a 'basic minimum' 
of commodity provision, which, as we have seen, is a highly problematic time and 
culture contingent concept. It may be that for some health producing commodities, such 
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as housing, a basic standards approach is appropriate, but for others, such as health care, 
clearly not. It is fair to expect that people should have as much health care as will do 
them some good (Culyer, 1991). The implication, in terms of evaluating advantage, is 
that emphasis should be wholly on distributional issues and furthermore, that the entire 
range of the distribution should be examined. Consequently our interest will be directed 
at the differences that are observed between people with unequal command over 
resources as regards their experience of health care goods. 
There are two related aspects of interest in evaluating advantage in health care 
commodity space: the use people make of such care and the payments that go to 
finance it. Asymmetries in health care utilization are seen, under the Sen approach, as 
contributory factors to gaps in health capability. For any two given individuals 
presenting identical personal circumstances, the higher level of health care use by one 
is judged to confer upon him a wider opportunity for choosing a desired level of health 
functioning. This suggests that comparisons between persons with different income 
constraints must be calibrated by relevant information on personal characteristics, such 
as age, sex and initial health status. I shall not be addressing the question of unequal 
utilization in empirical analysis, but will instead concentrate on conceptual issues related 
to measurement indices (Chapter 9). " The discussion is relevant to previous research 
which focuses on the problem of inequity in the delivery of care (eg. Le Grand, 1978; 
Wagstaff et al, 1991b). It should be stressed, however, that the rationale for 
concentrating on health care use is distinct from that of previous work, where the 
general motivation has been to measure the extent of horizontal inequity Qe. the degree 
to which there is unequal treatment for equal need). In the context of the capabilities 
approach, unequal utilization is important in so far as it implies unequal advantage in 
attaining potential improvements in health status. 
The empirical interest in health care finance is implied by the concern for inequity 
in health care utilization. It is possible that a person's advantage in terms of the use 
" An application based on some of the indices discussed may be found in Pereira and Pinto 
(1993), which used what is still the most recent nationally representative portuguese data source. The 
current context of portuguese health policy suggests that there is less interest in this question than in 
that of inequity in health care finance. Given contingencies of space, I choose to concentrate on the 
latter issue. 
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they make of health care goods is itself determined by the payment mechanism. 
Therefore, inequity in the distribution of payments should also be examined. A possible 
objection to this approach is that the focus ought properly to be upon all those variables 
that affect the demand for care and not simply the method of payment. However, it is 
also the case that a more aggregated approach that concentrates on the relation between 
ability to pay and health care payments can provide useful insights into inequities in 
health capability. The more an individual pays towards health care the less she has 
available to spend on other health enhancing commodities, thereby limiting the scope 
for potential health improvements. Consequently, fairness in terms of opportunity for 
health functioning should include a desideratum that payments in the space of x- 
commodities (of which health care is one) be related to ability to pay. The most 
obvious means for measuring such an objective is by evaluating the progressivity of 
different health care financing mechanisms (cf. van Doorslaer et al, 1993). The 
methods for addressing this task are discussed in the next chapter with actual empirical 
application being carried out in Chapter 7. 
As I have stressed, the empirical agenda described above can only be seen as a 
partial evaluation of the capability for healthy living enjoyed by different persons. One 
aspect in which the proposed analysis is silent is in the process whereby goods inputs 
are transformed into health status levels. Distributional assessments of instrumental 
commodities provide useful insights into capability, but ultimately one must consider the 
impact of commodity use on actual achievements. This inevitably involves the 
specification and testing of a model of health behaviour. The similarities between the 
capabilities approach and models of household production suggest that the Grossman 
(1972) model might be a useful means of accomplishing this task. I therefore explore 
this question in Appendix I with a view to clearing ground for future empirical work. 
3.7 Conclusions 
In this chapter I have reviewed normative aspects of the health inequality debate 
which only very recently have begun to be addressed by economists and other social 
scientists. This is despite wide agreement that grasping their implications is a 
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prerequisite for understanding why people are concerned about inequity, how it should 
be measured, what causes it and how policies may be formulated and monitored. 
Although I have sought to identify economic conceptions of equity which reflect the 
objectives of Portugal's health system, the discussion is also relevant to other countries. 
Given that no consensus definition of equity has emerged in the literature the most 
immediate task has been to critically review available conceptions in terms of their 
suitability for informing the health-equity debate. A set of assessment criteria were 
previously laid out in this respect. Although all the distribution rules are easily 
comprehensible there is no doubt that some do not take us very far in terms of clear 
policy solutions. With regard to specificity and rigour, there is clearly much room for 
further development at the analytical level. Since ultimately our interest in different 
equity formulations is based on their potential for empirical analysis it is disheartening 
to find that, in the health domain, many of the approaches either have ambiguous 
implications or simply suggest excessive information requirements. Finally, most of the 
approaches tend to go against the views put forward in the portuguese policy statements. 
It clearly makes no sense to adopt a particular health-equity formulation if there is no 
widespread support for its ethical base. 
Sen's capabilities framework comes closer to achieving all previously specified 
standards. This does not mean that important insights cannot be extracted from the 
other formulations or that these are irrelevant for the equity in health debate. The Le 
Grand approach, once developed, may come to be seen as analogous to the capabilities 
approach. The crucial difference between them is that the choice sets are defined over 
commodities and capabilities, respectively. In empirical analysis, this distinction may 
be of little importance. Further refinement of the health maximization approach could 
also yield results of great significance. For the moment, however, it is not at all clear 
that it can serve as a suitable guide to empirical evaluation of health-equity objectives. 
It seems to be largely uninformative with regard to the comparison of interpersonal 
feasibility of attaining rewards and does not focus on the processes of health production 
and health care delivery which policy objectives emphasise. Thus, although it has the 
logical advantage of treating efficiency and equity attainment in a single policy step it 
is silent on particular aspects of the equity problem. Sen's framework has most obvious 
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advantages in this respect and consequently appears the more fruitful as a basis for 
positive analysis of specifically equitable objectives. 
Admittedly, the Sen approach leaves many issues unresolved. It provides an 
ethical justification for concentrating measurement of inequity on a particular evaluative 
space (ie. positive freedom to achieve health) but acknowledges that data limitations 
may effectively restrict the focus of analysis to partial elements of that space (eg. what 
health levels are actually achieved). This limitation means that various avenues for 
positive analysis can be justified under the ethical base. Indeed the chosen empirical 
strategy that emerges does not adopt the obvious route of conceiving and comparing 
unique representations of health capability sets. This may raise the objection that the 
Sen framework does not meet two of the assessment criteria laid out (viz. that a 
distribution rule should be specific and rigorous and that it should be readily susceptible 
to empirical documentation). Such an argument is not wholly convincing. The Sen 
framework when applied to health is quite clear on what constitutes an equitable 
distribution (equality of health capability); however, the limits imposed by practical 
calculations mean that only a partial answer may be given in empirical analysis. The 
important point is that 'capabilities' provides the global ethical rationale that appears to 
be missing from a good deal of previous research on equity in health and health care. 
Empirical work in the field is commonly guided by a variety of unrelated egalitarian 
objectives. The present analysis suggests that the common focus on issues like 
economic inequalities in health and health care utilization, though partly based on the 
unavailability of more refined data, may not be as misconstrued as some authors have 
suggested. 
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Part 3 
METHODOLOGY 
Chapter 4 
The Measurement of Inequity in Health and Health Care 
"What is just, then, is what is proportionate, and what 
is unjust is what is counter-proportionate. " 
Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 
4.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter proposed a new specification of equity in the domain of 
health, based on Sen's capabilities approach. Two separate issues were identified as the 
correct focus for positive analysis: the actual level of the functioning 'good health' that 
particular individuals obtain, described as their achievement; and the experience of 
those persons with regard to commodities that are instrumental to attainment of the 
desired functioning, their advantage. The framework entails various specific empirical 
tasks, two of which are addressed in the present thesis: (i) measurement of inequity in 
health, and (ii) measurement of inequity in the payment of health care goods. The 
present chapter provides the conceptual means by which these tasks are to be 
accomplished. The remaining empirical tasks suggested by the Sen framework are only 
examined at the conceptual level, and hence their discussion is postponed until Part 5. 
They are: (i) measurement of the level of social welfare associated with the health 
distribution (Chapter 8); and (ii) measurement of inequity in the utilization of health care 
goods (Chapter 9). 
The approach to measurement adopted in the present case is based on the 
application of cardinal indices of economic inequality to the problem of inequity in 
health and health care. Although this is also the route taken by recent economic work 
on the subject, it is not uncontroversial. One plausible objection is that a focus on 
cardinal measures carries an implication that complete and unambiguous rankings of 
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distributions can always be made. This argument suggests that it might be more 
appropriate to concentrate on ordinal measures (eg. the Lorenz dominance criterion) 
when studying inequity in health and health care. It is well known that such measures 
are based on a smaller set of underlying assumptions likely to command wider societal 
agreement. However, the ordinal method also has a drawback: it excludes the 
possibility of evaluating the degree of inequality, a feature that is of fundamental interest 
for policy-making. Adequate monitoring of inequitable situations requires information 
which does more than simply rank distributions; it should also show how much more 
or less inequitable one situation is in relation to another. For this reason, the cardinal 
approach is accepted in the thesis as providing the most informative route to 
measurement. However, it is also recognised that its evaluative potential is increased 
if (a) one is able to choose indices that make explicit possible differences in social 
judgements (eg. a preference for more or less inequality); and (b) the method is 
complemented by pragmatic comparisons of graphical representations of distributions. 
Traditionally, economists have concentrated on the distribution of a single variable, 
income, which is accepted to be a suitable proxy for more ultimate objects of social 
concern, such as the level of welfare or the opportunity set faced by an individual. 
Analyses of health domain inequality, on the other hand, are generally agreed to involve 
measurement of the joint distribution of a health variable and one that describes an 
individual's command over economic resources, given that it is the systematic relation 
between the two that is usually at the root of equity concerns. Rather surprisingly, there 
are few conceptual answers to this type of problem in the literature dealing with 
economic inequality. ' This poses the question of whether single-attribute measures 
developed in that context can be suitably extended to the health inequality debate? 
Although important recent work suggests that caution should be exercised (eg. Coulter 
et al, 1992a), the few studies of multi-dimensional inequality to have emerged (eg. 
Atkinson and Bourguignon, 1982; Jenkins and O'Higgins, 1989) draw on techniques that 
are essentially extensions of the univariate case. It seems reasonable, therefore, to take 
I The neglect of conceptual analysis of multi-dimensional inequality is exemplified by a recent 
series of monographic issues of the Journal of Econometrics, dealing with inequality measurement 
(Vol. 42, no. 1,1989 and Vol. 43, no. 's 1-2,1990). Of a total of twenty-seven articles, twenty-three 
are simply dedicated to the univariate distribution of income or wealth. 
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work on summary measures of income inequality as the starting point for measurement 
of inequity in health and health care. 
The indices chosen for application in empirical analysis are based on the so-called 
concentration curve approach. The methodology was introduced to health economic 
research by Wagstaff, van Doorslaer and Paci (1989) under an international project 
financed by the European Community (the ECuity study). The present chapter provides 
a formal presentation of the measures used by the ECuity group. It uses a continuous 
random variable framework, which may be seen as useful in two respects: (i) it permits 
access to mathematical calculus so that normative and statistical properties of the indices 
can be conveniently determined; and (ii) it helps to distinguish conceptual from data- 
specific features of the measures suggested. These are aspects in which the ECuity 
analysis appears incomplete. The method of exposition is also important for establishing 
the results of Part 5, where further extensions to the concentration curve approach to 
measuring health domain inequity are reported. 
The present chapter also extends the methodological base of the ECuity group by 
proposing indices that take due account of alternative social judgements concerning the 
degree of equality preference. This seems to be a crucial element missing from previous 
analyses of health domain inequity, where researchers have typically used measures that 
entail what some might regard as unappealing assumptions about the weight to be 
attached to inequity at different levels of the income distribution (eg. the range, Gini 
coefficients and standard concentration indices). Such measures also implicitly presume 
a degree of agreement about equity judgements, which is rarely found in practice. By 
contrast, the 'generalized' measures here introduced can yield numerical estimates of the 
degree of inequality that are conditional on the choice of a single parameter which 
reflects different distributional points of view. Thus, the earlier adoption of the 
capabilities framework does not imply that the positive analysis to be carried out is 
irrelevant to policy-makers who choose a different equity norm. What it has done is to 
demarcate the entities of ethical interest; the precise degree of desired distributional 
equity is still very much open to explicit empirical discretion. 
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. In the next section, a selective 
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review of the more important economic approaches to measurement of inequality in 
incomes is provided. The purpose of this analysis is to evaluate the relative merits of 
measures that might be applied to the field of health, while at the same time covering 
necessary background material to the rest of the thesis. Section 4.3 describes the ECuity 
approach to measuring health and health care finance inequity, which is based on 
standard concentration curves of health and health care population shares ranked by 
income. Section 4.4 extends the scope of the ECuity measures through the mechanism 
of generalized concentration indices. Section 4.5 discusses the empirical procedures 
used in the thesis to compute summary measures. The main interest of this analysis is 
in the methods for estimating the 'generalized' indices, since these have not been 
applied elsewhere in the literature. However, the section also presents results on the 
bias involved in computing measures from grouped data. These are useful for 
interpreting later empirical results and have implications for other studies. The final 
section summarizes and concludes the analysis. 
4.2 Income-based indices of inequality2 
Broadly speaking, cardinal indices of income or income-related inequality can be 
divided into three main groups: (i) normative measures that are derived directly from 
specific social welfare functions; (ii) measures that are founded on axiomatic 
consideration of the desirable properties which an inequality index ought to have ; and 
(iii) measures that are based on the slopes and ordinates of Lorenz and concentration 
curves. The applications in this thesis are drawn from the third approach. It is useful, 
nevertheless, to begin by establishing the reasons why so-called normative and axiomatic 
measures are not applied. In the first case, this is done with reference to the widely 
used Atkinson family of indices, which, paradoxically, can also be seen as a precursor 
in the literature to the parametric statistical measures to be employed. The discussion 
is also relevant to the analysis of Chapter 8. 
2 The discussion of income-based inequality indices presented below is necessarily selective. For 
greater detail the reader is referred to the numerous reviews of the income inequality literature which 
are available. Recent examples are Lambert (1989), Chakravarty (1990) and Jenkins (1991). 
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Atkinson (1970) criticized conventional measures of inequality, such as the 
coefficient of variation and the Gini index, on the grounds that these are simply 
statistical devices that measure the relative dispersion of a frequency distribution without 
reference to a normative notion of social welfare. He also showed that the implicit 
weights which these measures attach to transfers at different levels of the income 
distribution are unlikely to command wide support. As an alternative, Atkinson 
proposed a family of indices that is derived directly from a social welfare function 
(SWF) that incorporates what are judged to be desirable social values. He assumed that 
the SWF can be defined in the additive separable utilitarian tradition of Dalton (1920). 3 
Given such a formulation, Atkinson introduced the concept of the equally distributed 
, which is the amount of 
income, if received by every individual, equivalent income y. 
would result in the same level of social welfare as that given by the observed income 
distribution. Atkinson's index of inequality is then defined as: 
ye 
Ily 
(4.1) 
which can be interpreted as the share of mean income (py) that is "wasted" as a 
consequence of inequality. Given that the index ranges from zero to one, if A=0.2 it 
is implied that only 80% of the present total income is required to achieve the same 
level of social welfare .4 However, for the 
index to be mean-independent it is necessary 
to place a further restriction of constant elasticity on the U(-) functions. In these 
circumstances, the Atkinson family of indices becomes: 
3 Specifically, the SWF is given by 
W U(Yi) 
where U(y) is the utility derived by an individual with income yi. It incorporates the following 
assumptions: (i) symmetry - everyone's incomes are evaluated using the same U( -) function; (ii) non- 
decreasing wetfare - an increase in one person's income must improve society's welfare or at least 
leave it unchanged; (iii) additive separability - implying that changes in social welfare arising from 
changes in one individual's income are entirely unaffected by those of others; and (iv) strict concavity - 
the welfare weight always decreases as income increases, implying a preference for equality. 
Subsequent research has shown that similar results can be obtained by relaxing assumptions (iii) and 
(iv) [See, eg. Dasgupta et al, 1973)]. 
4 Alternatively, a maximum of 20% of current total income would need to be sacrificed to achieve 
equality. 
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A(c) 1- -1 F, 1,0 n ýty (4.2) 
1 
1n 
i 
7yly. 
where c is a parameter measuring the degree of inequality aversion. This parameter can 
be given any value in the range zero to infinity, with the two limiting cases respectively 
implying indifference to inequality and the Rawlsian criterion. Hence, as e rises, greater 
emphasis is attached to transfers at the lower end of the distribution relative to those at 
the top. 
In terms of policy prescription, there is much appeal in tracing out different 
degrees of inequality aversion by varying a single parameter. Atkinson's method has, 
therefore become particularly influential, setting the research agenda for the normative 
approach to inequality measurement and also challenging those that adopt different 
methods to develop measures that reflect alternative distributional judgements. 
However, it has also come in for a certain amount of criticism (eg. Meade, 1976; Sen, 
1978). It is argued that what enables the set of derived indices to be greatly reduced 
is simply the arbitrary form of the SWF. Important issues, such as the extra-welfare 
characteristics of individuals or their concern for the position of others in the income 
distribution, are neglected by the additive separable utilitarian SWF. Equally damaging 
is the argument that Atkinson's approach does not measure inequality in any sense. It 
is actually a measure of inefficiency or utility-loss arising from a less-than-optimal 
distribution of the available income. A reduction in c, for example, decreases measured 
inequality even though the gap in individual utilities might be increasing, which is a 
result of those on higher incomes producing utility relatively more efficiently. 
The upshot of these arguments for the present thesis is most obvious. Adopting 
Atkinson-type indices would contradict two fundamental arguments of the normative 
analysis in Chapter 3: that extra-welfare information must be brought to bear on social 
decisions and that equity analysis should involve actual measurement of the relative 
differences in the variable of interest. Consequently, an approach which involves direct 
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consideration of the relevance and practicality of particular indices seems better attuned 
to our needs. ' 
The second approach to developing indices of income inequality consists of 
specifying at the outset a number of desirable properties that an index ought to have, 
and then to use these to characterize the index. Five axioms, in particular, have 
gathered wide assent. If inequality is given by a continuous and twice differentiable 
function I= W(y), where y= yl,..., y,,, these properties can be stated as follows: 
Population homogeneity (replication). XV(y, y, ..., y; r n) = q(y; n) 
for any 
arbitrary positive integer r. 
(ii) Scale-independence. V(Xyl, ky, ) = xV(yl, ..., y. ) 
for any arbitrary positive 
scalar X. 
(iii) Symmetry (anonymity). xV(y) xV((; y) for all permutations 0. 
(iv) Principle of Transfers. xV is Schur-convex. 
(V) Additive decomposability. There exists C1 such that 
Vyl, 
..., Y. 
) = Q1 Vy 1 (1), --YI (n), -- 
VY G (1), ---, YG (n); nj, ..., nG; Pyl, -9 PyG 
for any arbitrary partition g (1, ..., 
G) of j 1, ..., n). 
The first three axioms respectively imply that the inequality index I is entirely 
unaffected by replications of the population, proportionate changes in the scale of 
incomes and permutations of income recipients. The fourth, which was initially 
proposed by Dalton (1920), implies that a progressive transfer of income (ie. from a 
richer to a poorer person) must lessen the degree of inequality. " The final axiom 
requires that the index be capable of being expressed as the weighted sum of the 
inequality values calculated for specified population subgroups, plus a term based on 
mean incomes and group size. 
' Obviously, this should not be interpreted as disregard for normative issues. These have been 
extensively discussed in Chapter 3. leading to identification of the entities and relationships of ethical 
interest, and will be further analyzed through the application of parametric inequality measures, and 
through the development, in Chapter 8, of an index of health social welfare. 
6 This axiom is sometimes strengthened with the requirement that the inequality reduction 
resulting from a progressive transfer be greater the lower the income of the recipient (transfer 
sensitivity). 
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Cowell (1980) and Shorrocks (1980) have shown that the entire class of indices 
satisfying these properties can be written in a very simple fashion, namely the 
generalized entropy (GE) family: 
11nc*0,1 
IC(Yd 
log( y, 
n (4.3) 
c Il(yl) 
n j=1 4y 4y 
io(YI) 1 10 c0 
n j., 
E 
Y, 
This class includes many well-known inequality measures. 1, and 10 correspond, 
respectively, to Theil's (1967) entropy measure and the mean logarithmic deviation, also 
suggested by the same author. When c=2,1, is equivalent to half the square of the 
coefficient of variation. Furthermore, for every member of the Atkinson family of 
indices there is a corresponding, ordinally equivalent member of the GE family (viz. 
Atkinson indices from c upwards correspond to GE measures from c=1 downwards). 
It appears, therefore, that the parameter c can be interpreted as a measure of the degree 
of inequality aversion, in very much the same way as Atkinson's C. As c decreases 
(to negative values) the inequality index becomes more sensitive to transfers at the lower 
end of the distribution and less weight is attached to transfers at the top. 
The GE family of indices has another important property for empirical work: 
additive decomposability. If there is an interest in the relationship between variables 
that contribute to income differences and actual inequality then an obvious approach is 
to decompose the inequality measure by population subgroups (eg. age, occupation, 
region). In such circumstances, the form given by (4.3) is particularly important, 
because GE indices are the only inequality measures for which a ceteris paribus increase 
in the inequality within a given group always leads to an increase in inequality overall. 
Without this property it is impossible to attribute total inequality to its component inter- 
and intra-group inequalities in an unambiguous way (Cowell, 1988). Moreover, the 
decompositions are achieved with relatively little information, namely the mean incomes 
of the subgroups, population shares and total subgroup inequality values. 
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GE indices appear to have some important properties for examination of health 
domain inequity. The reasons for their not being applied in this study are largely 
pragmatic and related to the advantages of using the concentration based measures 
discussed below. First, concentration indices have associated graphical representations 
which facilitate their interpretation by non-specialists (eg. policy makers); whereas 
'fentropy measures are for specialists only and difficult to conceive and to interpret for 
the many other people interested in redistributive effects" [Pfdhler (1987, p. 16)]. 
Second, concentration indices have an established mechanism for handling income- 
related health domain inequality, which is the main focus of the study. Third, 
concentration measures can also be extended to incorporate different degrees of 
inequality aversion by varying a single parameter. Fourthly, use of GE measures would 
make comparisons with previous work somewhat uncertain. Given that research by 
health economists has largely drawn on the concentration curve approach and that I wish 
to measure the impact of alternative empirical specifications on the degree of measured 
inequity, it makes sense to focus on indices drawn from that approach. Finally, it may 
also be noted that the individual welfare functions implied by GE measures are 
somewhat unappealing. In particular, it is assumed that a person's well-being is 
independent of the opportunities for choice of others [see Sen (1973, p. 36) and 
Kakwani (1986, p. 18)]. However, a crucial aspect of equity judgements is the 
comparison made by specific individuals (or an ethical decision maker on their behalf) 
of their own position in relation to others'. The implied social welfare functions of 
concentration measures appear to incorporate precisely such a notion [see, eg., Sen 
(1974), Pyatt (1980), and the work reported in Chapter 8]. 
I turn therefore to the third approach to examining economic inequality: the class 
of Lorenz and concentration measures. The Lorenz curve - which maps the cumulative 
share of total income accruing to each cumulative share of the population, when incomes 
are -ordered from poorest to richest - is the most widely used graphical representation 
of income distributions. A convenient formal definition is available by assuming that 
income Y is a non-negative random variable with probability density function fty), 
cumulative distribution function F(y) and mean VY. In this case the Lorenz curve is 
given by: 
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Figure 4.1: The Lorenz curve 
y 
LY(P) fy 
fly) dy 0<p< (4.4) 
0 Ily 
where p= F(y) = Joy J(Y)dY, interpreted as the proportion of income units having an 
income less than or equal to y; and Ly(p) = FI(y) = Upy Joy YAY)dY, interpreted as the 
proportional share of total income held by units with income less than or equal to y. 
In Figure 4.1, the straight line Ly(p) =p defines the points at which each unit 
receives exactly the same income. In the case of perfect inequality of incomes, the 
Lorenz curve is J- shaped, implying that all income is received by a single income 
unit. Various summary measures of inequality can be derived from the Lorenz curve, 
the best known being the Gini coefficient, which is equal to twice the area between 
LY(p) and the diagonal, or equivalently one minus twice the area under LY(p). 
A generalization of the Lorenz method to deal with variables that are related to 
income was suggested by Mahalanobis (1960) and later developed by Kakwani (I 977a). 
It essentially requires postulating a functional relationship between Y and a further 
random variable X, eg. X= g(Y), and mapping out values of F(y) and F, [g(y)], so 
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that a concentration curve for variable X is generated. This curve describes the 
cumulative share of variable X possessed by each cumulative share of the population, 
ranked in ascending order of incomes. ' It is then possible to define a concentration 
index for x= g(y) as: 
I 
2fG. (p) dp (4.5) 
0 
where G,, (p) is the concentration curve for variable X. 
This generalization underlies many of the most widely used statistics of tax 
progressivity (eg. Kakwani, 1977b; Suits, 1977) and horizontal inequity (eg. Atkinson, 
1980; Plotnick, 1981). It is also the basis for the approach to health and health care 
inequality measurement developed by Wagstaff, van Doorslaer and Paci (presented in 
the next section and applied in the empirical chapters). If it is assumed that problems 
associated with the presence of confounding variables, such as age and sex, can be 
satisfactorily resolved through careful empirical specification, then the concentration 
curve approach has some obvious merits. It provides a clear expositional device that 
is easily understood by policy makers and opens the way to establishing summary 
measures that take due account of the socioeconomic dimension to health domain 
inequity. Moreover, in contrast to the Atkinson method, it involves actual measurement 
of relative differences in the variables of interest. 
It is well-known, however, that the family of standard concentration indices 
implicitly entails an assumption about the weight to be attached to inequity at different 
income levels which some might find undesirable. This is because the sensitivity of 
such measures to a hypothetical transfer of the variable X depends on the rank orderings 
of the persons at which the transfer takes place, rather than on their actual income 
levels. A greater weight is given to transfers of X around the mode of the income 
distribution rather than at its tails. An interesting mechanism to counter this problem 
has been provided in the income inequality literature through a parametric variant of the 
Gini coefficient - the extended or generalized Gini (Kakwani, 1980a; Donaldson and 
7 Note from this argument that the Lorenz curve of income y can be interpreted as a special case 
of the concentration curve of the function g(y), when g(y) = y. 
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Weymark, 1980). This family of measures incorporates a distributional judgement 
parameter which has most of the properties of Atkinson's e. It can also be expressed 
as a function of the Lorenz curve which suggests that the result can be readily extended 
to other concentration indices (Yitzhaki, 1983; Lambert, 1988). In Section 4.4 such an 
extension is carried out in relation to health and health care concentration measures, 
thereby providing health equity analysts with a range of indices that reflect alternative 
distributional points of view. 
4.3 The concentration approach applied to health 
This section provides a formal presentation of the Mity indices that are applied 
in later empirical analysis. 8 The review builds on the continuous random variable 
framework used to describe the Lorenz curve. Attention is first directed at analysis of 
inequity in health status, which serves as a building block to examination of inequity in 
health care financing. 
4.3.1 Health Status 
Allow that income Y is a continuous random variable with p. dl J(Y), distribution 
function F(Y), and c. d. f. F(y). Assume further that morbidity M is also a random 
variable, related to Y by means of a continuous invertible function M= g(Y), so that 
its first derivative and E[g(Y)] = p. (the mean level of morbidity) exist, and g(Y) ý: 0 
for all Y ýt 0. In a manner analogous to the Lorenz curve, the relationship between 
p= F(y) and G. (p) = Fjg(y)], interpreted as the proportional share of total morbidity 
experienced by persons having an income less than or equal to y, yields the illness 
concentration curve. The curve is represented in a unit square (Figure 4.2). ' 
' The methodology adopted in the ECuity study is described in a series of publications by the 
project leaders: eg. Wagstaff et al (1989), Wagstaff et al (1991a, b), Wagstaff et al (1992), van 
Doorslaer et al (1992), van Doorslaer et al (1993: Chapters 3 and 4). 
I For ease of exposition, in this chapter I take M to represent morbidity and thus speak of illness 
concentration curves and indices. In Chapter 6, the empirical analysis considers mortality as an 
indicator of health. In order to make the present discussion relevant to that context, one simply has 
to substitute the terms 'morbidity' and 'illness' with 'mortality'. 
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Figure 4.2: Illness concentration curves 
The actual shape of the illness concentration curve depends on the sign of g'(y), 
the first derivative of morbidity with respect to income. If g'(y) >0 for all y ý: 0, the 
curve is convex to the p=F(y)-axis, implying that F, [g(y)] < F(y) for all y. In this 
case, the concentration curve falls below the diagonal, signifying that higher income 
groups experience a greater than proportional share of morbidity. If g'(y) <0 for all 
y ý: 0, the concentration curve is concave to the F(y)-axis and lies above the diagonal, 
with F, [g(y)] > F(y). In this case, the poor unambiguously experience a higher burden 
of total illness. Obviously, when g'(y) =0 at all levels of income, the curve coincides 
with the diagonal, signifying that morbidity is distributed in exact proportion to income. 
These results are easily obtained if nonzero values of y and g(y) are excluded. The 
slope of the illness concentration curve is then given by: 
dF, Lg(v)] g(y) >0 (4.6) 
dF(y) E[g(y)] 
implying that the curve is monotonic increasing. To establish curvature take the second 
derivative: 
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d2F, fg(y)] 
_ gl(v) 
1 (4.7) 
dF2(y) Efg(y)] fly) 
which is either positive or negative depending on the sign of g'(y) [see Kakwani 
(1980b, pp. 157-158)]. It is of course quite possible that the illness concentration curve 
crosses the diagonal (eg. if g'(y) is positive at low levels of income but negative at 
higher levels), in which case no unambiguous conclusions can be made regarding the 
association of income and morbidity. 'o 
Further extending the analogy to the Lorenz curve makes it possible to define the 
illness concentration index as: 
2fF, [g(y)] dF(y) =1-2fG. (p) dp 
(4.8) 
where p= F(y), and G. (p) is the illness concentration curve. This index, which was 
first suggested by Wagstaff et al (1991a), provides' a measure of the extent of 
inequalities that are systematically associated with income position. C. varies from 
-1.0, when only the poorest person is ill (in which case G. (p) is r- shaped), and 
+1.0, when the richest person experiences all illness in the community (with G. (p) 
being J- shaped). It takes a value of zero when there is no systematic association 
between morbidity and the individual's rank in the income distribution. " 
It should be obvious from the above that in order for Cin to provide an unbiased 
picture of income related inequalities in health status, it is necessary to remove the effect 
of confounding intervening variables in the income-health relationship. This issue is 
addressed by means of direct standardization in the empirical analysis of Chapter 5, 
where the index is applied to portuguese survey data. 
10 See the example shown later in Figure 4.5 when consideration is given to empirical estimation 
of concentration indices from grouped data. 
" Given that G. (p) can cross the diagonal, C. might register a value of zero even if morbidity 
shares do not correspond to income shares. This would happen if, for example, the area between 
G. (p) and the diagonal lying to the right of the intersection were equal to the corresponding area to 
its left. 
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It is worth emphasising that the illness concentration index is not the same as the 
Gini measure used by Le Grand and associates (eg. Le Grand and Rabin, 1986) to 
measure health inequality. They suggested plotting the cumulative proportions of health 
against cumulative proportions of the population, ranked by their health. This approach 
has been widely criticized for failing to address the main question which motivated the 
health inequality debate, namely the systematic association between health variation and 
differences in economic status [see, eg. Carr-Hill (1987); Wagstaff et al (1991a)]. In 
the framework developed above, the illness concentration curve is related to Le Grand's 
health Gini by 
R [m, r(y)] z (4.9) 
R [m, r(m)] 
where R[a, b] is the coefficient of correlation between a and b, Z. is the Gini index for 
morbidity, and r(y) and r(m) stand for the rank of y and m, respectively. Thus, the two 
measures will give the same result only if the ranking of units by morbidity is the same 
as the ranking by income. If the view is taken that the worrying aspect about 
inequalities in health is not that they exist but that they are associated with economic 
position then comparisons based on the univariate distribution of health variables, such 
as the health Gini, are clearly insufficient. The illness concentration index, on the other 
hand, takes due account of the income-health relationship. 
As with any inequality measure, C. embodies a particular weighting scheme, 
which in turn has normative implications for inequality measurement. Given the 
widespread use of standard concentration measures in economics, these implications are 
well known [cf. Atkinson (1970); Pfdhler (1987)]. Greater weight is attached to health 
inequities occurring around the mode of the income distribution rather than at the 
sparser lower and upper tails. Furthermore, the measure is not sensitive to income 
differences as such, but instead to relative rankings of persons given their income 
positions. There seems to be no particularly compelling reason to believe that such a 
weighting scheme is desirable. For this reason, the measure is 'generalized' in Section 
4.4 to reflect alternative normative viewpoints. 
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4.3.2 Health Care Finance 
The ECuity analysis of health care finance is based on the notion that an 
equitable health system is one that is financed according to a households' ability to pay. 
There appears to be some support for this view in Portuguese policy statements (recall 
Chapter 2), and indeed in those of most other European countries (Van Doorslaer et al, 
1993). Just as in the analysis of fairness in taxation, the ability to pay principle in 
health care financing can be interpreted in terms of both horizontal equity (households 
with the same income should make identical payments for health care) and vertical 
equity (households with unequal incomes should provide appropriately dissimilar 
contributions). The ECuity work focuses on the latter, which appears to be the aspect 
which most preoccupies observers. 
The ECuity researchers make use of the well-known Kakwani (1977b) and Suits 
(1977) global progressivity indices, which are used in the applied public finance 
literature to measure the extent to which different people pay different rates of 
taxation. " This approach implies two value judgements of some importance. In order 
to calculate degrees of progressivity a reference system of redistributional neutrality has 
to be posited. The implicit assumption made in Van Doorslaer et al (1993) is that this 
is given by proportionality of health care payments; which in turn implies, that one 
accepts a portrayal of the income and health care payments distributions as relative 
distances between equidistant income levels. As an alternative, the distributions could 
be portrayed in terms of absolute differences, in which case a per capita health care tax 
would constitute the reference system of redistributional neutrality (Pfahler, 1987). The 
other (related) value judgement implied is that proportionality is the relevant 
counterfactual when comparing health finance distributions. Aaron (1992) argues that 
in "analysing health care financing, this standard has no obvious appeal" (p. 468), and 
seems to suggest that the observed financing distribution of a particular country should 
be taken as the relevant counterfactual. But this method is scarcely more agreeable. 
" By analogy to the progressivity of taxation, a health care financing system is described as 
progressive when health care payments rise as a proportion of income as income rises; regressive when 
payments fall as income rises; and proportional when everyone contributes towards the cost of health 
care in the same proportion as the income they hold. 
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Figure 4.3 (a)-(b): Lorenz and health care payments concentration curves 
The Kakwani and Suits proRressivity indices 
Given the lack of precise policy definitions of what constitutes an equitable distribution 
of financing, the acceptance of proportionality as the reference distribution seems as 
good as any other benchmark. The same argument can also be applied to the portrayal 
of the distributions as relative distances. It is, however, important that these value 
judgements are recognized when the measures are applied in empirical analysis. 
In order to define a Kakwani index of health care finance progressivity, let 
financing HF be a continuous function of Y, denoted by lif = g*(y) with go(y) 2t 0 for 
all y ý: 0. The relationship between p= F(y) and GhXP) = F, fg*(y)] defines the health 
care finance concentration curve [See Figure 4.3(a)], which has analogous properties 
to those given for G. (p). The Kakwani index is defined as an area measure between 
this curve and LY(p), the Lorenz curve for income defined earlier: 
I 
2f [LY(p) - G4, (p)] dp 
(4.10) 
0 
G. ýp) will lie everywhere above LY(p) iff the income elasticity of health care 
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payments, 11g. (y) = g*'(y) -y/ g%y), is less than unity for all y ý: 0, which is equivalent 
to saying that health care payments are regressive at all levels of income [the case 
depicted in Figure 4.3 (a)]. Similarly, GhXp) will lie below (coincide with) LY(p), 
iff 11g. (y) is greater than (equal to) unity for all y ; -> 0, signifying respectively, 
progressivity and proportionality of health care payments with respect to income (cf. 
Kakwani, 1977a). 
Equation (4.10) may also be expressed as: 
7rK = Chf - Zý (4.11) 
where Chf is the concentration coefficient for health care payments and ZY is the Gini 
coefficient for income. The bounds of 7CK depend on inequality in the income 
distribution. Maximal regression is given by -1-ZY (-2.0 if all income is held by one 
person and all health care payments are made by another). Maximal progression, on the 
other hand, is given by 1-2ý (+1.0 if income is equally distributed and a single person 
finances the entire health care system! ). Negative, positive and zero values of nK imply 
regressivity, progressivity and proportionality, respectively. 
The Suits measure is based on relative concentration curves, rather than the 
standard curves depicted until now. The difference between the two approaches results 
from substituting the function p= F(y) on the abcissa by q= LY(p) = FI(y), the 
proportion of total income held by units with Y: 5 y. Therefore, the health carefinance 
relative concentration curve, GhXq), expresses the relationship between F, [g*(y)] and 
171(y), which means that the diagonal provides the reference line of payments 
proportionality in relation to income [Figure 4.3 (b)]. In some comparisons of vertical 
inequity in the distribution of health care financing, this graphical representation is more 
convenient than that for the Kakwani index, since all relevant information can be shown 
on a single curve for each component of observation. " 
G, Xq) will lie below the diagonal if il,. (y) > 1, signifying that payments are 
13 Note, however, that Figure 4.3(a) permits visualization of inequality in the distribution of 
income as well as non-proportionality in the financing distribution. For some comparisons this may 
be relevant. 
94 
progressive in relation to income, and above the diagonal if 118. (y) < 1, signifying that 
payments are regressive. The Suits index follows logically as an area measure between 
GhXq) and the diagonal: 
I 
ns =2f [q - Gk, (q)] dq 
0 
If the health care financing system is regressive in relation to income, as in Figure 
4.3(b), 7cs is negative. Maximal regressivity is given by TCs = -1.0 (implying that all 
health care payments are made by the poorest person). If, by contrast, the system is 
progressive, ns is positive, with maximal progressivity given by 7rs = 1.0 (suggesting 
that the richest person bears the burden of all health care financing). In common with 
the Kakwani index, a value of ns =0 is implied by proportionality of payments in 
relation to income. 
14 
Given that, nowadays, the Kakwani and Suits measures are the most widely used 
indices of global progressivity their descriptive and normative properties are well 
known. " Both measures satisfy the important statistical properties of population 
replication, scale independence, anonymity and transfers (encountered earlier in the 
discussion of GE measures). They can also be straightforwardly decomposed by finance 
source. For instance, if there are T sources of health care finance (eg. taxation, private 
insurance, etc. ) the Kakwani index RK can be expressed as a weighted average of the 
T "CKt indices for each finance source. Specifically, nK : -- 11 T (Ot 7CKt9 with weights co, 
being the proportions of each source of finance in total revenue. " This decomposition 
also makes clear that, under the ECuity approach, the vertical equity characteristics of 
a health care financing system depend on the proportion of total revenues raised from 
each source and the degree of deviations from proportionality of each of these sources. 
14 The definition of the Suits index in the unit interval (4, +1) is another convenient property 
in its favour since it facilitates comparisons. Note, however, that the Kakwani index can also be 
normalized to same-interval as [-I = nK/(I+Zy), 7cK/(I-Zy) = +1). 
15 Pfdhler (1987) provides a detailed discussion of this issue. 
16 The analogous decomposition for the Suits index is given by: 7cs = 7,110), ns, It is also possible 
to decompose these and other concentration measures by population subgroup (cf eg., Pyatt, 1976; 
Silber, 1989). However, the decomposition is not particularly convenient. Given that information on 
individual rankings in the subgroups and in the total population is used, it is possible for inequality 
or progressivity within one group to increase but overall inequality/progressivity to decrease. 
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Despite these points in common, the Kakwani and Suits measures may provide 
inconsistent rankings whenever the distribution of income is not fixed (which is 
invariably the case in time and cross-national comparisons). Furthermore, if the health 
care payments concentration curve crosses the relevant benchmark curve, 7rK and 7cs may 
not agree on whether a financing system is overall progressive or regressive (Formby 
et al, 1991). These inconsistencies arise because of differences in the two measures' 
weighting schemes. The Kakwani index assigns weights according to household rank 
in the income distribution, implying that maximum significance is given to changes in 
health care financing ocurring around the mode of the income distribution. The Suits 
measure, on the other hand, assigns weights according to household rank and size of 
income, implying that maximum significance is given to changes in health care 
financing ocurring at income levels higher than the mode. However, in one respect the 
weighting schemes are similar: both are positive and monotonically increasing in 
income. This implies that they strongly react to payment redistributions from low to 
high income people (Kakwani, 1986; Pfdhler, 1987). 
These normative properties suggest two immediate implications for empirical 
analysis. One is that the computation of indices must be accompanied by careful 
examination of the relevant concentration curves, checking in particular for crossings. 
Therefore, in the empirical analysis of Chapter 7, graphical representations of the 
distributions are also presented. The other implication is that the descriptive power of 
the analysis would be improved if the measures were extended to accomodate alternative 
weighting schemes. This leads to consideration, in the following section, of 
'generalized' progressivity indices which have negative monotonically increasing 
weighting schemes. 
There are various other progressivity indices which could be drawn on to measure 
vertical inequity in the distribution of health care payments. In particular, to the 
Kakwani and Suits indices there correspond specific measures of redistributive effect, 
namely the Reynolds and Smolensky (1977) and Pfdhler (1983) indices. These indices 
measure the redistribution of income which takes place as a result of health care 
financing rather than deviations of the payments distribution from proportionality. 
Although the measures have been applied in some ECuity study publications [eg. Van 
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Doorslaer et al (199 1), Lachaud and Rochaix (1992) and Pereira and Pinto (1992)], there 
seems to be no great benefit in using them as well. This is not so much because there 
is "very little evidence that equity objectives in the health field are couched in terms of 
income redistribution" (Van Doorslaer et al, 1993, p. 15). In the partial equilibrium 
framework adhered to by the ECuity researchers, income redistribution effects are 
necessarily implied by progressivity of health care payments. The main reason is that 
the weighting schemes of the Reynolds/Smolensky and Pfahler measures are identical 
to those of the Kakwani and Suits indices. 17 
4.4 Generalized concentration measures 
All the measures considered up to this point embody specific normative 
judgements about the importance attached to inequity at different positions in the income 
distribution. The adoption of any particular index for empirical research means that the 
analyst effectively accepts its implied weighting scheme. Yet there is no reason to 
believe that others will also share the normative judgements implicit in the measure. 
It is advisable, therefore, that checks are made on the robustness of empirically observed 
inequality rankings to different distributional judgements. The parametric variant of the 
Gini coefficient mentioned earlier provides a useful tool in this respect. By changing 
a single parameter it is possible to make the measure more sensitive to particular points 
of the income distribution. The work of Yitzhaki (1983) and Lambert (1988,1989) 
suggests that the result can be readily extended to other concentration indices. The 
objective of this section is to propose generalized versions of the indices discussed in 
4.3. These will then be used in the empirical chapters to verify the robustness of the 
ECuity measures to alternative distributional judgements. " 
" On a practical note, computation of redistributive impact measures is also more cumbersome, 
since it is necessary to re-rank the distribution of post-health care payments income if micro-data are 
available, or apply a correction formula (Jenkins, 1989a). None of the authors cited above rearrange 
their distributions or apply the formula accordingly, and therefore their Reynolds/Smolensky and 
Pfdhler measures are effectively underestimates of the true degree of implied income redistribution. 
18 As far as I am aware Le Grand (1987) is the only study to have used a parametric index to 
measure health domain inequity. He computed the Atkinson index of health inequality (proxied by 
age-at-death) for 32 developed countries, using two values of the inequality aversion parameter, 0.75 
and 1.25. However, this index, like the health Gini discussed in 4.3.1, does not measure ability-to-pay 
related inequities. 
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Consider first a generalization of the illness concentration index, C.. Making use 
of the fact that the Lorenz curve for income can be interpreted as a special case of the 
concentration curve for the function g(y) when g(y) = y, and drawing on Kakwani's 
(1980a, p. 444) and Yitzhaki's (1983, p. 620) formulations of the extended Gini, it 
follows that a family of generalized illness concentration indices can be expressed as 
a weighted integration of the area below the illness concentration curve: 
I 
f 
P)8-2 G. (p) dp 
0 
This equation defines various coefficients, one for each value of the distributional 
judgement parameter 8>1. As 8 -ý 1, Cm(S) approaches zero for all distributions, 
implying indifference to income related health inequalities. At 8=2, Cm(8) is 
equivalent to the standard illness concentration index, C.. In the limiting case 8 -4 -, 
the implicit ethics of Cm(S) approximate the maximin rule (defined over incomes). "' 
Each of the CJ8) measures has the same sign properties as C., varying from -1.0 to 
+1.0, with negative values signifying pro-rich health inequality and positive values, pro- 
poor health inequality. 
The effect of varying 8 can be seen from Figure 4.4(a-b), which shows the 
relationship between the weighting scheme [w = in (4.13) and rank in 
the income distribution. At values of I<8<2, the weights increase with income rank, 
signifying that C. (5) attaches greater weight to health inequities at the top of the 
income distribution (Figure 4.4(a)). At 8=2 (the standard concentration index), weights 
and rank are independent. Subsequent increases in 8 leads the weights to decrease with 
income rank (Figure 4.4(b)). Therefore, higher values of 8 mean that greater weight is 
attached to health inequities at the lower end of the income distribution and lesser to 
those ocurring at the upper end. Thus, the generalized illness concentration index puts 
at the disposal of the analyst a parameter which reflects different judgements about how 
the concentration curve values are aggregated. 
19 It should be apparent that 8 has a similar effect on measured inequality to Atkinson's inequality 
aversion parameter. The behaviour of C. (6) at the extremes 8 -ý I and 8 resembles that of 
A(F-) at the extremes E -+ 0 and e -+ - of inequality aversion. 
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The analysis presented above can be readily extended to the concentration 
measures of vertical inequity in financing of health care. Thus, the family of 
generalized Kakwani indices is given by: 
I 
1) f (1 - P)8-2 [Ly (p) - GIV(p)l dp (4.14) 
0 
CIVO) - Zy(8) 
where ChX8) and ZY(5) are generalized concentration coefficients for health care 
payments and generalized Ginis for income, respectively. Similarly, the family of 
generalized Suits indices is given by: 
[1 _L y 
(p)]8-2 [LY(p)-GWp)]dLY(p) 
0 (4.15) 
8(8-1) f (I _08-2 [q -G Ar (a dq 
0 
The sign properties of nK(b) and ns(8) are identical to those of the related standard 
progressivity measures. When 8=2, 'CK(8) and ics(8) give the standard Kakwani and 
Suits indices, respectively. Values of 8>2 yield progressivity estimates that register 
concern with the health care financing position of poorer members of society. In the 
case of the Kakwani measures, greater weight is given to the poor on the basis of their 
number, whereas for the Suits indices, this weight is assigned on the basis of number 
and size of income. 
4.5 Empirical estimation of concentration indices 
The indices presented above are calculated in Part 4 of the thesis by either the 
covariance or linear approximation methods. The first of these is particularly useful 
because of its simplicity and accuracy. Several authors have shown that concentration 
measures can be rewritten as a linear transformation of the covariance between an 
income unit's rank in the income distribution and its own value of the variable under 
analysis [Kakwani (1980, p. 173), Lerman and Yitzhaki (1984), Shalit (1985) and 
Jenkins (1988c)]. If micro-data are available, this result opens the way for accurate 
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estimates without the need to assume a specific frequency function. 
The covariance formula for the illness concentration index is as follows: 
2 cov [m, FWI 
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where cov [-] denotes covariance, m= g(y) is the morbidity level of an individual 
with income y, F(y) is the population share of individuals whose income is no greater 
than y, and p. is the mean level of morbidity. Thus, the procedure for calculating the 
index is straightforward. First, the income rank r(y) for each observation i=1, ..., n 
is obtained. Next the covariance between r(y) and m is calculated. Since r(y)ln 
terms are the empirical representation of F(y), the covariance must be divided by n. 
Finally, the resulting value is multiPlied by 2 and divided by p,. to obtain Cm. 
Taking into account (4.11) and (4.16), the Kakwani index of health care finance 
progressivity is computed as : 
'TK =2 
cov [hf, F(y)] 2 cov [y, F(y)] 
R)v Ily 
with the terms having analogous definitions to those given above (eg. lif = g*(y) is the 
level of health care payments of an income unit with income y). For the Suits index, 
given that it is based on relative concentration curves, the formula is slightly different 
(Jenkins, 1988c). The term F(y) in the first covariance must be substituted with F, (y), 
defined earlier. 
With regard to the generalized indices, Lerman and Yitzhaki (1984) have derived 
the covariance formula for the Gini. Since the Lorenz curve for income y can be seen 
as a special case of the concentration curve of a function g(y), when g(y) = y, their 
result can be readily applied to measures based on concentration curves. Thus, the 
generalized illness concentration index can be computed as: 
cm (8) =-8 cov 
(m, [I- F(y)]6-1 1 
pm 
where 8 is the distributional judgement parameter. The corresponding formulas for the 
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generalized Kakwani and Suits indices follow trivially from (4.17). 
When data are only available in grouped form (as is the case in Chapter 6 and in 
the standardized distributions of Chapter 5), there is little to be gained in applying the 
covariance procedure. I have chosen in these cases to use the traditional linear 
approximation method, derived on the assumption that the concentration curve is 
20 piecewise linear (Morgan, 1962). One such formula, used here to compute the illness 
concentration coefficient is: 
i 
ca, Z- E (Pi Mi-i - Pi-i li) 
J. i 
where P, is the cumulative proportion of income ranked units up to the jth class and mj. 
is the cumulative proportion of total morbidity experienced by the same units. The 
standard progressivity indices for grouped data are given by analogous formulas taking 
into account equations (4.11) and (4.12). 
Lerman and Yitzhaki (1989) have provided a covariance formula for computing 
the generalized Gini from weighted samples. I use this method to compute the 
generalized illness concentration index from grouped data in Chapters 5 and 6. The 
formula is the same as that shown in (4.18) with the covariance component being 
given by: 
nn 
cov E w, (m. - p. ) [(I -Ek)a-l -Ew, (l - Ek)8-11 
(4.20) 
k-1 k-1 
whereWk is the proportion of the population in income group k, Mk the mean level 
of illness in group k, and Eka mid-interval estimator of F(y), ie. 
Ek = 7' Wk+I+Wk/2. 
2' The results arrived at by this procedure are identical to those obtained when the covariance 
method is applied to grouped data. The latter can be applied in either one of two forms: (i) by using 
a variant of the covariance formula, viz. 
ýin2 
cm 
6n 
m 
where DA [the slope coefficient obtained by regressing m on r(y)] is estimated through weighted 
least squares (Wagstaff et al, 1991a), or (ii) by weighting the covariance directly (Lerman and 
Yitzhaki, 1989). In both cases the weights are provided by the relative size of the income groups. 
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Figure 4.5: Hypothetical concentration curve for morbidity 
It is well-known that the linear approximation method leads to biased estimates 
of concentration indices, since it assumes that inequality is zero within income 
classes. " What is less appreciated is that the direction of the bias cannot be 
ascertained a priori. For the Gini index, linear approximation of the Lorenz curve must 
inevitably lead to downward bias since the curve is convex to the diagonal (Gastwirth, 
1972). However, concentration curves may not be convex (or concave) over the whole 
range of incomes given that the variable whose shares are represented on the ordinate 
is not the same as the ranking variable. Hence, a configuration of the type shown in 
Figure 4.5 is conceptually possible. In this example, income-indexed health inequality 
is negligible at low levels of income but rises substantially after the third decile, leading 
to a kink in the illness concentration curve. If the linear approximation method is used 
with a small number of partitions (say quintiles), the resulting Cm index will over- 
" The weighted covariance procedure described above and the weighted least squares estimator 
used by Wagstaff et al (1991a) also suffer from the same problem. It is possible to improve the 
accuracy of grouped data estimates by using non-linear approximations (eg. Kakwani and Podder, 
1976). However, such methods have high time costs which make them unattractive when the number 
of calculations are large. 
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estimate the true value. An obvious response to this problem is to verify actual bias by 
means of sensitivity analysis. 
Tables 4.1 and 4.2 report the results of estimating standard measures from micro- 
and grouped data. The data sets are those used in Chapters 5 and 7, where the variables 
are defined. For present purposes the precise definitions are not important. In the 
morbidity analysis (Table 4.1), linear approximation leads to over-estimates of the true 
degree of inequality suggesting that the concentration curves may be similar to the one 
shown in Figure 4.5. The health care finance analysis shows that the bias is in the 
opposite direction. 
Of greater importance, however, is the degree of bias when the number of income 
groups is varied. The results show unsurprisingly that increasing the number of 
partitions improves the accuracy of inequality estimates. Segmenting the data by 
vingtiles leads to a negligible degree of bias (invariably less than one per cent). 
Conversely, if quintiles are taken as the basis for linear approximation the resulting 
estimates are inaccurate by between 5 and 12 percent. This may be judged as 
acceptable. However, the differences are not so small when compared to observed 
cross-national and time variations (see, eg., van Doorslaer et al, 1993). Therefore, two 
conclusions may be drawn. First, if methods that take no account of inequality within 
income classes are used, high levels of aggregation should be avoided. Obviously, in 
some cases the researcher has no choice but to accept published tabulations. However, 
there are numerous examples in the literature where micro-data are inappropriately 
segmented into small partitions for the purpose of demographic standardization (eg. 
Pereira and Pinto, 1993). In the next chapter standardization is carried out using vingtile 
classes, a method which the above results suggest produces an insignificant level of bias. 
The second conclusion is that due caution should be exercised when comparing results 
generated through different levels of aggregation. This is particularly relevant given that 
health domain inequity comparisons are likely to become increasingly available in the 
future. As will be seen, it also has implications for the empirical analysis reported in 
the following chapters. 
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Table 4.1: Comparison of empirical measurements of health ineguality 
(concentration indices) by level of aggregation 
National Health Survey, 1987 
Variable Income groups of equal size 
Micro data Vingtiles Deciles Quintiles 
Equivalent income 0.3456 0.3441 0.3400 0.3247 
% bias relative to micro-data 0.4% 1.6% 6.0% 
Bed days -0.2032 -0.2038 -0.2118 -0.2253 
% bias relative to micro-data 0.3% 4.2% 10.9% 
Limiting chronic -0.1244 -0.1253 -0.1324 -0.1397 
% bias relative to micro-data 0.7% 6.4% 12.3% 
Table 4.2: Comparison of empirical measurements 
of health care finance progressivity by level of aggregation 
Fan-dly Budget Survey, 1989/90 
Variable Income groups of equal size 
Micro data Vingtiles Deciles Quintiles 
Concentration indices 
Equivalent income 
% bias relative to micro-data 
Direct payments 
% bias relative to n-dcro-data 
Total payments 
% bias relative to micro-data 
Kakwani indices 
Direct payments 
% bias relative to micro-data 
Total payments 
% bias relative to micro-data 
0.3514 0.3491 0.3438 0.3267 
0.7% 2.2% 7.0% 
0.1656 0.1649 0.1627 0.1540 
0.4% 1.8% 7.0% 
0.3231 0.3212 0.3164 0.2998 
0.6% 2.1% 7.2% 
-0.1858 -0.1842 -0.1811 -0.1727 
0.9% 2.5% 7.1% 
-0.0283 -0.0279 -0.0274 -0.0269 
1.4% 3.2% 5.0% 
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4.6 Concluding comments 
This chapter has presented six summary measures of health domain inequity, three 
of which are new to health economic research. Appendix 4 provides a summary of all 
indices discussed (as well as others to be proposed in Part 5). Like all inequality 
measures used previously by health economists, the new indices draw on analogous 
measures in the income inequality and public finance literature. They incorporate a key 
element missing in previous work: flexibility in the method of aggregating inequality 
at different points of the income distribution. By varying a single parameter the 
measures become more sensitive to the position of specific income groups; and may 
therefore be seen as incorporating alternative social judgements concerning the degree 
of equality preference. 
The indices chosen for application in empirical analysis are all based on the slopes 
and ordinates of Lorenz and concentration curves. This choice rules out other 
approaches to distributional measurement, such as the GE family of indices which might 
conceivably provide a versatile route to evaluating the structure and time-trend of health 
domain inequity. The view taken here is that the approach introduced by Wagstaff and 
van Doorslaer has obvious merits for examining key questions raised by Sen's ethical 
structure, and that there is much to be gained in refining and extending their initial 
effort. The present chapter has provided a formal exposition of the approach that 
clarifies implicit normative and statistical properties of the indices and is useful in 
establishing further results such as those to be presented in Part 5. However, the main 
work required of studies that adopt the Wagstaff-van Doorslaer methodology is in the 
area of empirical application. The analysis in section 5 suggests that alternative methods 
for estimating indices can lead to errors in the interpretation of results from comparative 
studies. The empirical chapters report further measurements aimed at establishing the 
impact of methodological choices on the degree of measured inequity. 
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Part 4 
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
Chapter 5 
Measuring Achievement 1: Inequity in Health 
"If thefundamental imperative is maximumfeasible equality of 
opportunities to : flourish, and health is a necessary condition 
for : flourishing, then greater equality of health itself 
dominates the other [distributional] principles. 
Culyer and Wagstaff (1992, p. 17). 
5.1 Introduction 
The next three chapters provide empirical estimates of the degree of health domain 
inequity in Portugal. Each chapter examines a particular aspect of the problem: 
namely, inequity in the population's health (the present chapter), inequity in infant 
mortality (Chapter 6), and inequity in family payments towards the health service 
(Chapter 7). 
The justification for focusing on these issues was spelt out in Chapter 3. Recall 
that in spite of the capabilities approach being adopted as the underlying ethical theory, 
the empirical analysis does not seek to conceive or to compare unique scalar measures 
of health capability sets. Instead, the study adopts an indicative pluralistic approach, 
characterized by separate measurement of inequity in functioning levels (achievement) 
and in the use and payment of commodities which permit their attainment (advantage). 
This approach maintains the key elements of Sen's framework but is actually more 
informative than the alternative of comparing a global index of the capability set. It is 
possible, for example, to re-interpret the empirical chapters as attempts to evaluate the 
degree to which specific Portuguese health policy objectives are being met (cf. Chapter 
2). Similarly, each of the chapters can viewed as an extension to previous work on 
particular aspects of health domain inequity (ie. inequalities in health and progressivity 
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of health care payments), which means that the results may easily be compared with 
those of other studies. 
There are three key options underlying the empirical chapters. First, the 
interpretation given to the term inequity. It refers to inequality in the distribution of 
achievement and advantage attributes that is systematically associated with inequality 
in the extent of choice over commodity bundles (measured by available income 
resources). This definition derives from the fact that commodities, or their 
characteristics, are what an individual requires to achieve functioning capabilities. The 
second option follows directly from the first. The basic tools of analysis are the 
concentration indices and associated graphical representations discussed in Chapter 4, 
which are a suitable means for measuring the type of inequities that command our 
attention. Finally, there is an underlying preoccupation throughout the empirical 
analysis to measure the impact of specific methodological choices on the results. These 
concern, for example, the issues of equivalization of income variables, age and sex 
standardization of the distributions and, of course, the parameterisation of indices to 
reflect different distributional points of view. That these and similar issues are discussed 
in greater depth than in previous work is perhaps the main contribution of the analysis 
from the disciplinary point of view. Equally important, however, is the unearthing of 
the health equity profile of the Portuguese health system, so far relatively understudied. 
The present chapter measures the extent of inequity in ill-health, drawing on 
morbidity data from the 1987 National Health Survey. In Section 5.2, the survey is 
described together with the income and morbidity variables used in the analysis. The 
section is also essential background to the empirical illustrations provided in Chapter 8. 
Section 5.3 presents the results, setting apart two issues for further analysis: 
standardization of the distributions by demographic variables and examination of 
inequity within age groups. Where appropriate, the results are contrasted with British 
evidence, mainly because comparative Portuguese research is not available. Section 5.4 
provides evidence on an important issue not previously addressed in the literature: the 
impact of equivalence scale relativities on the degree of measured inequity. The final 
section (5.5) concludes the chapter. 
109 
5.2 Data and variable definitions 
5.2.1 The National Health Survey 
The data source for this chapter is the Inquirito Macional de Sa(Ide (INS), or 
National Health Survey. This is a cross-sectional household interview survey used 
primarily by the health planning authorities to obtain national and regional estimates of 
the incidence and prevalence of illness, the utilization of services and other health 
related phenomena (eg. direct expenditures, waiting times, smoking habits and patient 
satisfaction). Despite being the only nationally representative data source which allows 
such information to be systematically linked to the socio-economic characteristics of 
individuals, the INS micro-data base has scarcely been used by health economists and 
other academic researchers. 
The survey has been carried out regularly since 1983 and is very closely based on 
the U. S. National Health Interview Survey. ' It covers the non-institutionalized civilian 
population and employs household sample selection with the individual as the unit of 
analysis. The sampling plan follows a three-stage probability design which yields 
representative estimates at the national level and for Portugal's five regions: North, 
Centre, Lisbon and Tagus Valley, Alentejo and Algarve. 
Data are collected continuously throughout a calendar year by means of face-to- 
face interviews based on a questionnaire. This consists of two basic parts: (i) a 'core' 
set of health, socio-economic and demographic items, and (ii) one or more sets of 
'supplemental' health items, which unlike the former are not repeated each year. The 
Pcore' questions include: basic demographic characteristics of household members; 
disability days occurring in the two-week period prior to the interview; health care 
expenditures during the same period; doctor visits and other types of service utilization 
during a three-month reference period; and the acute, chronic and symptomatic 
conditions responsible for the illness and service use reported. 
' In the initial phases the INS drew on technical support from the U. S. National Centre for Health 
Statistics. More recently, it is carried out jointly by the Ministry of Health the National Statistical 
Institute (IKE). 
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Like most large scale health interview surveys, the INS's validity and reliability 
have been insufficiently researched. There is, however, some evidence suggesting that 
the survey provides acceptable estimates of key health-related parameters of the 
Portuguese population. Of the ten national surveys used in the ECuity study, for 
example, the INS had by far the largest sample size [van Doorslaer et at (1993, p. 52)], 
which generally implies lower sampling error. The questionnaire design appears to 
guarantee a low degree of observational bias (Falcdo and Silva, 1983). The response 
rate is usually at least 80% (roughly the same as the U. K. GHS), with the majority of 
non-responses due to eligible respondents not being found at home after repeated calls 
(Minist6rio da Sadde, 1987). Validation studies on comparable data sources in other 
countries have shown national health interview surveys to provide "significant agreement 
with medical records, doctors statements and/or medical examinations" [Kars-Marshall 
et at (1988, p. 228)]. With regard to reliability of the data, the INS carries out follow- 
up interviews on an 8% random sample of interviewed households in order to check for 
reproducibility. Relatively large variations have been detected in this process [Ferreira 
and Lemos (1987, p. 119)], but they are no greater than those found in comparable 
surveys [Kars-Marshall et at (1988, p. 229)]. 
The present study uses the micro-data base for the 1987 INS, which is actually the 
only year that the survey has covered the whole of mainland Portugal. 2 The sample 
size is 41585 individuals, of which 37 002 (89%) were used in the analysis following 
deletion of cases with missing values for the income variable. This loss of information 
does not appear crucial. Non-parametric tests (Mann-Whitney and Kolmogorov- 
Smirnov) were carried out for two income proxies (SEG and educational level of the 
family head) and for the morbidity and demographic variables used in the analysis. The 
null hypothesis of the two samples having identical distributions was not rejected (at the 
1% level) for the income proxies, sex and most of the morbidity variables. Therefore, 
the representativeness of the results does not appear compromised by the level of non- 
response to the income question. 
2 In other years, the INS was circumscribed to specific geographic regions, making the term 
national in the survey's title largely a misnomer. A further nationwide survey is planned for 1995. 
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5.2.2 Measurement of income position 
The chapter adopts the individual's position in the income distribution as a 
measure of his extent of choice over commodity bundles. In common with most health 
surveys, the INS only obtains categorical income data. Families are asked to indicate 
on a card showing ten monthly gross income groupings that which best represents their 
own. Each family member is then attributed his or her family income category. ' in 
order that these data serve as an adequate representation of the variable of interest and 
allow reliable computation of inequality measures, it is necessary to carry out three 
adjustments: interpolation of the grouped data, transformation of the gross values into 
income net of taxes and homogenization of differences in family characteristics. The 
importance of these adjustments cannot be overestimated. In the final analysis, the 
accuracy of health inequity measures is likely to depend as much on the appropriateness 
and detail of the variable used to segment the population as it is on the adequacy of 
health status indicators. 
Interpolation of the categorical income data increases the range of estimation 
techniques that may be applied, and is in anyway indispensable if adjustments for family 
characteristics or taxation are to be made. The data were interpolated by assuming that 
all observations in a given interval Y are concentrated at the midpoint of the boundaries, 
ie. x, = V2[di + d,., ]. Sensitivity analysis using Frank Cowell's INEQ package showed 
that alternative methods of interpolation - piecewise Paretian, linear and histogram - had 
a negligible impact on final results. The top interval, which is open-ended in the INS 
questionnaire, was assumed closed by choosing a value consistent with the gross income 
distribution of the 1989/90 Family Budget Survey (FBS). 4 
'A similar procedure is also used to generate yearly income values. I have used the monthly 
observations since they appear to be more reliable. The yearly variable has a greater number of 
missing values (6583) compared to the monthly counterpart (4583), and more importantly, dispersion 
of annual income is actually greater, which is contrary to the logical expectation of the longer time 
period averaging out short-term fluctuations [see Atkinson (1983, pp. 41-46)]. The reason for these 
discrepancies may be simply that the notion of "annual income" is hardly ever used in Portugal (even 
among higher-paid professionals), thereby leading to incomplete and innacurate responses. 
4 The FBS, which is similar to Income and Expenditure Surveys in other countries, is discussed 
in Chapter 7. It uses the same sampling frame as the 1987 INS, based on the 1981 Census. 
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A further problem with the INS data is that the respondent is asked to consider 
gross income (ie. factor income plus transfers). It is generally accepted that disposable 
income is a more suitable proxy of the family's potential command over economic 
resources [Atkinson (1983), Jenkins (1991)]. Therefore, the interpolated gross incomes 
were adjusted by subtracting the expected value of income and property taxes and social 
insurance contributions, thereby providing a measure of the net cash income available 
to families. This was carried out by means of a cell-based approach which matched the 
INS observations with those of the 1989/90 FBS. The procedure involved, first, 
computing direct tax rates for 60 family groups (cells) defined by their gross income 
ranking and family characteristics. That is: 
E Tki 
tu =j ykl (5.1) 
where Yk, and T., are respectively, gross income and total direct tax liabilities of families 
belonging to the kth gross income percentile range (corresponding to those observed for 
the INS income variable, after aggregating the data file by family) and Ith family type 
(single person aged under 65; single person aged over 64; couple without children; 
couple with children; single adult with children; other families). The computed tax rates 
(tkl) were then used to correct the INS gross income values through the formula: 
N=Y (I - tki) (5.2) Jkl i 
where Njk, is net cash income of the jth family belonging to the matched kth percentile 
range and Ith family type. An important implication of this procedure is that we assume 
that effective tax rates were the same in 1987 as in 1989/90. ' 
The third adjustment - homogenization of differences in family characteristics - 
is required because of the mismatch in units of analysis: the income variable is 
recorded on a per family basis, but the empirical interest (by virtue of the ethical 
concern for the functioning 'health') is with the individual. The simplest solution to this 
' There was a reform of the income tax system in 1989 (discussed in Chapter 7) which is a 
potential source of bias for these adjustments. It should be noted, that contrary to the approach to be 
adopted in Chapter 7, here I have used only taxes levied under the "old" income tax system. 
Tberefore, the degree of bias is unlikely to be so great as to significantly affect the computed indices. 
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problem is to divide the reported income by the number of family members, but this is 
unlikely to provide an accurate measure of each person's choice opportunities given that, 
for many items of consumption, economies of scale are likely to operate. The preferred 
procedure is to use an equivalence scale (ie. an index that measures the relative income 
required by families of different composition to maintain the same level of commodity 
choice opportunities). There is, however, no agreement in the literature as to which of 
the many scales available is the most appropriate. Moreover, there is growing evidence 
that the results of distributional comparisons are sensitive to the choice of scale 
[Buhmann et al (1988), Coulter et al (1992a, 1992b), Atkinson et al (1993)]. Since this 
is also likely to be true of health inequity analyses that use income to rank the 
population, section 5.4 checks the robustness of the results to different equivalent scale 
relativities. There are, however, many situations for which sensitivity analysis of 
income assumptions is impractical (eg. where parameterized inequality indices are 
calculated for a range of health and health care indicators, the number of calculations 
can grow out of all proportion). Consequently, there is a need to establish a plausible 
base-line equivalence scale for the empirical analysis. 
Given the thesis' objectives, it is logical to turn to Portuguese experience to decide 
upon the reference scale. The only study where equivalence factors were derived 
econometrically from Portuguese expenditure data is Santos (1984), who produced two 
scales based on the Engel and Prais-Houthakker models of household behaviour. These 
scales have, however, scarcely been used in subsequent research, since they draw on 
data from the early seventies when family expenditure patterns were markedly different 
from what they are now, and because the range of goods considered (food and clothing) 
was rather limited. Furthermore, as Coulter et al (1992a) argue, in a comprehensive 
review of equivalence scale methodologies, "budget data scales do not have a monopoly 
of virtue with respect to (other scales explicitly based on) normative judgements" (p. 
95). Indeed, they suffer from a number of well-known conceptual and empirical 
weaknesses. 6 
6 For example: (i) the identification problems raised by Pollak and Wales (1979) imply that 
econometric analysis of expenditure data cannot provide a single 'correct' equivalence scale; (ii) the 
reliance on consumer behaviour effectively makes consumer sovereignty the sole basis of welfare 
judgements, which can lead to ethically unappealing outcomes (Fisher, 1987); (iii) budget data studies 
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Distributional studies involving Portuguese data have tended to rely on normative 
scales prescribed by international organizations. The National Statistical Institute, for 
example, uses the ILO scale. Virtually all income inequality research has, however, 
drawn on the scale recommended in the OECD List of Social Indicators (eg. Teekens, 
1990; Rodrigues, 1993; Ferreira, 1993; Costa, 1994). This is a very simple construct 
which assigns a weight of 1.0 for the first adult, 0.7 for other adults and 0.5 for children 
aged less than 14. Although there are no strong conceptual reasons to accept the OECD 
scale for the present study, it does have the advantage of maintaining comparability with 
previous Portuguese research. The choice of any other scale could only be justified if 
it was clearly more appropriate. Since this is not the case, the OECD's suggestion is 
used as the reference scale throughout the empirical analysis. It is worth stressing, 
however, that the sensitivity analysis of section 5.4 shows that the scale does not 
produce results which are greatly at odds with those obtained through the Santos or ILO 
relativities. 
The income values N,, were equivalized as: Ej = Njk, / n*, where Ej is equivalent 
income and n* is the number of equivalent adults in the family. Equal weighting was 
assumed with each family member being attributed the value Ej. Therefore, the 
resulting income distribution is the individual distribution of equivalent net income. 
This variable was used to rank the population when computing the health concentration 
indices. 
5.2.3 Measurement of health 
Measurement of health status is probably the most debated issue in health services 
research. McDowell and Newell (1987) pinpoint the problem rather well: 
"There will probably always be a debate over how best to measure health, and one 
reason for the debate lies in the complexity and abstract nature of health itself. 
Like attitude or motivation, health cannot be measured directly ... [T]here is no 
concentrate solely on private goods and services, but time allocations, leisure and non-cash 
consumption are also relevant to family well-being; and (iv) the econometric analyses invariably 
include a number of nornwtive choices (eg. characteristics used to distinguish family types) whose 
empirical robustness is hardly ever addressed. 
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standard scale for health; rather, its measurement relies on assembling a number 
of indicators, each of which more or less adequately represents an element of the 
overall concept" (p. 12). 
The indicators used in this chapter are measures of sey-reported morbidity. They focus 
on particular physiological deficits or consequences of ill-health, thereby providing 
partial measurements of true underlying health status. There is no attempt to construct 
a global health index given that the INS data does not lend itself well to such a task. 
Instead, the heterogeneity of the INS morbidity measures is used to draw out aspects of 
critical importance to health-equity evaluations. Among these are the severity of illness 
experienced by individuals and cause-specific disease prevalence, both of which have 
been insufficiently addressed in previous economic research. 
The choice of indicators is based on Blaxter's (1989) useful classification of 
morbidity measures commonly found in health surveys. She distinguishes between three 
categories according to underlying conceptual model: (i) a social-interactional or 
functional model, in which ill-health is defined in terms of incapacity to perform 
'normal' tasks or roles; (ii) a subjective model, in which ill-health is defined in terms 
of an individual's perception; and (iii) a medical model, defining ill-health in terms of 
pathology or deviation from physiological norms. Blaxter's schema actually reflects the 
distinction that is often made between sickness, illness and disease. 
Definitions and summary statistics of the indicators used in the analysis are shown 
in Table 5.1. There are six variables conforming to the social-functional model. The 
first three measure the number of days, in a 2-week reference period, that an individual 
experienced a particular disfunction: namely, confinement to bed, absence from work 
or school and restricted activity. The remainder are dummy variables indicating the 
prevalence of the same disfunctions (eg. bedridden attributes a value I to all persons 
who experienced at least one bed day during the reference period). I follow the 
convention in the literature in describing these six indicators as measures of disability. 
The subjective health model is not well represented in the INS. The typical survey 
question whereby respondents are asked to assess their general health as "good, fair or 
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not good" was not included in the 1987 survey. Persons who reported no disability days 
were, however, asked if they felt "ill" or "unwell". The responses to this question make 
up the illness indicator. Given that persons reporting functional disability are excluded, 
it is likely that, on average, this indicator reflects less serious conditions. 
Eleven measures were chosen as representative of the medical model. The first 
ten are based on supplementary information to the disability and self-assessment 
questions. For example, limiting chronic indicates persons whose disability in the 
reference period is the result of a medical condition present for at least three months. 
The INS also enquires about the precise pathology which caused disability or illness. " 
The variables listed from acute to chronic respiratory were constructed from this 
information. Diseases are distinguished on the basis of (i) acute and chronic 
pathologies, and (ii) broad ICD categories. In the latter case, the five most prevalent 
disease groups identified in Chapter 2 (Figure 2.1) were chosen. Disability or illness 
of the respiratory system is also further disaggregated into acute and chronic pathologies, 
given that in this case the implications for the health of individuals are particularly clear. 
Acute respiratory illness (eg. colds, influenza, upper respiratory infection) seldom leads 
to serious or prolonged health problems, whereas chronic manifestations (eg. 
emphysema, asthma, chronic bronchitis) have a profound impact on the quality of life 
of sufferers. The final 'medical' indicator - prevalence of high blood pressure - is 
distinct in the sense that it refers to a predisposing condition and also because it was 
generated by the interviewer providing the respondent with a check-list of diseases. 
It is important to recognize the advantages and limitations of these variables as 
instruments for measuring health inequity. Four basic criteria that one might expect 
such indicators to meet are: (i) relevance; (ii) validity; (iii) independence of the decision 
to report from cultural and economic bias; and (iv) ability to distinguish between 
different degrees of ill-health. In one sense, all the indicators are relevant. They are 
' Individuals are asked to report either the disease or the four main symptoms experienced. This 
information is then codified by the interviewer according to an adaptation of the ICD-9 classification, 
specially geared to illness. The information is later verified by survey staff at the central level, who 
also codify the pathology as acute, chronic or symptomatic. The validity of the data thus generated 
is discussed below. 
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partial measures of underlying health according to the particular model under which 
they are classified. Since all three models are legitimate approaches to defining health, 
it makes sense to compare and contrast the results obtained for each category. The point 
is often made, however, that from the perspective of social policy, disability measures 
are the most suitable (eg. Jazairi, 1976; Culyer, 1978). The important questions for the 
policy-maker are: who is incapacitated by ill-health and what is the time duration of 
their inability to participate in day-to-day activities. Illness which has no social 
consequences is of less interest. Furthermore, it has been shown that, of all 
conventional morbidity indicators, disability days are the most important predictor of 
medical care use (Newman, 1975). 
With regard to validity, there are problems with the 'medical model' variables. 
Given that individuals' awareness of pathology is often imperfect, it is not at all clear 
that a population-based survey can properly ascertain the prevalence of diseases. 
Indeed, where interview data have been compared with medical records, the extent of 
non-correspondence has sometimes been shown to be relatively large (NCHS, 1967; 
Kirscht, 1971). However, this does not mean that self-reports are necessarily invalid. 
Most of the conditions declared will be medically diagnosed. Some will not, but it 
could be argued that a true record of morbidity ought to include those conditions which 
respondents suffer from, can identify in broad medical terms, but never consult about. 
A more serious problem is that responses have been shown to depend on the method of 
eliciting information. Asking persons to name their condition leads to underestimates 
of the prevalence of diseases (NCHS, 1967), whereas providing check-lists tends to 
stimulate reporting (Blaxter, 1989). 8 
The third criterion is in many ways the most important. In measuring inequity, 
we need to be reasonably certain that there is no selection bias, related to income 
position, in the decision to report illness. Many of the chosen variables raise doubts in 
8 Blaxter (p. 207) provides the example of the General Household Survey. Before 1977, about 
a quarter to a third of the population declared 'chronic illness', but when in the 1977 edition a check- 
list of chronic illnesses was introduced, 56% of men and 70% of women identified themselves as 
suffering from one or more of the conditions listed. 
120 
this respect. Better-educated individuals (who also tend to be richer) are likely to give 
more informative answers to the pathology questions. 9 Similarly, self-perceived health 
may be subject to distortion because of cultural norms related to socioeconomic status 
(d'Houtaud and Field, 1984). Undoubtedly too, the work absence indicator (and the 
restricted activity measure, to a lesser extent) may show a degree of bias related to the 
nature of work or social security arrangements. However, such doubts would in effect 
rule out most morbidity measures available in large scale sample surveys. If we wish 
to monitor inequity in a country's health, the best that can be done is to use the 
indicators while at the same time remaining alert to possible biases. 
Finally, it is reasonable to expect that a measure provide some indication of the 
severity of illness, given that there is no simple cut-off point between those who are 
healthy and those who are not. The sickness days measures are useful in this respect, 
since they indicate the time duration of incapacity. In general, longer periods of 
disability will be associated with greater severity. The categorical variables do not 
permit such inferences to be made, when observed in isolation. However, by comparing 
the degree of inequity in, say, acute and chronic disease, it is possible to shed some 
light on the variation of illness severity across income groups. By the same token, 
comparisons of inequity in ICD disease categories provide a means of ascertaining 
whether particular income groups carry a heavier burden of specific diseases. 
In sum, all the morbidity indicators used in this chapter have deficiencies of one 
kind or another; but they also have positive features which render them useful in health- 
inequity analysis. On balance, it would seem that the disability indicators are the most 
acceptable: they are clearly defined, less open to subjective variation, permit inferences 
to be made about the severity of illness and represent a view of health which has greater 
relevance for social policy. 
9 The correlation between equivalent income and years of schooling among adults in the INS 
sample is r=0.57. 
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5.3 Results 
5.3.1 Actual and standardized distributions of morbidity 
Table 5.2 presents the estimated concentration indices for the various morbidity 
indicators. "' There are two sets of calculations: one for the observed distributions and 
another for the age-sex standardized counterparts. Consider first the unstandardized 
results. Without exception, these indicate a negative relationship between equivalent 
income and self-reported morbidity. However, the degree of measured inequity varies 
considerably according to type of illness. The largest absolute values are for the 
disability indicators and the smallest for 'medical model' variables mainly representing 
acute conditions. The concentration curves for seven variables actually cross the 45" 
line. Nevertheless, chi-squared tests on cross-tabulations of morbidity with equivalent 
income quintiles indicate that the relationship between income and illness is statistically 
significant at the 0.001 level for all but the two acute illness variables (acute and acute 
respiratory). This tends to suggest that income related inequity is inexistent for short- 
term illnesses but prevalent when more serious conditions are considered. 
However, there is a possibility that these findings are biased due to the 
confounding influences of intervening demographic variables (ie. the determinants of 
the health production function specified in the diagrammatic framework of the Sen 
approach). Given that age and gender are likely to be systematically associated with 
both income and morbidity, the observed relationship may simply be a reflection of 
distinct age and sex structures at different points of the income distribution. The 
common procedure for dealing with this problem is direct standardization for age and 
sex. " This involves calculating the number of persons (or number of sick days) in a 
" The indices were computed from the micro-data base using the covariance formula shown in 
equation (4.16). Note that the method is valid since the adjustments made to the income variable 
produced a relatively large number of distinct observations (over 500). In common with the rest of 
the literature, confidence limits for the index values were not calculated. Frequency distributions of 
morbidity by equivalent income quintile are shown in Appendix 4 (Tables A4.1 and A4.2), which 
reports further results pertaining to the analysis of this chapter. 
11 The technique of direct standardization is commonly identified with epidemiologists, but it has 
been widely used by economists when measuring socio-econon-dc inequity in health and health care 
(eg. Le Grand, 1978; O'Donnell and Propper, 1991a). 
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Table 5.2: Concentration indices for morbidity 
Actual and age-sex standardized distributions. 
Indicator Concentration Indices 
Actual Standardized 
Bed days -0.203 -0.192 
Off-work days -0.146 -0.126 
Restricted activity -0.159 -0.108 
Bedridden -0.169 -0.160 
Off-work -0.114 -0.080 
Restricted activity -0.120 -0.082 
Illness -0.059 * -0.010 
Limiting chronic -0.124 -0.124 
Acute -0.023 * -0.017 
Chronic -0.094 -0.071 
Circulatory -0.112 * -0.074 
Respiratory -0.021 * -0.014 
Digestive -0.042 -0.035 
Muscoskeletal -0.130 -0.109 
Injury and Poisoning -0.092 -0.088 
Acute respiratory -0.004 * 0.004 
Chronic respiratory -0.058 * -0.055 
ffigh blood pressure -0.072 * -0.039 
* Concentration curve crosses the diagonal 
given income group on the assumption that the group has the same sex-age distribution 
as the whole sample. Naturally, this procedure does not address the issue of causality, 
and would be inappropriate if the aim of the research were to explain inequalities in 
health. However, it is a valid technique for measuring income-indexed health inequity, 
since it removes collinearity between income and demographic factors. The formula 
used to calculate the standardized values was 
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my,, 
. 
ny njk (5.3) 
jk nyjk N 
where myik denotes the number of individuals reporting morbidity (number of days sick 
for the disability days indicators) in the yth income group, jth age group and kth sex; 
nyjk9 the number of individuals in the yjkth income-age sex group; ny, the number of 
individuals in the yth income group; njk, the number of individuals in the jkth age-sex 
group; and N, the sample size. 12 
Given that the process of standardization involves grouping the data by income 
class, the estimated indices for the standardized distribution are less exact than those 
computed from micro data. In order to minimize such bias, standardization was carried 
out using 20 income groups of roughly equal size. Concentration indices were then 
computed from the resulting vingtile frequencies by means of the linear approximation 
method (equation 4.19). The results of the simulation exercise carried out in Chapter 
4 suggest that this approach produces an insignificant degree of bias. " Therefore, the 
indices presented in Table 5.2 permit reliable comparisons of the effect of demographic 
standardization. 
For each type of morbidity the effect of standardization is to reduce the degree of 
measured inequity. This is consistent with findings in other countries [eg. Christiansen 
(1990) for Denmark or O'Donnell and Propper (199 1 a) for the UK], and reflects the fact 
that the elderly, who are generally more susceptible to illness, are disproportionately 
located in lower income groups. The reduction in the degree of pro-rich inequity varies 
between 5 and 25 per cent for most of the morbidity indicators. However, there is a 
much larger variation for the 'subjective' illness measure, with the absolute value of the 
concentration index declining from 0.059 to 0.010. One possible explanation for this 
effect is that subjective evaluations of health status are highly dependent on the 
12 Five age groups were used for age-standardization (0-17 years, 18-34 years, 35-44 years, 45-64 
years, and 65+ years). 
13 Recall from Table 4.1 that linear approximation estimation based on unstandardized income 
vingtile frequencies resulted in a less than I per cent bias relative to the exact micro-data measures. 
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interaction between demographic characteristics and socio-economic position. Thus, 
there may be a significant degree of selection bias in the decision to report illness. 
There is some evidence, for example, that middle-aged poor individuals hold a 
particularly pessimistic view of their own health (eg. Blaxter, 1990). If the conjecture 
is correct, then the rather large degrees of health inequity identified for self-assessed 
health in van Doorslaer et at (1993) - where age-sex standardization was not carried out 
- may be somewhat overstated. 
" 
The standardized indices continue to show varying degrees of inequity depending 
on the type of morbidity under consideration. The largest absolute value (-0.192) is 
recorded for the bed days indicator, which describes the most serious loss of social 
function. The relative frequencies reported in Table A4.2 indicate that the poorest 
income quintile accounts for 28% of all bed days reported compared with 11% for the 
richest. It is noticeable that the disability days indicators reveal a higher degree of pro- 
rich inequity vis-a-vis the prevalence measures based on the same questions. This is 
indicative of greater severity or slower recovery periods in lower income individuals. " 
Further evidence of greater severity among poorer income groups is provided by 
the illness and 'medical' model variables. Recall that illness describes persons who felt 
unwell in the two-week reference period, but suffered no functional incapacity. This 
indicator shows no systematic relationship with income, whereas the disability 
prevalence measures all reveal a significant pro-rich bias. Note also the differences 
between the computed indices for limiting chronic, chronic and acute disease. There 
is scarcely any income related inequality for acute conditions but this rises significantly 
once chronic diseases are considered (particularly if they limit the individual's activity). 
These results are consistent with British evidence. For example, Blaxter (1990), who 
analysed data from the Health and Lifestyles Survey, found that lower income groups 
"' The estimates of health inequality computed by van Doorslaer et al are shown in the Appendix 
as Table A4.6. I do not compare them with those estimated here since they were not age-sex 
standardized. A comparison would be open to the objection that observed cross-national differences 
were simply due to different demographic compositions of the income groups in the various countries. 
15 It also casts doubt on the suitability of broad-based prevalence measures as a means of 
identifying persons with 'equal' levels of health status when measuring horizontal inequity in the 
delivery of care (cf. Chapter 9). 
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were significantly more likely to suffer from multiple and more serious conditions. 
Research based on the General Household Survey also points in the same direction. 
Propper and Upward (1992) computed concentration indices for acute and limiting 
chronic illness in the order of -0.047 and -0.122, respectively. 
The pathology indicators reveal that health inequity is by no means uniform across 
disease categories. There are strong negative associations with income for muscoskeletal 
disease and injury and poisoning but the relationship is rather weak for respiratory 
disease. The latter is in stark contrast to the steep socio-economic gradients commonly 
found for mortality differentials in the same disease category (cf. eg. DHSS, 1980). 
Although there are no comparable mortality data for Portugal, the discrepancy may 
be a sign that inequities in cause-specific death rates are a bad proxy for analogous 
inequities in illness. Note, however, that there is a large difference between the acute- 
and chronic respiratory disease indices and that the concentration curve for chronic 
conditions does not cross the diagonal. This suggests that there is no income related 
inequality for the first case; while in the second, the poor support a relatively high 
burden of illness. Finally, the high blood pressure variable also points to a pro-rich 
bias, although of a reduced degree. 
Figure 5.1 shows the concentration curves for (standardized) limiting chronic and 
acute illness. The two configurations are in fact typical of the curves for other 
variables, which for reasons of space are not shown. " The acute illness curve crosses 
the diagonal twice and does not deviate from it a great deal at all points of the income 
distribution. This is also true of the illness, respiratory and acute respiratory curves, 
confirming the view that there is no systematic relationship of these variables with 
individuals' command over resources. The curves for all other morbidity indicators lie 
everywhere above the 45* line. They are also, like the limiting chronic curve shown, 
generally concave to the population-axis, suggesting that functional incapacity, chronic 
illness and most disease categories, decrease monotonically with income. Therefore, we 
can safely conclude that pro-rich inequity exists for these types of illness. 
"' See, however, the frequency distributions in Table A4.2. 
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Figure 5.1: Concentration curves for two morbidity variables 
Age-sex standardized 
The results are also robust to different distributional perspectives. Table 5.3 
presents generalized concentration indices for six of the variables previously 
examined. " Recall that values of 8 -ý I imply indifference to income related 
inequality; 8=1.5, that greater weight is attached to the top end of the income 
distribution; 8=2, a weighting scheme identical to the standard index (ie. more 
emphasis on modal incomes); and 8=3, greater weight to persons with lower incomes. 
Unsurprisingly, the degree of measured inequity rises as 8 is increased. When there is 
a strong concern for the position of the poor, this has the effect of accentuating the 
absolute differences between inequity levels for each type of morbidity. However, the 
ranking of these levels does not change at 8>1. Therefore, unless one is completely 
disinterested in the relationship between economic inequality and health, the conclusions 
reached by the standard concentration analysis remain valid. 
" The unstandardized and standardized indices were computed by means of equations (4.18) and 
(4.20), respectively. The age-sex standardized vingtile distributions were used in the second case. 
Inequality indifferent indices were computed with 8 set at 1.001. The slight differences in the 5=2 
indices in relation to those reported in Table 5.2, are due to rounding error. Generalized equivalent 
income Gini's were also computed. The following values were found: 0.001 at 8--l; 0.229 at 8--1.5; 
0.346 at 8--2; and 0.467 at 8--3. 
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Table 5.3: Generalized concentration indices for selected morbidity indicators 
Values of 8=1.0.1.5,2.0 and 3.0 
Value of 8 Bed Off work Restr. act. Limiting Acute Chronic 
days days days chronic 
Unstandardized 
1.0 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
1.5 -0.126 -0.093 -0.099 -0.079 -0.014 -0.063 
2.0 -0.203 -0.146 -0.160 -0.125 -0.023 -0.094 
3.0 -0.274 -0.197 -0.218 -0.166 -0.029 -0.106 
Standardized 
1.0 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
1.5 -0.114 -0.079 -0.065 -0.077 -0.010 -0.047 
2.0 -0.193 -0.127 -0.108 -0.121 -0.017 -0.069 
3.0 -0.290 -0.180 -0.162 -0.176 -0.026 -0.092 
5.3.2 Distribution of morbidity by age grout) 
The standardization procedure used above has obvious merits but also some 
drawbacks. One is that it obscures information that may be useful to the policy maker. 
In particular, since the morbidity experience of different age groups is conflated into a 
single number, it is no longer possible to examine inequity at different stages of the age 
cycle. It is important that this be done for two reasons: (i) because illness at different 
ages has different causes, and (ii) because opposing socio-economic trends in different 
phases of the life cycle may cancel each other out. Thus, although standardization is 
a useful device for measuring the overall level of health inequity, a detailed analysis 
requires that the global estimates be disaggregated by relevant age groups. 
The approach taken here is to compare the degree of income related inequality 
within age groups. The INS data were divided into five sub-samples, respectively 
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comprising individuals aged under 18,18-34,35-44,45-64 and 65 years or more. Age- 
specific concentration indices were then computed for twelve of the morbidity indicators 
examined previously. " Note that this method does not indicate the contribution of age 
to overall inequality. For that purpose, the appropriate measures would be the 
generalized entropy indices discussed in Chapter 4, which would provide an 
unambiguous decomposition into within- and between-group components. The present 
method seeks only to provide a succinct quantitative description of health inequity at 
different stages in the life cycle. 
The main results are shown in Figure 5.2, which plots the computed index values 
for different types of morbidity. The actual values are shown in the Appendix as Table 
A4.3. Chi-squared tests were also run on the data to verify the significance of the 
association between morbidity and income at different ages. These are important 
because of the likelihood of small numbers reporting particular types of illness in some 
age groups. The results are shown in Table A4.4. Note that the distributions were not 
sex-standardized as this was found to have a negligible impact on the degree of 
measured inequity. 
There are two basic patterns to the results. One, where pro-rich inequity is non- 
existent in childhood and adolescence, particularly high in middle age and lower, but 
still significant, in persons aged over 64; and another, where the relationship between 
income and morbidity is weak across all (or most) age groups. The disability days 
indicators provide the clearest evidence for the first pattern; but similar U-shaped age 
structures are found for the 'medical' model variables: limiting chronic, chronic, 
circulatory, muscoskeletal and injury and poisoning. Note from Table A4.4 that none 
of these indicators show a significant association with income for the under 18 age 
group. Thus, although varying levels of the concentration index are computed (ranging 
between -0.088 and +0.035) the results are not strong enough to suggest that either rich 
" The excluded indicators are the prevalence of incapacity measures, acute and chronic respiratory 
disease and high blood pressure. Note that the off-work days indicator is included even though it is 
less relevant at the extremes of the age structure. The justification is that the measure also includes 
days absent from school (72% of under 18's in the sample were either studying or in the workforce); 
and that a significant number of over 64's (25%) were still in work. 
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or poor are favoured. " In adulthood, however, poorer individuals report comparatively 
higher levels of the types of morbidity indicated. In middle age, the degree of inequity 
is large and highly significant. The high index value computed for the circulatory 
variable in the 35-44 age group may be a sign that poorer individuals are more prone 
to experience heart and cerebrovascular disease at an early age. The pro-rich bias 
declines in old age, but is still statistically significant for most morbidity categories. 
The second age pattern is shown quite clearly by three indicators: non- 
incapacitating illness and the variables representing acute and digestive system 
conditions. In each case, negative values of the concentration index were computed for 
the adult population; and positive values for the under 18 age group. However, the 
degree of inequality is relatively low at all ages and the chi-squared test is seldom 
passed. Therefore, the measurements for these types of illness point to a generally weak 
association with income throughout the age cycle. 
There are a number of points to note about these results. First, the two age 
configurations seem to be broadly associated with illness severity. Those types of 
morbidity that are on average less serious (ie. acute and non-incapacitating illness) 
belong to the second group; whereas, chronic and incapacitating illness belong to the 
first. It is noticeable too that the age-inequality U-shape is more pronounced for bed 
days than it is for days of restricted activity. Though both are a form of disability, the 
latter involves a less severe loss of social function. Therefore, pro-rich levels of 
inequity are greatest in the middle years the more serious the type of illness. If, as 
seems quite plausible, prevalence of chronic conditions and functional incapacity are 
better predictors of underlying health status, the results point to a more rapid 
deterioration of health in those who are economically disadvantaged. Future policy 
initiatives should perhaps pay particular attention to this situation, not least because of 
the resource consequences it holds (eg. lost production, increased use of public health 
and social services, etc. ). 
" The indices for circulatory and muscoskeletal disease at age < 18 are not plotted in Figure 5.2 
since they are clearly affected by the small number of individuals reporting illness (7 and 34 
respectively). For all other indicators, there are at least 80 persons reporting illness in each age group. 
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Another important finding is that there appears to be no inequity in the distribution 
of morbidity among children and adolescents. Similar evidence is available for the U. K. 
(eg. West, 1988; Macintyre and West, 1991), though none of these studies uses 
equivalent income as the ranking variable. An obvious implication is that the common 
practice of excluding children in overall assessments of health inequity in a particular 
country may lead to an overstatement of the pro-rich bias. Some caution is, however, 
necessary over these results. It may be that population-based survey measures of 
morbidity are not particularly appropriate for young, generally healthy individuals; in 
which case, future work should attempt to develop improved morbidity indicators that 
better capture the health experience of children and adolescents. Furthermore, richer 
parents may show a greater propensity to report their children as ill. It is noticeable 
that, even though the associations between income and morbidity are insignificant, there 
is a positive sign for the non-incapacitating illness variable, but negative signs for the 
more objective disability days measures. 
Finally, there is one morbidity indicator which does not fit well into either of the 
two age patterns identified above. The respiratory disease measure is distinct in 
showing a pro-poor bias among adults aged under 45. It is possible that, were 
confidence limits to be placed on the index values, the age configuration would not be 
too different to that of the illness, acute and digestive variables. However, the 
statistically significant relationship found for the 35-44 age group (see Table A4.4) 
provides some evidence that the pro-poor bias is real. One possible explanation for this 
result is the differential in smoking habits between income groups. Unlike northern 
european countries, Portugal still has a higher prevalence of smoking among the better- 
off. The differences appear to be particularly high among 35-44 year olds. 20 Given 
that general levels of morbidity are not very high among this age group, habitual 
smoking may be the main factor behind the observed pro-poor distribution. 
" The following smoking prevalence rates by equivalent income quintile (from poorest to richest) 
were computed from the INS data for the 35-44 age group: 17%; 21%; 19%; 23%; and 31%. 
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5.4 The effect of different equivalence scale relativities 
The rest of the chapter is dedicated to measuring the effect of different 
equivalence scale relativities on computed index values. This has two purposes: (i) to 
check the robustness of the earlier results, and (ii) to inform future distributional 
comparisons of a cross-national or intertemporal nature. The analysis is relevant to all 
studies that seek to measure income related health and health care inequalities; and in 
particular, those that adopt the line of research initiated by Wagstaff et al (1989). It 
hardly needs to be stressed that equivalence scale adjustments are but one of the 
measurement issues for which sensitivity analysis is advisable in these type of 
studies. " Nevertheless, the fact that the procedure is common to all measurements of 
economic inequality in the domain of health, while at the same time no general 
agreement exists over the 'correct' equivalence scale to use, suggests that the space 
given over to the issue in this chapter is justified. 
The impact of equivalence scales on measurements of health inequality is not 
immediately obvious. The effect depends crucially on the relationship between health, 
income and the family characteristics that go to make up the scale. Coulter, Cowell and 
Jenkins (1992b) have provided a rigorous analysis of the impact of different scales on 
measurements of income inequality and poverty. They note that the effect on the Gini 
coefficient is particularly difficult to ascertain. This is because concentration measures, 
unlike most other indices of inequality, aggregate incomes on the basis of rank ordering. 
In our case, the scope for establishing a priori results is even more limited given the 
inter-relationship with health. All that can be said is that changing the value of the 
equivalence deflator may lead to changes in the rank order of individuals; and that these 
will generally lead to changes in measured inequality. 22 The direction of the effect on 
index values is not clear. It, therefore, needs to be established empirically. 
" Others include: the choice of inequality measures (exan-dned in this study by means of the 
parametric indices); the method of aggregating health care consumption in studies of inequity in 
delivery; the choice of cut-off point in multiple category morbidity indicators [see Wagstaff and van 
Doorslaer (1994)]; incidence assumptions in health care financing analyses; and so on. 
22 The exception is where the configuration of health profiles is such that re-ranking effects are 
cancelled out. 
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For reasons of tractability and clearer recognition of scale effects, I assume that 
all equivalence scales can be characterized simply in terms of family size and a single 
key parameter. Buhmann et al (1988) have shown that several scales currently used in 
empirical work - including those that are based on other family characteristics 
in 
addition to size - can be conveniently summarized in this manner. Their scale 
is 
Si (5.4) 
with S, representing the size of jth family and e, the elasticity of family 'need' with 
respect to size. Income values are equivalized by dividing observed family incomes by 
M,. Larger values of e correspond to smaller econon-&s of size. A value of e=0 
implies no adjustment for size, while e=I corresponds to taking per capita income. 
Scales based on subjective evaluation of what is needed "to get along" (ie. the Leyden 
School approach) tend to produce relatively low values of the elasticity; those based 
on econometric analysis of consumption patterns or on the relativities implicit in social 
welfare payments produce intermediate values; and normative scales (which Buhmann 
et al call 'expert statistical'), are represented by high size elasticities typically greater 
than 0.70.23 
Figure 5.3 shows the empirical effect on income related health inequality of 
assuming equivalence elasticities in the range 0 to 1. Computations were carried out for 
four of the morbidity indicators considered earlier: bed days, off work days and limiting 
chronic and acute disease. The data points shown are concentration index values for 
the all-sample unstandardized distributions. " The results show clearly that different 
equivalence scale relativities have an appreciable effect on inequality estimates. Making 
23 Unique representations of the Buhmann et al scale (or slight variations thereof) have been used 
in a number of income (re-)distribution studies (eg. Rainwater, 1992; Aronson et al. 1994); and also 
in health economic research [eg. the Italian, Spanish and Portuguese country studies in the volume 
by Van Doorslaer et al (1993)]. Coulter et al (1992a, 1992b) use the formula to measure the impact 
of scale relativities on computations of income inequality and poverty, in very much the same way as 
it is used here to measure the impact on illness concentration indices. 
' The analysis was also repeated on the age-sex standardized distributions of the bed days and 
off-work days variables. This was found to have no appreciable effect on overall conclusions. Since 
the objective of the analysis is to illustrate the effect of scale relativities, rather than obtain precise 
measurements of the extent of inequity. all measurements shown are for the unstandardized, 
distributions. The advantage of this option is that it is less demanding in terms of computations. 
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Figure 5.3: Impact of equivalence scale relativities on measured health ineguity 
Unstandardized concentration indices 
no adjustment for family size leads to health inequality estimates which are between 
70% and 220% greater than if per capita income was taken as the ranking variable. It 
is noticeable also that the inequality ranking of the limiting chronic and off work days 
variables changes as e is increased, suggesting that the earlier conclusions regarding 
inequality in different types of illness could change if a different equivalence scale had 
been adopted. Perhaps the most important feature of the results is that the extent of 
inequality declines quasi-linearly as the equivalence scales become more generous to 
larger families. This is in marked contrast to the effect on the Gini coefficient of 
equivalent income, the graph of which against e is distinctly U-shaped. The values for 
this measure in the range of elasticities shown in Figure 5.3 are: 0.358,0.351,0.345, 
0.342,0.347 and 0.357. A similar pattern is shown by Coulter et al's (1992a, b) 
calculations using the UK 1986 FES. Note also that the relative effects on computed 
index values appear much larger in the case of morbidity concentration coefficients. 
The difference between the maximum and minimum estimates for the Gini are only 5%. 
These results may be challenged on the grounds that they are essentially driven 
by the categorical income variable available in the INS. Changing the value of the 
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equivalence elasticity changes the income ranking. If the number of income 
observations is small very few rank changes can have a pronounced effect on measured 
inequality. I cannot provide conclusive evidence on this issue, but there are a number 
of points which suggest that the findings are valid. First, the number of distinct income 
observations produced by the interpolation procedures is quite high. Though many 
people are left with equal income levels this is also true of real world situations. 
Second, if the induced reranking is thought to have a crucial influence on the disparity 
of health inequality estimates then it should affect the measure of income inequality in 
a similar manner. However, the 5% difference found for the Gini coefficient is less than 
the 8% reported by Coulter et al (I 992a, p. 107) for continuous income data. Third, the 
results in this section are confirmed in Chapter 7, where a similar procedure is used to 
measure the impact of scale relativities on progressivity estimates. The analysis uses 
continuous income data from household budget surveys. The effect of increasing e on 
health care payments concentration indices is also to reduce the degree of measured 
inequality in a quasi-linear fashion. Generally, the impact of different scale relativities 
is quantitatively smaller than in the present case, but the most likely explanation is not 
the income measure as such, but the nature of the health or health care variable under 
analysis. The strong effect shown in Figure 5.3 may be due to the scale on which ill- 
health is measured. Rank changes in the income distribution will have pronounced 
effects on measured health inequality because the scale for morbidity may be a simple 
dichotomous category. Since most morbidity indicators are categorical rather than 
continuous, there is likely to be a significant impact on health inequality measures when 
equivalence scale relativities are changed. Finally, it is also the case that many health 
surveys are restricted to categorical income data. If researchers are to adequately 
measure income-indexed health inequality, then they have little choice but to adopt the 
interpolation procedures used in this chapter. Therefore, there is a case for accepting 
the findings of Figure 5.3 and indeed for extending the analysis to draw further 
implications for future research. 
Although a systematic relationship between income related health inequality and 
equivalence scale relativities has been established, the analysis does not indicate 
conclusively if the earlier results are robust or not. The alternative scales that might 
have been chosen may well be characterized by a narrow range of e values. It is 
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unlikely, for example, that non-adjusted or per capita income would be used since both 
provide an unrealistic measurement of individuals' potential command over resources. 
On a more general level, it is also important to know if the effect on index values is 
likely to affect cross-country comparisons. It may be that observed differences in levels 
of health inequity between countries are so great that the choice of equivalence scale is 
irrelevant to final conclusions. One may also take the view that different countries (or 
the same country at different points in time) should indeed adopt different scales, 
reflecting variations in family 'needs'. 
Definitive answers to these questions are beyond the scope of this study, but some 
light may be shed on them by further sensitivity analysis. Drawing on the work of 
Buhmann et at (1988), 1 calculated the implicit family size elasticities of the scales used 
in previous portuguese research and in the ECuity study as reported in van Doorslaer 
et at (1993). Values of the parameter e were estimated by ordinary least squares from 
the INS data file through the equation: 
Log (Ej) =e Log (Sj) +c. (5.5) 
Ej represents the number of equivalent adults, Sj fan-dly size and e, the equivalence 
elasticity. The full results are shown in the Appendix as Table A4.5, together with a 
description of each equivalence scale. Judging by the values of the computed R-squares, 
the Buhmann et al formula does indeed provide a reasonable empirical approximation 
to all equivalence scale relativities. The explained variance for six of the scales is over 
98% and only slightly less for the other two. Age gradation in the scales appears to 
make no difference to the goodness of fit of the regression line. 
The estimated e values for the scales used previously in portuguese research are 
0.77 for the OECD scale; 0.82 for the ILO scale; and 0.78 and 0.86 for the Santos 
(1984) econometric scales. Clearly, the family size elasticities of these scales are very 
similar, suggesting that measurements of income-indexed health inequity are unlikely 
to be greatly affected by choosing any of the four. 25 
" It is interesting to note that the estimate of e for the OECD scale is greater than that obtained 
by Buhmann et al who report a value of 0.73. This is due to different distributions of family size in 
the samples used. I replicated the analysis on both the 1980/81 and 1989/90 Portuguese Family Budget 
Surveys and the same value of e=0.77 was revealed. The most likely explanation is that average 
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Table 5.4: Implicit (or explicit) family size equivalence elasticities 
adopted in the ECuity study 
Country study Scale used Fam. size elasticity 
Denmark OECD 0.769 
France OECD 0.769 
Ireland Irish scale 0.677 
Italy None 0.000 
Netherlands Dutch scale 0.454 
Portugal Buhmann et al formula 0.600 
Spain Buhmann et al formula 0.400 
Switzerland Swiss scale 0.590 
United Kingdom CSO/DSS 0.690 
The elasticities of the scales used in the ECuity study are summarized in Table 
5.4. Two countries (Spain and Portugal) used explicit values of the Buhmann et al 
elasticity to adjust the distribution of incomes in their surveys. The Italian study used 
a value of e=0.40 in the finance side analysis, but left family incomes unadjusted for 
the delivery side due to lack of information on family structures. France and Denmark 
used the OECD scale; and the remaining countries used national scales. There is a 
much larger variation in the e values of the ECuity scales than was found for the 
"Portuguese" ones. Note, however, that if adjustments based on arbitrary values of e 
are excluded, the range of elasticities is (0.454,0.769). " 
family size is higher in the Portuguese samples than in that used by Buhmann and others. Similar 
exercises on different data sets are also likely to reveal small variations in the estimates of e. 
2' A recent paper by the ECuity group (Wagstaff et at, 1994) has used a parametric scale 
suggested by Aronson et at (1994). This scale is defined as 
Mi ý' (SA + 000 9 
0: 5 ý: 5 1.0: 5 0 : r. I 
where SA is the number of adults in the family, sc the number of children, and ý and 0 are parameters, 
the former determining the importance of children and the latter an equivalence elasticity with 
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As a final step in the analysis, illness concentration indices were computed by 
assuming each of the eleven different income adjustments used in portuguese research 
and in the ECuity study. The results are shown in Table 5.5. Consider first the 
implications of these measurements for the question of robustness of the earlier results. 
The obvious frame of reference is the results produced by the other "portuguese" scales. 
These show that the degree of pro-rich inequity is slightly less than that estimated under 
the OECD assumptions. However, the effects are not strong enough to warrant 
changing any of the conclusions reached by the earlier analysis. The measurements for 
the bed days, off work days and limiting chronic variables continue to show relatively 
high degrees of inequality, whereas the acute indicator still shows a very slight pro-rich 
bias. It may be argued, nevertheless, that none of the "portuguese" scales provide an 
accurate picture of current equity-relevant non-income differences between persons. 
This was the view taken by the portuguese report in the ECuity study, which used a 
value of e=0.60 to adjust family incomes (Pereira and Pinto, 1993). It was conjectured 
that the Santos (1984) scales were unduly generous to larger families, because the 
econometric analysis was based solely on food and clothing expenditures. If other items 
of consumption had been included (eg. housing, energy, transportation, etc. ) economies 
of scale would in all probability have been found to be higher. While the argument is 
relevant, the choice of e=0.60 may seem too strong a departure from other scale 
relativities used in portuguese research. Such a judgement is, of course, only possible 
now that the implicit e values have been estimated. Nevertheless, it is reassuring to find 
that for the four morbidity variables considered, the earlier conclusions are still valid. 
At e=0.60, the indices show values between 12 and 23 per cent greater than under the 
OECD assumptions, but the ranking of the indicators remains the same. Therefore, it 
is fair to say that the earlier results are robust in terms of other probable equivalence 
scale relativities. 
With regard to the implications for cross-country comparisons, the first question 
that needs to be asked is whether the impact of changing e is quantitatively significant? 
An instructive comparison can be made with the variation in estimates of health 
analogous properties to Buhmann et al's e. Wagstaff et al (1994) set both parameters equal to 0.5. 
1 calculated the implicit e-value of this scale using the INS data and found e=0.439 (W = 0.986). 
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Table 5.5: Impact of eguivalence scale relativities on measured health inequity 
"Portuguese and ECuity study scales. Unstandardized concentration indices 
Equivalence scale Bed days OfTwork Limiting Acute 
days chronic 
"PORTUGUESE" SCALES 
Santos 1 -0.164 -0.131 -0.097 -0.022 
Santos 11 -0.199 -0.145 -0.121 -0.023 
ILO -0.178 -0.139 -0.108 -0.022 
OECD -0.203 -0.146 -0.124 -0.023 
Percentual difference from OECD scale 
Santos 1 80.8% 89.4% 77.9% 92.8% 
Santos H 97.7% 99.1% 97.5% 99.7% 
ILO 87.5% 95.2% 86.4% 95.4% 
OECD 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
ECUrrY STUDY 
Italy -0.324 -0.205 -0.231 -0.040 
Spain -0.278 -0.181 -0.185 -0.033 
Netherlands -0.270 -0.178 -0.178 -0.032 
Switzerland -0.240 -0.164 -0.152 -0.029 
Portugal -0.240 -0.163 -0.152 -0.028 
Ireland -0.222 -0.154 -0.137 -0.025 
United Kingdom -0.218 -0.152 -0.134 -0.024 
Denmark & France -0.203 -0.146 -0.124 -0.023 
Percentual difference from OECD scale 
Italy 159.3% 139.9% 185.3% 170.5% 
Spain 136.7% 123.5% 148.8% 143.0% 
Netherlands 133.0% 121.4% 142.9% 138.7% 
Switzerland 118.3% 111.8% 122.4% 123.6% 
Portugal 118.3% 111.7% 122.2% 122.8% 
Ireland 109.1% 105.0% 110.1% 108.3% 
United Kingdom 107.0% 103.6% 107.9% 104.5% 
Denmark & France 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
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inequality for nine european countries presented in van Doorslaer et al (1993). The 
absolute differences between the lowest and highest C. values reported in that study are 
0.14 for chronic illness and 0.20 for self-assessed health and limiting chronic illness. 
The latter indicator is particularly relevant since it is common to both studies. Table 5.5 
suggests that, for a given joint distribution of health and income, the range of scale 
relativities adopted by the nine countries can itself lead to an absolute variation of 0.11 
points in inequality estimates. This is more than half of the observed inter-country 
variation in Van Doorslaer et al (1993). Furthermore, there is a strong possibility that 
rankings would change if particular countries adopted a scale other the one chosen. For 
example, Denmark which has a mid-ranking score on the chronic illness indicator might 
well emerge as the most inequitable country if its incomes were deflated by, say, the 
Dutch scale; Switzerland, which has less inequality than Italy for self-assessed health, 
would very likely reverse positions if it adopted the Italian scale. Therefore, the 
quantitative impact of scale relativities on cross-country comparisons is far from 
negligible. 
A more important question, however, is whether these effects are conceptually 
significant? Should we view the scale-induced variation as a form of statistical bias or 
as the inevitable result of differing circumstances between countries? The answer 
depends crucially on whether the scales chosen to deflate each country's incomes are 
an accurate representation of the relationship between income, family composition and 
levels of economic well-being in different countries. If they are, then use of country- 
specific scales is legitimate. However, it is not too difficult to raise doubts about the 
choices actually made in van Doorslaer et al (1993). Six countries (DK, F, I, P, E, and 
CH) used scales which bear no known empirical relationship to the joint distribution of 
income and 'needs' among their citizens. Of the remainder, the Irish scale is based on 
the relativities implicit in that country's welfare payments. However, as Coulter et al 
(1992a, pp. 99-101) argue, such scales may also be inaccurate (eg. they vary 
substantially according to policy choices rather than actual 'needs'; are typically 
inconsistent with relativities implicit in other parts of the tax and transfer system; and 
seem more appropriate for distributional assessments concerning the bottom tail of the 
27 See Table A4.6. 
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income distribution rather than its full range). This leaves the UK and Dutch scales 
which were in fact derived empirically from budget data. As mentioned earlier, 
however, this apparent advantage may not mean a great deal: econometric equivalence 
scales also rest on potentially controversial normative judgements and their results 
clearly depend on the measurement approach and particular model chosen [Bradbury 
(1989); Coulter et al (1992a, 1992b); Nelson (1993)]. 
In short, no single scale used by the ECuity researchers can categorically be 
assumed to truly represent the underlying relationship between income and 'needs' in 
a particular country. This does not mean that the scales were wrongly chosen. Rather, 
it accepts that the state of the art is such that a 'correct' equivalence scale is well-nigh 
impossible to find. "A range of equivalence scales is ... not only inevitable but also 
legitimate" [Coulter et al (1992a, p. 79)]. In these circumstances, and given that 
different scale relativities quite evidently contribute to observed variations in health 
inequality estimates, it is advisable that future cross-national comparisons seek to assure 
that the results are not unduly affected by those differences. 
What then should be done? Recent cross-national studies of income distribution 
have invariably opted to use a common scale [eg. O'Higgins et al (1990); Nolan and 
Callan (1992); Rainwater (1992)]. However, this approach seems too restrictive. The 
obvious recommendation is that a major role be assigned to the parametric scales 
examined in this section. Quite how that role is materialized is a matter for future 
comparative studies. Calculations may be carried out for a range of scale relativities 
ab initio, or the parametric scales may be used to check the robustness of results 
derived by assuming country-specific or common scales. The main drawback is the 
increased number of computations that are required. However, this seems a price 
worth paying in order to achieve more robust results. In fact, the extra computational 
effort may not be too great. If the evidence for a quasi-linear relationship between 
health inequality estimates and scale relativities is generalizable, then checks for 
robustness may be carried out by choosing two plausible extreme e values. " Of 
course, a great many problems will remain to be solved if well-informed cross-national 
29 On the basis of the estimates shown in Table 5.4, those values may be set at 0.45 and 0.77. 
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comparisons of health domain inequity are to be made. The area of health inequality 
is notoriously problematic owing to cultural influences on the decision to report illness. 
However, by tackling the equivalence scale issue, at least one major area of uncertainty 
will have been removed. 
5.5 Conclusions 
The conclusions to this chapter may be stated simply enough. First, strong 
evidence has been found showing that the distribution of illness among the Portuguese 
population is generally unfavourable to poorer income groups. Second, the overall 
picture masks some important counteracting trends. For example, less serious illnesses 
show virtually a uniform distribution across income groups whereas more serious 
conditions are disproportionately concentrated among the less well-off. Also, the age 
dispersion of health inequality shows that poor middle-aged individuals are particularly 
disadvantaged. In contrast, there appears to be no economic differentiation in the health 
experience of children and adolescents, although this evidence may in part be due to the 
inappropriateness of the available morbidity variables for that sub-group of the 
population. Third, the overall results are robust in terms of two crucial methodological 
choices: the method of weighting income groups when aggregating inequality and the 
equivalence adjustments made to the income variable. Finally, it has been shown that 
a degree of caution is necessary when interpreting cross-national results based on 
different equivalence scale relativities. For a given joint distribution of health and 
income, the extent of measured inequity varies considerably according to equivalence 
scale generosity. The implications of these findings are discussed in the concluding 
chapter. 
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Chapter 6 
Measuring Achievement 11: 
The Time-trend of Inequity in Infant Mortality 
"By the year 2000, the actual differences in health status 
between countries and between groups within countries should 
be reduced by at least 25%, by improving the level of health 
of disadvantaged nations and groups. " 
Target I of the common health policy adopted by WHO 
European Region member countries in 1980. 
6.1 Introduction 
Measurement of inequity in health is at its most useful when the prevailing time- 
trend can be established. The single year estimates presented in the previous chapter 
can signal the need for policy intervention (by virtue of the degree of inequity being 
judged undesirable); but they provide no way of knowing whether past or present 
measures are in any way successful. In contrast, a time series of inequity measures can 
inform the policy-maker if the country is moving in the desired direction, or not. It may 
also suggest the type of health and social phenomena that underly changes in the 
distribution, thereby indicating possible corrective measures. 
In Portugal, as in most other countries, the only means currently available for 
examining the time-trend of inequities in health is through data on mortality. The use 
of such data is not without its drawbacks. On the one hand, information on deaths does 
not indicate health among the living (in particular, for diseases where the case-fatality 
ratio is low, the mortality rate will be a gross underestimate of the incidence of the 
condition in the community); and on the other, the scope and accuracy of socio- 
economic information collected at the time of death are somewhat limited. With the 
increasing availability of large scale micro-data bases, which include information on 
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morbidity that may easily be crosstabulated with demographic and economic variables, 
there has naturally been a trend away from using mortality data. This is particularly true 
of work by economists! However, information on deaths does have some advantages. 
First of all, it provides detail on a particular (and important) dimension of the social 
concern for health, that of the length of life. Mortality statistics are, therefore, 
complementary to the morbidity indicators used in Chapter 5, which may be interpreted 
as measuring the "healthfulness" of life (Jazairi, 1976). Secondly, unlike morbidity data 
they do not raise the problem of cultural variability in the rates reported by (or on 
behalf) of different socio-economic groups (d'Houtaud and Field, 1984). The actual 
occurrence is accurately and completely documented in developed countries, although 
some variability remains in the accuracy of cause-of-death and demographic background 
of the deceased. Finally, it is also the case that specific types of mortality are highly 
correlated with increased risks of ill-health in survivors, when both are disaggregated 
by individuals' socio-economic characteristics. According to Tooley (1966, p. 18) and 
Blaxter (1991, pp. 34-35), this is especially true of mortality among infants. Therefore, 
examining inequities in death may, in some circumstances, be an informative means of 
establishing inequities in health. 
The present chapter concentrates precisely on the time-trend of inequity in infant 
deaths (ie. children under I year). This age group has long been recognized as highly 
vulnerable to the adverse living conditions that go hand in hand with poverty. 
Numerous epidemiological studies, both at the aggregate and micro levels, have added 
support to this view (eg. Blaxter, 1981; Paneth et al, 1982; Nersesian, 1988; Stockwell 
et al, 1988). In Portugal, the issue has attracted a good deal of attention from 
researchers and policy-makers. The rapid decline in infant mortality rates witnessed 
throughout the 1970's and 80's is often put forward as an example of improved levels 
of general well-being, not least by government sources. Doubts have been raised, 
however, as to whether the decline was accompanied by improvements in the socio- 
economic and spatial distribution of those rates. All research results to date point to the 
equity gains having been negligible (eg. Kannisto; 1986; Leitdo, 1988). These studies, 
' The work of Le Grand and associates cited earlier (Le Grand and Rabin, 1986; Illsley and Le 
Grand, 1987; Le Grand, 1987) makes extensive use of mortality data, but it does not address the issue 
of socio-economic differences. It simply measures inequality in age-at-death. 
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however, have some important drawbacks discussed in Chapter 2. They cover limited 
time-spans; do not distinguish between the different types of infant mortality; make 
limited use of statistical techniques available for summarizing distributions; or simply 
fail to address the issue of socio-economic differences. 
The present analysis maintains the ethical base of Chapter 3, identifying inequity 
with income-indexed mortality differentials. By implication, the concentration curve 
methodology is also adopted. Routinely published data are used throughout and an 
empirical approach is presented that may be useful for countries with an insufficiently 
developed information base. I first set out the methodology (section 6.2) and then 
present the results (6.3). Section 6.4 discusses the main implications of the findings. 
6.2 Methodology 
The empirical approach is based on the use of geographical observations ranked 
by economic position. The infant population is first disaggregated by mother's place 
of residence, and then ranked by an index of average income levels in the spatial units. 
The cumulative percentiles of these observations together with the respective infant 
death percentiles serve as inputs to the construction of concentration curves. The 
ranking element assures that we are measuring socio-economic differences, albeit at a 
high level of aggregation, and not merely geographical inequalities. 
The procedure is justified by the incompleteness and inaccuracy of more direct 
alternatives. For example, the obvious approach to the problem would be to rank the 
infant population by some proxy of families' economic circumstances, such as the 
father's profession or mother's level of educational achievement, both of which are 
recorded on Portuguese death certificates. This method is adopted by Wagstaff et al 
(1991 a), who use data grouped by occupational class, to compute standard concentration 
coefficients for adult mortality in England and Wales, Finland and Sweden. However, 
in Portugal the quality of socio-economic information on death certificates is known to 
be particularly poor. The National Statistical Institute (INE) only began publishing 
crosstabulations of deaths by occupational class in 1987, and then only for adults of 
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working age. Furthermore, even if the necessary data were readily available, it would 
then have to be linked with data on births, decomposed by the same categories. These 
statistics are also generally not available. Even if they were, it is by no means certain 
that this would provide a satisfactory basis for examining inequity. The linking of 
occupational class data from two sources (recorded in quite different circumstances) is, 
after all, one of the main reasons commonly advanced for doubting the value of 
mortality-based inequity analyses (Power et al, 1991, p. 17). 
The present approach has no such drawbacks. Information on mothers' place of 
residence is generally reliable and complete on both death and birth certificates. The 
economic ranking of geographical units is an area that is relatively well researched. It 
needs to be stressed, nevertheless, that the relationship between mortality and income 
levels is being measured at a high level of aggregation. Persons living within the 
geographical units will obviously have unequal command over resources, to which may 
be associated further inequalities in mortality. If this is true, then the computed indices 
are likely to be biased, showing lesser inequity than is in fact the case. Yet this is a 
problem that is shared by studies that measure socio-economic status directly. Virtually 
all work on mortality has used grouped data, usually by occupational class. Within 
those classes there will also be inequalities. Therefore, given the underdeveloped 
information base and the limitations of alternative methods, there seems to be good 
reason for pursuing the current approach. 
The empirical analysis considers four conventionally used components of infant 
deaths: 
Perinatal mortality. Stillbirths occurring at 28 weeks or more of gestation and 
deaths of live born infants occurring in the first week of life. 
(ii) Neonatal mortality. Deaths occurring in the first four weeks of life; 
(iii) Post-neonatal mortality. Deaths occurring from the fifth week of life up to one 
year; and 
(iv) Infant mortality. Deaths occurring in the first year of life (ie. the sum of neonatal 
and post-neonatal mortality). 
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It is common to express the perinatal mortality rate per thousand live births and 
stillbirths at 28 or more weeks of gestation, and the rates for the other three components 
per thousand live births. The main reason for considering the components separately 
is that they are differentially affected by specific causal factors (WHO, 1970; Jazairi, 
1976; Blaxter, 1981; Edouard, 1985). In particular, neonatal and perinatal deaths are 
more sensitive to hereditary factors, the natural environment and the impact of ante-natal 
and obstretric and perinatal care. Post-neonatal deaths, on the other hand, mainly reflect 
poor conditions in dwellings, bad nutrition and lack of sanitation and hygiene - in short, 
the type of situations that are associated with poverty. 
The unit of observation is the district (n = 18), which is the main geographical 
entity used for administrative and statistical purposes in Portugal. The period of analysis 
is comprised by the years 1971 to 1991 for the infant mortality indicator and 1976 to 
1991 for the other three components. 2 As Table 6.1 shows, there are considerable 
differences in death rates between the districts, both at the beginning and end of the 
period. For example, in 1971 the infant mortality rate varied between 25.9 and 65.7 
deaths per 1000 live births. By 1991, there had been a marked decline in rates 
throughout the country, but the highest recorded value (20.5) was still almost three times 
greater than the lowest (7.4). The ratios between extreme values are greater for the 
neonatal and postneonatal components and smaller for perinatal mortality. 
The economic ranking of the observations was established via a 3-year moving 
average of an index of wages in the construction industry, derived from a continuous 
employment survey carried out by the INE. ' This is the only indicator of living 
standards in the districts that is available for all years under consideration. Although 
the nature of the index might raise doubts as to its ability to proxy the underlying 
2 The different periods of analysis are due to inconsistencies in the published data. For some 
years in the period 1971-75, the published statistics for the neonatal, post-neonatal and perinatal 
components refer to the de facto district of death/birth. I use only data broken down by the mother's 
place of residence. The data sources are: INE, Estattsticas Demogrdficas and INE, Estattsticas de 
SaMe, for the period 1971-86; and Minist6rio da Sadde (DGCSP). Natalidade, Mortalidade Infantil 
e Mortalidade Perinatal 1987191, for the remaining years. The district borders are shown in the map 
presented as Appendix 2. 
' The source is the Anudrio Estattstico (various years). 
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Table 6.1: Mortality rates at the endpoints of period of analLsis 
Infant Neonatal Post-neonat Perinatal. 
1971n6* - National rate 48.3 19.8 13.1 29.1 
Maximum 65.7 30.4 30.5 39.3 
Minimum 25.9 8.0 8.7 15.7 
1991 - National rate 10.7 6.9 3.8 12.0 
Maximum 20.5 10.6 9.9 14.5 
Minimum 7.4 3.3 2.1 6.9 
The infant mortality rate refers to 1971 and the neonatal, post-neonatal 
and perinatal rates to 1976. 
variable of interest, concordance tests with other possible indicators for the years when 
these are available revealed fairly strong positive associations. Values of the Spearman 
correlation coefficient, Kendall's Tau-b and Goodman and Kruskal's Gamma in the 
range 10.65,0.84) were computed for associations between the rank of the chosen index 
and those of 3 standard of living indices (census- regional product- and market research- 
based) in selected years when these were available. This suggests that the analysis is 
robust in terms of choice of available income proxies. ' 
The concentration curves and indices were estimated by using data on the 
numerators (number of deaths) and denominators (live births and still-births) of the four 
mortality indicators. For example, the infant, neonatal and post-neonatal mortality 
curves were constructed by measuring, on the horizontal axis, the cumulative percentage 
of live births with the districts ranked from poorest to richest; and on the vertical axis, 
the cumulative percentage of deaths occuring to infants of mothers residing in the 
4 Nevertheless, actual inequality estimates based on a more general measure of living standards 
are provided in section 6.4. It needs to be stressed that the construction industry wage variable is used 
because there are no other indicators available for all years under analysis. 
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income-ranked districts. A visual representation is available in Figure 6.2, which 
presents the observed concentration curves in the years 1976 and 1991. For the case of 
perinatal mortality, one obviously has to add still births to live births and deaths in order 
to calculate the percentiles. The standard concentration indices (C. ) were computed 
using the linear approximation formula given in equation (4.19), with p, representing 
the cumulative proportion of live births (plus still births in the case of perinatal 
mortality) and rrý. representing the cumulative proportion of respective deaths (plus still 
births for perinatal mortality). 
6.3 Results 
Table 6.2 presents the series of standard concentration indices calculated for the 
four infant death components. All the indices have negative signs, suggesting that lower 
levels of average income are associated with higher mortality rates. The burden of 
infant deaths is, therefore, generally unfavourable to the poorer districts. There is also 
a clear pattern in the relative values of the four indicators. Apart from a short period 
in the late 1980's - which detailed inspection of the data suggests is not an artefact 
effected by the ranking variable - inequity is always greatest for post-neonatal mortality 
and least for the perinatal. and neonatal components. Thus, the closer one gets to birth 
the smaller the degree of inequity. It is, however, worth noting that a larger number of 
deaths are associated with these smaller income differentials (see Table 6.1). 
The most salient finding is, nevertheless, the significant decline in the degree of 
inequity over the two decades. For example, the concentration index for infant 
mortality, which stood at -0.117 in 197 1, had by the end of the period risen to -0.030. 
Between 1976 and 1991, the absolute values of all component indices are at least 
halved, suggesting that the WHO precept cited earlier has already been surpassed. The 
average annual rates of change (reported in the lower part of Table 6.2), suggest that the 
greatest relative 'equity gains' were achieved for the neonatal and perinatal. components. 
Indeed, by 1991 there is virtually no income related inequity in the distribution of these 
deaths. It is also clear that in the late 1970's, the overall decline in inequity levels is 
primarily attributable to improvements in the post-neonatal distribution, but that in the 
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Table 6.2: Standard concentration coefficients. 
Infant mortality and components, 1971-1991 
Year Infant Neonatal Post-neonatal Perinatal 
1971 -0.117 na. na. na. 
1972 -0.102 na. na. na. 
1973 -0.119 na. na. na. 
1974 -0.103 na. na. na. 
1975 -0.109 na. na. na. 
1976 -0.080 -0.028 -0.158 -0.046 
1977 -0.098 -0.068 -0.148 -0.062 
1978 -0.097 -0.063 -0.149 -0.066 
1979 -0.080 -0.034 -0.153 -0.031 
1980 -0.068 -0.054 -0.092 -0.073 
1981 -0.091 -0.075 -0.124 -0.071 
1982 -0.078 -0.056 -0.129 -0.052 
1983 -0.065 -0.043 -0.109 -0.034 
1984 -0.036 -0.030 -0.047 -0.038 
1985 -0.034 -0.023 -0.058 -0.006 
1986 -0.055 -0.061 -0.043 -0.041 
1987 -0.058 -0.044 -0.087 -0.012 
1988 -0.048 -0.050 -0.045 -0.055 
1989 -0.063 -0.070 -0.048 -0.033 
1990 -0.050 -0.032 -0.082 -0.008 
1991 -0.030 -0.007 -0.072 -0.001 
Average rate of annual change 
1976-91 3.9% 4.7% 3.4% 6.1% 
1971-75 1.3% na. na. na. 
1976-80 3.0% -18.4% 8.3% -11.9% 
1981-85 12.6% 14.0% 10.6% 18.3% 
1986-91 7.6% 14.7% -11.2% 16.2% 
na. = not available 
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Figure 6.1: Smoothed time-trend of standard concentration indices. 
Infant mortalitv and components. 1971-1991. 
1980's this role is taken over by the close-to-birth components. ' 
The time-trend is best examined through Figure 6.1, where smoothed plots of the 
index values are presented. ' Pro-rich inequity in infant mortality shows a steady 
decline up to the mid-eighties; it then stagnates at C. - -0.06, but there is a renewal of 
the declining trend after 1989. This general tendency is the result of quite distinct 
movements in the component indices. The distribution of post-neonatal mortality is 
initially very unfavourable to the poorer districts. However, the degree of inequity falls 
rapidly up to the mid-eighties, whereupon the tendency is inverted. By contrast, pro- 
rich inequity in the neonatal component, which starts off at a much lower level, hardly 
' The relative weight of component mortality does not change greatly throughout the period. Post- 
neonatal deaths accounted for 40% of all infant deaths in 1976 and 36% in 1991. 
6 Smoothing of the time series was carried out via a technique sometimes referred to as T4253H 
smoothing. It involves repeated smoothing with running medians of size 4,2,5 and 3, followed by 
hanning (running moving averages). The procedure is available on some statistical packages (eg. SPSS 
for Windows). 
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changes up to the late 80's. It is, however, the moving force behind the renewed overall 
decline at the turn of the decade. Noticeably, this recent inflexion in the neonatal 
tendency is also apparent in the perinatal distribution, which is not surprising given the 
degree of overlap in the indicators. 
An explanation for these trends clearly requires evidence based on multivariate 
analyses. However, bearing in mind the differential impact of causal factors referred 
to earlier, it is quite plausible that the early sharp fall in post-neonatal mortality inequity 
is the result of improved living conditions, particularly in the poorest regions. Prior to 
the mid- 1970's, the remotest parts of the country lacked basic sanitation and income was 
very unevenly distributed. With the advent of democracy in 1974, major improvements 
were rapidly brought about in these areas, and these may have had a decisive impact on 
the distribution of post-neonatal deaths. By the same token, the recent inversion of the 
tendency may be a result of the well-documented increase in poverty in the mid-eighties 
(eg. Franco, 1990). There is also a plausible explanation for the recent decline in 
neonatal and perinatal inequity in terms of improved access to health care. Since the 
early 80's, a number of new hospitals have opened in previously underserved areas and 
the spatial distribution of ante-natal care facilities has also improved (Abel-Smith, 1992; 
Urbano et al, 1993). It may be that these factors provided the necessary stimulus to 
make the distribution of close-to-birth mortality insensitive to underlying income 
differences (as reflected by the income-ranked geographical distribution). 
The concentration curves at the beginning and end of the period shed further light 
on the time-trend of the distributions (Figure 6.2). In 1976, the distribution of infant, 
neonatal and post-neonatal mortality unambiguously favours the better-off districts. ' 
Furthermore, the post-neonatal distribution dominates the infant distribution which in 
turn dominates that of the neonatal period. In 1991, the dominance relationship is 
maintained, but there is a conspicuous decline in pro-rich inequity. Indeed, the curves 
for both infant and neonatal deaths now actually cross the 45' line. It is therefore 
inadvisable to conclude that, in 1991, there is still a pro-rich bias in these distributions. 
7 This is also true of perinatal mortality. Its concentration curve is not shown for presentational 
reasons, but it closely follows the configuration of the neonatal curve. 
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Even so, the fact that the curves initially cross the diagonal from above, means that the 
very poorest districts continue to experience a comparatively high burden of mortality. 
Therefore, it would seem that the equity gains observed throughout the period are 
primarily accounted for by districts where average levels of income are highest. ' 
In order to check the robustness of the results in terms of alternative distributional 
judgements, generalized concentration coefficients (with 5 set at values between 1.0 and 
5.0) were also computed. Given that, in this case, the computational requirements are 
considerably more demanding, the analysis is restricted to five year intervals. The 
results are shown in Table 6.3 and Figure 6.3, which plots the index values presented 
in the Table. 9 10 
As expected, all indices tend to zero when the distributional judgement parameter 
is set at 5 -ý I (computed for 8=1.001). The observer's indifference to economic 
related inequality leads him to infer that the distribution of mortality favours neither rich 
nor poor. At 8=2 the indices are equivalent to the standard coefficients reported in 
Table 6.2. As the parameter is increased beyond 8=2 (reflecting greater weight being 
given to the lower tail of the income distribution), successively greater degrees of pro- 
rich inequity are shown. For example, the sequence of increases in the 1976 perinatal 
distribution is: -0.046 at 8=2; -0.071 at 8=3; -0.088 at 8=4; and -0.102 at 5=5. 
However, it is noticeable that increased levels of inequality aversion have a differential 
impact, depending on the type of mortality under consideration. 
The degree of measured inequity in the post-neonatal distribution is particularly 
' The exception to this trend is the ante-penultimate observation (the Oporto district), which has 
both high living standards and high levels of mortality. Given that it also has the largest number of 
births, a further crossing of the diagonal is induced. This finding - allied to the fact that widespread 
social inequalities are known to exist within the Oporto district - suggests that the geographical 
classification may need to be further disaggregated in order to serve as a better proxy of income 
differences among the Portuguese population. 
9 Note that the post-neonatal diagram in Figure 6.3 has a different scale. 
" The indices were computed according to equation (4.20). Note that P. and Mk represent 
average and district mortality rates rather than number of deaths. The Wk and Ek elements represent 
the same denominators used for calculating the standard concentration indices (ie. live births and still 
births). 
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Table 6.3: Generalized concentration indices 
Infant mortality and components. 1971-1991 
8 1971 1976 1981 1986 1991 
Infant 1.0 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
2.0 -0.117 -0.080 -0.091 -0.055 -0.030 
3.0 -0.166 -0.130 -0.149 -0.080 -0.053 
4.0 -0.186 -0.167 -0.191 -0.010 -0.078 
5.0 -0.195 -0.193 -0.224 -0.112 -0.107 
Neonatal 1.0 na. 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
2.0 na. -0.028 -0.075 -0.061 -0.007 
3.0 na. -0.047 -0.115 -0.082 -0.011 
4.0 na. -0.057 -0.140 -0.090 -0.023 
5.0 na. -0.063 -0.161 -0.099 -0.038 
Post-neonatal 1.0 na. -0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 
2.0 na. -0.158 -0.124 -0.043 -0.072 
3.0 na. -0.259 -0.220 -0.077 -0.134 
4.0 na. -0.334 -0.293 -0.111 -0.189 
5.0 na. -0.390 -0.353 -0.139 -0.242 
Perinatal 1.0 na. -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
2.0 na. -0.046 -0.071 -0.041 -0.001 
3.0 na. -0.071 -0.108 -0.059 -0.004 
4.0 na. -0.088 -0.133 -0.072 -0.010 
5.0 na. -0.102 -0.150 -0.084 -0.017 
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sensitive to changes in the value of 8. Compare, for example, the sequence of 
generalized indices for post-neonatal and perinatal mortality in 1986; or for that matter, 
the sequence of post-neonatal indices in 1991 with the neonatal values in 1981. In both 
comparisons, the standard concentration coefficients hardly differ, but the effect of 
increasing inequality aversion is considerably greater for the post-neonatal 
measurements. This suggests that the poorest districts bear a particularly high burden 
of post-neonatal deaths, and tends to confirm the view that chances of survival in the 
1-12 month age group are highly susceptible to the degree of poverty. 
The basic direction of the time-trend for the component indices does not change 
as greater weight is attached to the tail of the income distribution. Inequities in neonatal 
and perinatal mortality first increase and then decline. Similarly, post-neonatal inequity 
shows the reversed tendency identified earlier. Nevertheless, the degree of change in 
measured inequity is much less at higher levels of inequality aversion. For example, 
between 1976 and 1991, the rate of annual improvement in the 5=5 infant mortality 
indices is 2.8%, which compares unfavourably with the 3.9% change identified in Table 
6.2. For the other indicators the differences between annual rates of change at 8=2 
and 8=5 are: 4.7% - 2.4% (neonatal); 3.4% - 2.4% (post-neonatal), and 6.1% - 5.2% 
(perinatal). A greater concern for the tail of the income distribution, has a conspicuous 
impact on the course of inequity in total infant deaths. At 8=5, the 1981 distribution 
of infant mortality is actually more inequitable than that of ten years earlier. 
Furthermore, the post-1986 improvement, identified by the standard measurements, now 
appears insignificant. Finally, note that at 8 ýý 4, the inequity ranking of the 
components in 1986 reverts to that found for other years at all levels of inequality 
aversion (ie. post-neonatal > infant > neonatal >< perinatal). This suggests that the 
reversal identified by the standard measures for the late 80's is not robust to different 
distributional perspectives. All these results are indicative of the very poorest districts 
supporting a relatively high proportion of infant deaths. They also suggest that the 
generalized concentration coefficient is particularly sensitive to inequities that are the 
result of poor socio-economic conditions. If there is a policy concern for the very 
poorest in society, and not merely for inequality as such, then the generalized 
concentration indices are clearly a useful measurement tool. 
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6.4 Discussion 
The problem of inequity in infant deaths has, for some time, captured the attention 
of researchers and policy-makers in Portugal. Recently, concern has focused on whether 
socio-economic and regional disparities, first identified in the 1970's, have shown signs 
of abating. Given that time series data are available, this question lends itself well to 
the concentration index approach. There is a problem, nevertheless, with regard to the 
choice of variable(s) used to partition the population. Our interest is in mortality 
inequalities that are related to economic status. However, information recorded on birth 
and death certificates that might be used to proxy this variable is generally of poor 
quality and, in any case, has only been published since 1987. Consequently, the present 
analysis has drawn on geographical observations of mortality and births ranked by an 
index of economic position. 
Given that economic status is measured in an indirect manner, the validity and 
reliability of the inequity estimates may well be questioned. Such reservations cannot 
be fully resolved while a suitable alternative is unavailable. Nevertheless, there is no 
doubt that the data approach does address the question of interest. The economic 
ranking of the districts provides an ordering of the population in terms of average 
income levels. Admittedly, there exists a wide variance in commodity choice 
opportunities within the districts, but this is also true of occupational classifications (eg. 
'skilled manual' may include long-term unemployed bricklayers and high earning 
electricians). The important point about the data approach is that a high level of 
aggregation is involved. It is possible that trends in the aggregate-level relationship 
between the socio-economic status and mortality of populations in the districts is quite 
different from the individual-level association between the same variables. However, 
we have no way of knowing since longitudinal individual-level data are not available. 
In these circumstances, the procedure of using geographical observations ranked by 
income levels is a valid method for measuring inequities in the health sphere. For 
countries with an insufficiently developed information base, it may be the only means 
for shedding light on the important question of time trends. 
Doubts may also be raised about the legitimacy of using the construction industry 
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Table 6.4: The effect of usiniz an altemative measure 
of living standards in the districts. Infant mortality 
Year Living standards ranking variable 
Census-based Wage index 
1971 -0.089 -0.117 
1981 -0.082 -0.091 
1991 -0.021 -0.030 
wage index as a measure of living standards in the districts. As I have stressed the 
choice is due to unavailability of more refined proxies in all years under consideration. 
Table 6.4 reports the results of using an alternative proxy. The new measure is based 
on population census information collected in 1971,1981 and 1991. The ranking was 
established by a simple weighted average of the district orderings for three indicators: 
the percentage of population living in urban areas; percentage of dwellings with access 
to electricity, running water and refuse collection; and the adult literacy rate. Though 
the new measure produces lower inequality estimates, the general trends shown by the 
main results are clearly visible. Judging by the concordance tests reported earlier, other 
proxies would also show similar results. 
The results obtained in section 6.3 point to three main conclusions. First, the 
degree of pro-rich inequity is currently much lower than it was in the 1970's. 
Irrespective of the indicator under consideration or the level of inequality aversion 
implied by the measures, the 25% reduction prescribed by the WHO has already been 
surpassed. Secondly, there are important differences in the trends of the four mortality 
components. Close-to-birth mortality inequities seem to have been largely effadicated. 
In contrast, inequity in the distribution of deaths to children aged 1-12 months is once 
again on the increase, after initially showing the greatest fall. The actual rates of these 
deaths are, however, much smaller than those in the earlier period of life. Finally, 
although the overall degree of inequity is much reduced, there are signs that the position 
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of the very poorest has not shown much improvement. This conclusion is suggested by 
both the configuration of the concentration curves and the trend of the inequality averse 
measures. 
There is an apparent disagreement between these results and those of previous 
research. The studies by Kannisto (1986), Pereira et al (1987) and Leitdo (1988) all 
suggest that the degree of inequity in infant deaths has remained more or less stagnant. 
The reason for this discrepancy is plain to see, but it needs spelling out not least for the 
important policy implications it holds. Previous studies have simply measured 
geographic mortality differentials and not whether these are associated with inequality 
in command over resources. They, therefore, address a quite different question to the 
one examined in this chapter. Nevertheless, geographic inequality results are often 
assumed to be a straightforward reflection of economic differences (eg. Santos and 
Hespanha, 1987), in much the same way as the 'north-south divide' in British mortality 
differentials is accepted as clear-cut evidence for inequities related to living standards 
(eg. Whitehead, 1987). The actual time-trend of the two types of inequity may, 
however, be quite different. 
Figure 6.4 compares the evolution of geographic and income-related inequities in 
infant mortality between 1971 and 1991. The plots in the negative region reproduce the 
data presented in Table 6.2 and Figure 6.1 (ie. the observed and smoothed trends of the 
standard concentration indices). The plots in the positive area represent analogous 
trends for the Gini coefficient, which is used to summarize geographic inequalities. " 
Quite clearly, spatial inequalities have not diminished. Throughout the 1970's and 80's 
the trend of the Gini measures hardly diverges from a value of around 0.13. 
Furthermore, the Gini is insensitive to changes in income related inequality. In six of 
the years under analysis (75,80,81,82,87 and 88) the change in the coefficient (vis-a- 
vis the preceding year) is actually sign-antagonic to the change in the concentration 
index. The obvious implication of these findings is that geographical inequalities in 
infant deaths are still pervasive but that they no longer reflect, so decisively, known 
differences in standards of living. If there is a policy concern for area differences, then 
" The Gini was calculated by ranking the districts in ascending order of mortality rate. 
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Figure 6.4: Comparison of concentration and Gini indices for infant mortality, 
1971-91 
it may be useful to target other factors which are known to affect the survival chances 
of infants (eg. very young mothers, mothers of high parity, the distribution of medical 
technology and so on). 
It is important to stress, however, that the overall decline in income related 
inequity should not be interpreted as a sign that the issue no longer merits attention. 
The recent downturn in post-neonatal inequity and the position of the very poorest are 
two specific questions which the results suggest should be monitored carefully. 
Although many of the social and economic circumstances which lead to infant deaths 
may no longer apply in Portugal, some deaths could probably be avoided. This may 
best be achieved by targeting social support and health care resources at persons in 
poverty. 
Finally, although the analysis has been useful in identifying past trends in infant 
health inequity, there is obviously a need for more refined measurement in the future. 
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Essentially, this means access to better data. For example, if small-area observations 
of both mortality and economic variables were available, then the reliability of inequity 
estimates would be improved. Such data have indeed become available in the late 
1980's and could therefore be used in future analyses. It is also important that the 
results are compared with those obtained from individual-level data. This will require 
concerted efforts on the part of researchers and data collecting agencies to guarantee 
acceptable standards of data quality. If possible, the analysis of individual level data 
should be based on linked records, in order to avoid the problem of numerator/ 
denominator bias. Ultimately, however, the results of this chapter point to a new 
situation which requires alternative measures of infant health. The number of deaths 
ocurring each year are now quite low (at the levels of other EU countries) and the 
degree of inequity in their distribution is much reduced. If we still wish to monitor the 
relatiopship between economic disadvantage and infant health, then more sensitive but 
equally objective health indicators are required. These might include birth weight or 
other measures based on clinical examination, many of which could be easily produced 
as part of routine assessments. 
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Chapter 7 
Measuring Advantage: Inequity in Health Care Payments, 1980-1990 
"In general, the poorest members of the population ... have to be 
supported entirely by the State, and richer individuals - for reasons 
of social justice, equity and social solidarity - have to make a 
financial effort towards the maintenance of [health] services. 
That, for me, is the great principle of health care financing". 
Paulo Mendo, Minister of Health (1993, pp. 10- 11). 
7.1 Introduction 
This chapter provides estimates of the degree of vertical inequity in health care 
financing in Portugal, both at the beginning and end of the 1980's. On the basis of the 
earlier normative discussion, a vertically equitable distribution is interpreted as one 
where families' health care payments are positively related to ability to pay. The 
analysis - which basically conforms to the approach adopted in the ECuity study (van 
Doorslaer. et al, 1993) - makes use of the global progressivity indices and associated 
graphical representations discussed in Chapter 4. Values of the Kakwani and Suits 
indices are computed for different sources of finance; namely, direct and indirect 
taxation, social insurance contributions, insurance premiums and out-of-pocket payments. 
The data are drawn from two household budget surveys carried out by the National 
Statistical Institute in 1980/81 and 1989/90. The main result is that, throughout the 
1980's, the distribution of health care payments evolved from being overall progressive 
to overall regressive. This change is shown to be robust in terms of a wide range of 
methodological choices. 
The main focus of the analysis is on providing relevant empirical information to 
the ongoing debate on health care finance in Portugal. When the NHS was created in 
1979, one of the main arguments put forward in its favour was that tax-financing would 
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lead to greater equity in the burden of payments bome by different income groups 
(Assembleia da Rep6blica, 1979). However, the following decade witnessed a marked 
escalation in the share of out-of-pocket financing, as the supply of NHS care proved 
insufficient to meet the growth in demand (see Chapter 2). There were changes too in 
the distribution of particular types of financing. The tax system, for example, underwent 
profound alterations with the introduction of VAT and the creation of a unified income 
tax. Patient co-payments within the NHS were also widened to various forms of care, 
after initially being circumscribed to pharmaceuticals. The redistributive impact of these 
changes has not been studied in any great detail. Only one empirical study has 
addressed the issue and that by means of simulation analysis of 1980/81 grouped data 
[Pereira and Pinto (1992,1993)]. These data limitations mean that the evidence may 
easily be challenged. By using micro-data drawn from two periods, the present analysis 
is able to provide greater detail and accuracy in measurement, and ultimately, improved 
understanding of the effect of policy choices. 
Recently, health care finance reform has been very much on the political agenda. 
The two main parties appear committed to enlarging the role of direct payments and 
private insurance [Mendo (1993); Campos (1990)]. However, this strategy is by no 
means consensual. Strong criticism has been raised in consumer, professional and 
academic circles, and legislation has continually had to be put back [Didrio Notfcias 
(1993); Ordem dos M6dicos (1994)]. Amid the disagreement, however, there is some 
common ground. Virtually everyone agrees that health care financing should be guided 
by the ability to pay principle (see, for example, the quote at the head of the chapter); 
and all have limited knowledge of how the actual burden of payments has evolved over 
recent years! Therefore, the present chapter may help to clarify the current debate by 
providing empirical evidence on how, and in what degree, vertical equity in financing 
has been achieved. 
There are two other aspects of the analysis that are worth underlining, each with 
implications beyond the Portuguese context. First, in common with previous chapters, 
there is a concern to measure the impact of what may be judged controversial 
methodological choices. I return, for example, to the effect of equivalence scale 
relativities and find a different impact to that on health concentrations indices. Other 
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issues that are discussed include the choice of the ability-to-pay proxy, standardization 
of family expenditures and aggregation of inequality in different parts of the distribution. 
I show that although there may be disagreement about particular methods, or even about 
attitudes to differential treatment of unequals, some relatively robust conclusions can be 
drawn. On the other hand, where alternative specifications are shown to have an impact 
on results, the analysis provides useful information to future empirical work. 
Secondly, as far as I am aware, the present analysis is the first attempt to measure 
inequity in health care financing over time. This has more than mere curiosity value. 
The main purpose of distributional analysis is to monitor and inform policy. Previous 
studies of inequity in financing have either compared the progressivity of different 
sources at a single moment in time for a given country [eg. Long et al (1982)], or 
extended that analysis to take in various countries [eg. Gottschalk et al (1989); Van 
Doorslaer et al (1993)]. The latter are clearly more informative to the policy-maker 
since they allow the relationship between finance-mix and the degree of overall 
progressivity to be established. However, they also present serious problems of 
comparibility due to variation in the quality, scope and accuracy of the data in different 
countries (Schieber and Poullier, 1991; Maynard, 1993). In contrast, such data 
defficiencies as do exist in a particular country are unlikely to change their relative 
importance over a period of time such as the one considered here. Therefore, one- 
country time comparisons may provide a sounder basis for examining the effect of 
reforms on inequity in financing. Many of the changes which occurred in Portugal 
throughout the 1980's (eg. growth of patient co-payments, narrowing of income tax 
bands) are similar to those experimented in other countries. By measuring the degree 
of inequity at the end points of the period, the present analysis provides a valuable 
indication of the impact of these policy choices. 
The chapter is organized as follows. Section 7.2 describes the data sources, the 
assumptions made in assigning the health finance burden and the definition of variables 
for empirical analysis. Section 7.3 presents and discusses the main empirical findings. 
Section 7.4 compares these results with those which might have been obtained under 
alternative assumptions. Finally, section 7.5 provides some concluding remarks drawing 
particular attention to policy implications of the findings. 
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7.2 Data and methods 
7.2.1 The data sets 
The analysis is based on microdata from the last two household budget surveys 
carried out by the National Statistical Institute: the 1980/81 Family Income and 
Expenditure Survey (FIES 80 for short) and the 1989/90 Family Budget Survey (FBS 
90). The sample sizes are respectively 8039 and 9640 households, corresponding to 
26753 and 29622 individuals! 
The surveys cover the non-institutionalized population of Portugal and yield 
representative estimates at the national and regional level. Their sampling and data 
collecting techniques are similar to those employed in budget surveys in other countries 
(eg. the UK FES). The basic sampling unit is the household, defined as a set of 
persons at the same address with common food and housing expenditures. Sampling is 
based on a multi-stage probability design, using information from the most recent 
decennial census. Interviewing takes place through a period of twelve months, with 
both surveys having run from March to February of the following year. The interviews 
were evenly distributed throughout the periods and the households were observed only 
once. A wide range of detailed information was collected, including income levels and 
sources, taxes and other contributions, public and private transfers, expenditures on 
goods and services and socio-economic characteristics of household members. Much 
of the expenditure data is derived from detailed diaries which respondents are required 
to keep during one week. 
The FIES 80 and the FBS 90 are the only data sources available in Portugal that 
permit the overall health financing burden to be measured. Naturally, they are not free 
of drawbacks. It might be argued, for example, that the incidence of health care 
financing should be measured over a life-cycle rather than at a single moment in time. 
This is particularly relevant if, as in Portugal, a large portion of health service revenues 
' In order to maintain consistency with the empirical analysis of previous chapters, observations 
for residents of the Madeira and Azores islands (roughly 5% of the country's population) were 
excluded from the analysis. 
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are raised through taxation. For instance, sales taxes may appear regressive at any point 
in time because the poor tend to have a higher average propensity to consume than the 
rich. However, over a lifetime average propensities to consume tend to unity, so the 
taxes would look close to proportional on a lifetime incidence basis (Davies et al, 1984; 
Poterba, 1989). Many such problems have been raised in the literature, but no 
convincing solutions have been proposed based on readily available data (Atkinson, 
1990). Unless one has access to longitudinal data, analysis of the health financing 
burden must be restricted to providing "snapshots" of current distributions. 
The other main drawback concerns data reliability. There are three potential 
sources of bias: recording errors, differential non-response and an atypical year of 
comparison. Only in the latter case does the available information permit any 
reasonable form of correction. The FBS 90 coincides with the introduction of a new 
income tax system which led to a temporary distortion of the underlying distribution of 
taxes. As a general rule, from 1989 onwards taxes on income were retained at source, 
whereas before an interval of one year elapsed between income accrual and payments. 
This meant that in 1989 many households paid income taxes under the 'old' and 'new' 
systems; the main exceptions being the large proportion of poorer households who make 
no such payments (eg. the unemployed, persons on state pensions and those whose 
incomes did not reach the payments threshold). Therefore, payments reported in the 
FBS 90 are likely to overstate the true degree of progressivity of the income tax system. 
In order to correct this deficiency I have excluded payments of taxes abolished under 
the new system. This option is not without its problems (see further on), but is likely 
to provide a more accurate picture of the underlying distribution than if all payments 
reported in the survey were included. 
With respect to the other problems, there is insufficient documented evidence to 
allow accurate corrections to be made. Experience with similar surveys in other 
countries has shown that recording errors may include the reporting of expenditures 
incurred outside the reference period and the under-reporting of certain types of income 
[cf., eg. Kernsley et al (1980), Atkinson and Micklewright (1983), Smeeding and 
Schmaus (1990)]. To a significant degree, the latter problem may arise because of 
differential non-response among sampled households. British evidence, for example, 
suggests that "older households, households where the head is self-employed, those 
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without children and higher income households, are less likely to cooperate than others" 
[Atkinson and Micklewright (1992, p. 62)]. Unfortunately, information on the 
magnitude of these biases in the portuguese surveys is rather limited. The only evidence 
comes from Pereirinha (1988) who compared the FIES 80 income data to National 
Accounts and found significant shortfalls with respect to self-employment and 
investment income. However, there has been no substantiation of data on the payments 
side and the level of differential non-response has not been documented. In these 
circumstances, any adjustments to the data would be arbitrary. 
7.2.2 Assigning the financiniz burden 
Estimates of progressivity are made for the four sources of finance identified in 
Chapter 2, as well as for the health care system overall. The sources are: 
(i) general tax revenues, which are used to fund the NHS and to subsidize 
occupational insurance schemes operating in the public sector; 
(ii) social insurance contributions to occupational schemes, of which by far the largest 
is the ADSE scheme for public servants and their families; 
(iii) private insurance premiums; and 
(iv) direct expenditures, including NHS co-payments and payments to the private 
sector. 
The distribution of these payments according to 'ability to pay' is derived directly from 
the surveys. However, given that tax revenues are not earmarked for health care, a 
method of weighting the sources when calculating the overall burden of payments is 
required. There are basically two options. One, where non-earmarked payments are 
allocated pro rata to the shares of relevant revenues going to finance health care, and 
the resulting survey proportions are used as weights; and another, where all sources are 
weighted by shares derived from aggregate data. Both these procedures are somewhat 
arbitrary. However, the first has the added drawback of leading to biased estimates if 
overall levels of different types of contribution are recorded with different degrees of 
2 accuracy and completeness. Because of this problem, previous studies (including the 
2 There is evidence that this may be so from a number of sources (eg. Kernsley et al, 1980; 
Borooah et al, 1991). The discrepancy arises, in part, because budget surveys are primarily designed 
to measure expenditures and hence the level of detail on this component is much greater than, say, for 
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ECuity research) have opted to aggregate the source distributions according to macro 
shares. The same procedure is followed here. 3 
Irrespective of whether a particular source is earmarked for health care, the 
question arises as to who bears the economic burden of the payment. The theoretically 
correct approach to this question is quite clear (Atkinson and Stiglitz, 1980; Aaron, 
1992). One wants to compare the general equilibrium (GE) of the economy before the 
payment is made to the equilibrium which occurs afterwards. Ideally the GE model 
would be sufficiently disaggregated and dynamic, and would allow for market and other 
distortions. This would permit the true shifting of taxes to be identified, deadweight 
losses to be accounted for and consumer surplus associated with expenditures to be 
excluded from calculations. In practice, of course, this method is overly aspiring given 
data limitations and the relative underdevelopment of computable GE models. 
Consequently, one has to opt for the less ambitious approach of specifying certain 
plausible incidence assumptions within a partial equilibrium framework. 
The approach used here and in the ECuity research is basically an application of 
the tax incidence evaluations carried out by Pechman, Musgrave and others [eg. 
Pechman and Okner (1974), Musgrave et al (1974), Reynolds and Smolensky (1977) 
and Pechman (1985)]. The advantages of this approach are its transparency, in the sense 
that assumptions are made explicit, and applicability, which means that detailed evidence 
on a matter of considerable interest to policy makers can actually be provided. In 
assigning the financing burden, I have adopted a standard set of incidence assumptions. ' 
Income, property and capital taxes are assumed to be borne fully by tax-payers. This 
conjecture implies that factor supply is either fixed or fairly inelastic. The corporate 
income tax is assumed to be divided equally between capital income recipients and 
consumers. Given the controversy which surrounds the incidence of this tax and the fact 
social insurance contributions. 
' The macro weights are derived from Minist6rio das Finangas (1981,1989), OECD (1993) and 
Pereira et at (1994). They are shown in Table 7.1 along with the main results. 
4 See Pechman (1985, Chapter 3) for a detailed explanation of the reasoning behind those related 
to taxation. 
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that household budget surveys may provide an incomplete picture of its distribution, two 
other alternatives are considered later in the chapter: (i) that the incidence falls 
completely on dividend recipients and (ii) that the burden is passed on to consumers in 
the form of higher prices. Indirect taxes on both final and intermediate goods and 
services are assumed to be fully shifted to consumers. The incidence is therefore 
allocated according to the consumption propensities of households. Payments to 
occupational insurance schemes are assumed to be bome by the employees' households. 
Note that employer contributions are largely irrelevant to the portuguese case given that 
general social insurance is not used to finance health care expenditures. The "social 
insurance" component measured in the analysis refers to mandatory contributions made 
overwhelmingly by public sector workers. It is assumed that any eventual deficits in 
the relevant schemes are bome by tax-payers. Finally, earmarked payments - private 
insurance premiums and net direct expenditures - are assumed to fall entirely on the 
households who make the payments. 
7.2.3 Variable definitions 
A household's ability to pay is measured by its gross income adjusted by the 
number of equivalent adults. This variable serves as the benchmark for assessing the 
progressivity of payments. The gross income definition is fairly comprehensive. It 
includes wage and self-employment income, cash property income, public and private 
cash transfers, the value of home-produced consumption, in-kind earnings and imputed 
rent on owner occupied housing. It does not include capital gains or employer 
contributions to social and private insurance schemes. Household incomes were 
converted to a per-equivalent-adult basis in order to provide a measure of the standard 
of living available to the household. The equivalence scale used for this purpose is that 
of the OECD, also used in Chapter 5. 
Personal direct taxes (eg. income tax, property taxes, inheritance tax) have been 
allocated on the basis of actual payments reported by households. The surveys do not, 
however, inquire about corporate taxes, which make up around 30 per cent of direct tax 
revenues. These have been allocated half in proportion to capital income and half in 
proportion to household expenditure. The total direct tax variable is weighted in 
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accordance with the revenues raised from non-corporate and corporate taxation. For the 
reasons stated earlier, the 1989/90 analysis excludes taxes abolished under the new 
income tax system. This means that whereas in 1980/81 the full burden is imputed to 
households, in the later period around 20% of direct tax revenues are left unallocated. 
The allocation of indirect tax financing is based on work carried out for the 
government commission which supervised the introduction of VAT in 1986 (Domingues 
et A 1984). ' This is the most recent study of indirect tax incidence in Portugal. The 
authors estimated the tax burden both before and after the introduction of VAT. The 
before-data, which I have used for the FIES 80 analysis, refer to estimates for 1979 
based on the 1973n4 FIES. The after-data, used for the FBS 90 analysis, are a 
simulation of the same information admitting VAT rates very similar to those actually 
in place during 1989/90. Domingues et al calculated effective tax rates by eight total 
expenditure percentile groups for seven classes of goods and services. In order to 
generate the indirect tax distributions, I have applied these rates to expenditures reported 
in the two surveys by matching by the relevant categories. "' The Domingues et al 
estimates are based on taxes which comprised roughly 60 per cent of all indirect tax 
revenues in 1980 and 1989. Stamp duty and excise taxes on tobacco, petrol and other 
goods were not considered. Given that in the present analysis the overall health care 
financing burden is weighted by the full share of indirect taxation, I make the implicit 
assumption that ommited taxes are distributed as those that are included. 
The variable termed social insurance represents mandatory contributions to 
occupational schemes. Although the health care financing component is usually 
autonomous in these schemes, no such separation is available in the data sources. This 
is unimportant for the present analysis given that both health and non-health 
contributions are typically proportional to earnings with no ceiling being applied. I have 
assumed that the distribution of health related payments reflects that of social insurance 
contributions made by civil servants. This seems valid given that the civil servants' 
'I was unable to calculate the incidence of indirect taxes directly from the surveys because the 
available data files provided an insufficient level of expenditure disaggregation. 
' The information from Domingues et al (1984) is taken from Tables I-Al and VI-Al. I have 
used Scenario E for the FBS 90 analysis. 
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health fund (ADSE) accounts for around 75% of all health related social insurance 
financing. Thus, the only major source of error in the calculations is if the distribution 
of earnings among other insured households is radically different to that of civil 
servants. This is unlikely to be the case. 7 
The distributions of private insurance premiums and direct payments are derived 
directly from the actual values reported by households. In the second case, the data 
provide a considerable amount of detail with regard to the type of care consumed (eg. 
pharmaceuticals, doctor visits), but not with respect to the sectoral mode of 
consumption (eg. NHS or private). In both years, direct payments have been 
computed net of reimbursements. 8 However, because of data limitations, no account 
is taken of tax rebates that households might receive in respect of their health care 
expenditures. 
Two further definitional issues of some importance concern the weighting of units 
and allowance for differences in household structure in the payments variables. In both 
cases, I adopt the assumptions made in van Doorslaer et al (1993). That is, each 
household is given equal weight irrespective of the number of individual members; and 
health care payments are not adjusted for household size and composition. The rationale 
for these choices is that the rules governing health care payments typically relate to 
families or households rather than individuals, and that economies of scale are unlikely 
to apply in health care consumption (Wagstaff et al, 1992). There are, however, some 
grounds for disagreement on these issues, and hence they are among those for which I 
modify the assumptions in section 7.4. 
7 The other main insurance schemes are for bank and insurance personnel, the armed forces and 
public utility workers. In the FBS 90, the Gini coefficient for the comprehensive income measure used 
in the analysis is, 0.19 for households where the head works in one of these sectors, and 0.21 where 
the head is a civil servant. Note that the definition of civil service in Portugal is much broader than 
in the UK. For instance, all NHS, local government and public sector teaching personnel are classed 
as civil servants and therefore contribute to the ADSE fund. 
" The FEES 80 provides specific information for this purpose. However, in the FBS 90 health 
sector reimbursements are grouped with other transfers. I have estimated the 1989/90 values by 
matching the data files accordingý to gross household income vingtiles and assuming that equal 
proportions of expenditures were reimbursed for each matched income group in both periods. A 
restriction of non-negative expenditures was also imposed. 
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7.3 Empirical Findings 
The main results are shown in Tables 7.1 and 7.2. Table 7.1 compares the 
proportion of source-disaggregated health care payments bome by each decile of 
equivalent income in the two periods under analysis. ' Table 7.2 reports standard 
progressivity indices estimated for the source distributions and for the health care system 
as a whole. These, and all other index values shown subsequently, have been 
computed from microdata using the covariance methods discussed in Chapter 4. 
7.3.1 Taxes 
Direct taxes are globally progressive in both periods, but over time the extent of 
their progressivity declines substantially. The larger fall computed for the Suits index 
suggests that the change is mainly attributable to reduced levels of progression in the 
top end of the income distribution. " It is noticeable too that the 1980/81 and 1989/90 
concentration curves do not cross, implying that there was an unambiguous shift in the 
direct tax burden favouring households that are better off. Although other factors may 
have contributed to this change, it is likely that the main explanation lies in the reform 
of the income tax system brought about in 1989. Among the alterations then enacted 
were a reduction in the number of personal income tax brackets from eleven to five, 
with the difference between the minimum and maximum rates becoming 24 percentage 
points, against 76 in the previous system. The reform also set a uniform rate for capital 
income and widened the tax base considerably. " 
The distribution of indirect taxes also becomes more favourable to the rich, with 
'A graphical illustration, by means of relative concentration curves, is also provided in Appendix 
5 (Figure A5.1). These curves have been drawn by taking the 1989/90 pre-tax income shares as the 
reference distribution. As Table 7.1 shows there was virtually no change in the distribution of pre-tax 
income between 1980/81 and 1989/90. This means that the curve comparisons in Figure A5.1 provide 
a useful graphical representation of distributional changes in the payments distributions from one period 
to the next. 
" This may easily be verified by computing measures of local progression from the data shown 
in Table 8.1 [see Lambert (1989, pp. 159-163)]. 
11 See OECD (1991) for a detailed survey of Portuguese fiscal reform in the 1980's. 
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Table 7.1: Distribution of health care financing 
1980/81 - 1989/90 
Income Pre-tax Direct Indirect Total Social Private Direct Total 
deciles Income taxes taxes taxes Insur. Insur. paym. payments 
1980/81 
Poorest 2.8% 0.5% 2.9% 2.0% 0.2% 0.0% 7.2% 3.4% 
2nd 4.3% 1.2% 4.0% 3.0% 0.9% 2.6% 7.4% 4.1% 
3rd 5.5% 2.3% 4.7% 3.9% 1.9% 0.6% 7.0% 4.6% 
4th 6.5% 3.6% 6.8% 5.7% 2.7% 3.1% 8.9% 6.4% 
5th 7.6% 5.7% 7.6% 7.0% 3.9% 4.1% 9.4% 7.5% 
6th 8.9% 6.5% 8.0% 7.5% 7.7% 4.9% 9.3% 8.0% 
7th 10.3% 8.2% 9.9% 9.3% 8.8% 22.7% 10.3% 9.6% 
8th 12.2% 11.3% 11.3% 11.3% 12.0% 10.5% 11.9% 11.5% 
9th 15.5% 18.8% 16.6% 17.3% 20.7% 16.8% 12.4% 16.1% 
Richest 26.4% 42.0% 28.2% 33.0% 41.2% 34.7% 16.1% 28.7% 
Percentfrom 
each source 23.2% 42.8% 66.0% 5.2% 0.6% 28.2% 100.0% 
1989/90 
Poorest 3.0% 0.7% 2.5% 1.9% 0.7% 0.4% 6.5% 3.5% 
2nd 4.3% 2.0% 4.1% 3.4% 3.2% 0.5% 7.9% 5.0% 
3rd 5.3% 2.9% 5.0% 4.2% 3.4% 5.2% 6.9% 5.2% 
4th 6.3% 5.0% 6.7% 6.1% 4.5% 4.6% 8.2% 6.8% 
5th 7.5% 6.2% 7.6% 7.1% 4.3% 9.2% 8.6% 7.5% 
6th 8.7% 9.0% 9.1% 9.1% 4.0% 7.2% 10.5% 9.3% 
7th 10.1% 10.6% 10.5% 10.6% 6.5% 10.6% 10.9% 10.4% 
8th 12.1% 12.9% 12.5% 12.7% 7.9% 5.8% 9.0% 10.9% 
9th 15.6% 17.7% 16.1% 16.7% 15.5% 16.7% 12.7% 15.1% 
Richest 27.2% 33.0% 25.9% 28.5% 50.1% 39.8% 18.6% 26.3% 
Percentfrom 
each source 20.7% 34.5% 55.2% 6.0% 1.4% 37.4% 100.0% 
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Table 7.2: Health care financing Progressivitv indices 
1980/81 - 1989/90 
Concentration Kakwani Suits 
1980 1990 1980 1990 1980 1990 
Equivalent income 0.343 0.351 
Direct taxes 0.570 0.479 0.227 0.127 0.253 0.123 
Indirect taxes 0.362 0.350 0.019 -0.002 0.021 -0.011 
Total taxes 0.436 0.398 0.092 0.047 0.103 0.040 
Social insurance 0.588 0.595 
Private insurance 0.519 0.503 
0.245 0.244 0.260 0.299 
0.175 0.152 0.177 0.173 
Direct payments 0.147 0.166 -0.196 -0.186 -0.201 -0.188 
Total payments 0.363 0.323 0.019 -0.027 0.026 -0.028 
the Kakwani and Suits measures suggesting a change from global progressivity to 
regressivity. However, the change is quantitatively small so that in both periods the 
distributions hardly diverge from the proportional benchmark. This suggests that 
differential sales tax rating -a feature of the portuguese tax system both before and after 
the introduction of VAT in 1986 - may be an effective instrument for achieving vertical 
equity. 
The overall progressivity of the tax system is computed by weighting the direct 
and indirect tax distributions by the respective State revenue shares. Naturally, the 
results point to a reduction in progressivity over time. The Kakwani index declines to 
51 per cent of its 1980/81 value and the Suits index to 39 per cent. This shift in the 
taxation burden appears to have penalized middle income groups the most. Table 7.1 
indicates that local progression for the lowest decile actually increases, but that it 
declines considerably at the highest levels of income. Thus, whereas in 1980/81 only 
the richest quintile paid a higher share of taxes than their share in total income, in the 
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later period this condition is shown by the top half of the distribution. It is significant, 
however, that despite the large fall in progressivity, richer households continue to 
support a higher than proportional share of the tax burden. 
It is worth considering the extent to which the data problems referred earlier may 
undermine the results. Because of the overlap between the FBS 90 and the income tax 
reform, it is possible that the fall in direct tax progressivity is slightly overstated. To 
see this, recall that pre-reform income taxes paid during 1989 were excluded from the 
analysis. There seems little doubt that this is justified, given that the 'double payment' 
transitional period led to a temporary distortion of the income tax distribution. 
However, reported payments of the 'new' taxes may also provide an imperfect basis for 
measuring the underlying progressivity of post-reform income taxation. For example, 
although under the new system income tax is generally retained at source, there are 
situations when this is not feasible (eg. self-employment income). In such cases, 
taxpayers are required to make pre-payments at the lowest tax rate based on self- 
assessed liabilities. Obviously, once the yearly assessments are made the effective tax 
rate for different units will vary considerably. It is unlikely that the FBS 90 captures 
this correction, given that the period of observation only lasted until March 1990. If 
effective tax rates for the self-employed were, on average, higher than the lowest 
marginal rate, then the 1989/90 estimates will understate the true degree of progressivity. 
Unfortunately, the data do not allow for such bias to be accurately measured, but a 
simulation admitting that income tax payments by the self-employed are double those 
actually reported led to the Kakwani index for direct taxes in 1989/90 rising to 0.137. 
Since this value is not much greater than the reported estimate and because other 
potential biases may in fact operate in the opposite direction (eg. tax rebates that are 
proportionally greater for higher income households), there seems little reason to believe 
that a large fall in progressivity did not take place. " 
12 Subsequent to writing this chapter two papers have been brought to my attention which may 
raise doubts about the estimates provided for direct tax progressivity. Rodrigues (1993) and Gouveia 
and Tavares (1995) both measured the distribution of disposable income in Portugal using the FIES 
80 and FBS 90. They concluded that inequality had decreased in the period, which seems incompatible 
with the reduced levels of progressivity identified in this chapter. However, the reason for their results 
is precisely the failure to consider the biasing effect of the 1989 tax reform. The two papers subtracted 
taxes levied under the "old" and "new" systems when computing individual disposable income levels. 
177 
The indirect tax results can also be questioned on the grounds that they depend 
on the VAT Commission estimates. However, the error induced by the allocation 
procedure may not be so great. There are two potential biases: one, if expenditure 
patterns changed considerably since the mid-70's (ie. the period from which Domingues 
et al (1984) drew their data to calculate effective tax rates); and another, if the 
distribution of excluded taxes is radically different from those that are included. As to 
the first issue, the analysis provides some form of correction to the extent that the actual 
expenditure distributions observed in the RES 80 and FBS 90 are used. With regard 
to excluded taxes (eg. excise taxes), there is no recent evidence as to their incidence. 
However, Tanzi and de Wulf's (1976) estimates for 1973 suggest that they were 
marginally progressive. Nothing guarantees that this pattern remained stable in later 
periods, but given that included taxes account for roughly 60 per cent of indirect tax 
revenues, some very large changes would have had to take place for the present results 
to provide a grossly inaccurate indication of the overall burden of indirect taxes in the 
1980's. Therefore, although a degree of caution is advisable in relation to the tax 
estimates, it would be surprising if the general trends suggested by the results were 
contradicted by better data. 
7.3.2 Social and private insurance 
Social and private insurance contributions are globally progressive in both periods, 
with their distributions being similar to those found for direct taxes. However, the 
explanation is somewhat different. The progressivity of direct taxation is largely 
attributable to increasing marginal rates of tax. In the case of social insurance, the 
progressive structure stems from the fact that the funds are not universal. Those 
employees that are covered make contributions in proportion to earnings, but because 
they tend to be in higher income groups (see Chapter 2), the source emerges as highly 
progressive. Similarly, the progressivity of private insurance is due to selective 
They also subtracted contributions which are not included in the present analysis (eg. employee social 
insurance contributions). It is these factors which apparently explain the discrepancy in the results. 
For the reasons given above, I believe that the approach followed in this chapter is the more useful 
if one wishes to estimate the underlying distribution of direct taxes (or income net of those taxes) at 
the beginning of the 1990's. 
178 
coverage; in this case, because insurance is mainly purchased by richer households, as 
a supplement to NHS cover. 
Levels of progressivity for insurance payments remained relatively stable 
throughout the 1980's. This is unsurprising given that there were no significant changes 
in the rules governing social insurance contributions, and that private insurance 
continued to be a relatively unimportant form of finance. The results by income decile 
do suggest some changes at different points of the income distribution but it is doubtful 
that they are of any great significance. For instance, the social insurance distributions 
show a fall in local progression at low to middle ranking incomes and a rise for the two 
richest deciles. In the absence of changes in the rules governing payments, these results 
are likely to reflect the evolving structure and relative value of public sector earnings. 
" 
There are very similar changes in the local progression of private insurance payments. 
However, it is not advisable to read too much into these results since the number of 
households in the decile cells is rather small (overall, the number of households 
reporting private insurance expenditures is 69 in the FIES 80 and 305 in the FBS 90). 
It is important to note that the insurance results do not imply that greater reliance 
on these sources would induce greater progressivity in health care finance. A significant 
expansion of either source would likely involve increased coverage among lower and 
middle income groups, which would tend to reduce progressivity levels. The cross- 
national results presented in van Doorslaer et al (1993, pp. 40-42) suggest that in 
countries where social insurance payments are not restricted to specific professions, the 
source tends to be, at most, marginally progressive. Wherever social insurance is the 
main source of revenue to the health service, it emerges as regressive. The same study 
also indicates that it is only in countries (such as Portugal) where private insurance is 
taken out as a supplement to comprehensive cover provided by the State, that this form 
of payment is progressive. If private insurance is (or is nearly) the sole source of cover 
for a part of the population, then it tends to be regressive. 
" Civil service pay differentials widened throughout the 1980's and average levels declined in 
relation to the private sector (Ministdrio das Finanqas, 1988). These trends will have altered the 
relative ranking of public sector workers in the income distribution, and hence the progression results. 
4 
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7.3.3 Direct plyments 
In contrast to other forms of finance, direct payments are shown to be highly 
regressive. In 1980181, the poorest 30% of the population held 13% of income but paid 
22% of all direct expenditures. The richest 30%, by comparison, held 54% of income 
and paid 40% of expenditures. The 1989/90 results present virtually the same 
distributional pattern (cf. the concentration curves in Figure A5.1), so that global 
regressivity levels remain stable at around -0.19. This suggests that the growth of 
private financing in the 1980's was secured by all income groups increasing their 
expenditures in roughly equal proportion. 14 
The interpretation of these results, and their implications for equitable financing 
of health services, are far less clear than for other sources. Since direct payments reflect 
consumption choices, the only way that the regressive structure may properly be 
understood is by focusing on the factors that affect demand for care by means of a 
behavioural model. Such an undertaking is beyond the scope of this thesis. 
Nevertheless, the present framework can yield a number of useful insights which may 
be followed up in later work. 
The first point to note is that the results take no account of the fact that health 
care expenditures are tax-deductable. Pinto and Santos (1993) examined tax returns in 
1989 and found that fiscal savings associated with health care expenditures were highly 
progressive, which in turn suggests that the distribution of direct payments in Portugal 
is even more regressive than the present results indicate. Because of data limitations, 
I have been unable to measure the precise extent of this effect. However, it may well 
be of some importance, particularly in the later period. In 1980/81 there were limits on 
the amounts which could be deducted (50% of expenditures at most) and certain 
expenditures were ineligible (eg. pharmaceutical expenditures). Following the 1989 
income tax reform no such limits prevailed. In principle, therefore, the richest 
households might be able to recoup as much as 40 per cent (the highest marginal tax 
14 Recall from Chapter 2 that the increased weight of out-of-pocket financing shown in Table 7.1 
corresponds to an increase in GDP share while the share of public financing remained stagnant. 
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rate) of their health care expenditures, whilst the poorest (if their taxable income does 
not reach the payments threshold) recoup nothing at all. Future studies should look 
closely at this issue. 
A further element of interest is that by international standards the level of 
regressivity is rather high. For example, it is higher than in all countries in the ECuity 
study that rely on tax-financing as the main source of revenue (eg. Denmark, UK, 
Ireland) . 
15 Given that in Portugal the share of out-of-pocket payments is higher than 
in these countries the regressive structure neutralizes the equitable impact of revenues 
raised through the tax system. It is noticeable too that countries such as Spain or Italy 
- which have high shares of direct expenditures and health systems that operate in a 
manner similar to the portuguese - reveal expenditure distributions that are close to 
being proportional. 
These observations raise the question of whether public policy may be contributing 
to high levels of expenditure regressivity. For example, could limited NHS supply in 
some medical specialities mean that less well-off patients have to resort to the private 
sector? To what extent does the practice of charging uniform rates of co-payment 
irrespective of the patient's economic condition lead to regressivity? The level of 
disaggregation available in the data allows only limited light to be cast on these issues. 
Table 7.3 presents a disaggregation of the Kakwani indices by type of care consumed. 
As for overall expenditures, these results show minimal variations from one period to 
the next, suggesting that policy and behavioural changes had a negligible impact on 
actual distributions. However, there are rather large differences in levels of 
progressivity/regressivity across types of care consumed. Direct expenditures on hospital 
care are highly progressive, suggesting that these outlays are largely borne by the rich. 
This is unsurprising given comprehensive cover by the NHS and absence of co- 
financing. Expenditures on diagnostic procedures are marginally progressive. In this 
case, NHS co-payments, (introduced in 1987) are waived for certain patient groups such 
as the poor, unemployed, pregnant women and children. This may be a crucial factor 
" See Figure A5.2 in the Appendix which compares the Kakwani index values computed for each 
financing source with the measurements made in the country reports in van Doorslaer et al (1993). 
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Table 7.3: Progressivity of direct payments by type of care consumed 
1980/81 - 1989/90 
Pharmaceuticals 
Therapeutic appliances 
Medical services and 
diagnostic procedures 
- Doctor consultations 
- Dental care 
- Nursing/paramedical 
- Diagnostic procedures 
Hospitalization 
Other 
Total direct payments 
Percentage Share 
1980 1990 
Kakwani index 
1980 1990 
61.0% 54.0% -0.309 -0.323 
5.0% 12.0% -0.030 -0.026 
27.0% 29.0% -0.049 -0.051 
na. 18.0% na. -0.077 
na. 4.0% na. -0.042 
na. 1.0% na. -0.201 
na. 6.0% na. 0.045 
6.0% 4.0% 0.138 0.154 
1.0% 1.0% -0.101 -0.113 
100.0% 100.0% -0.196 -0.186 
na. = not available 
Reimbursements are assumed to be divided between each type of care 
in proportion to their share in total direct payments. 
determining the progressive structure in 1989/90. All other forms of care show 
regressive distributions. Of these, the most noteworthy results are for pharmaceutical 
expenditures, where values of 7CK< -0.30 were computed in both periods. It would 
seem that these outlays are the main contributory factor to high levels of regressivity in 
the total expenditure distribution. Despite various changes in NHS co-financing 
arrangements, no exemptions on demographic, social or economic grounds have ever 
operated (see Chapter 2). Naturally, the results do not merely reflect uniform rates of 
co-payment within the NHS. Some expenditures are on OTC medicines and others are 
made by privately insured individuals. However, the market share of these categories 
is relatively small, fluctuating each year around 27 per cent (Infarmed, 1993). Data 
from the INS 87 also indicate that pharmaceutical outlays account for over three quarters 
of direct expenditures made by NHS patients (Pereira et al, 1994). Thus, it is likely that 
the high levels of drug expenditure regressivity shown by the two budget surveys reflect, 
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to an important extent, policy choices and that these have inequitable consequences. 
Generally, however, the results of this section call for further research to be undertaken. 
7.3.4 Overall healthcare financing 
The aggregate results show that, over the 1980's, health care financing in Portugal 
became unequivocally more favourable to the rich. In 1980/81, the financing system 
was marginally progressive, with both the Kakwani and Suits indices displaying values 
in the region of 0.02. By 1989/90, the estimates show a decline of roughly five points, 
suggesting that health care finance had become slightly regressive. An indication of 
the gainers and losers can be gathered from Table 7.1, by considering which 
decilescontributed to the health system in greater proportion than their share in total 
income. In 1980/81 this condition is met by the Ist, 9th and 10th deciles; whereas in 
the later period, all bar the 3rd, 8th, 9th and 10th are in such a situation. Therefore, 
the burden of health care finance would appear to have shifted to middle income groups, 
with the principal beneficiaries being households who are situated in the richest quintile. 
Under the concentration index approach, changes in the progressivity 
characteristics of a health care financing system depend on: (i) variations in the degree 
of progressivity of each finance source (the progressivity effect) and, (ii) variations in 
the proportion of total revenues raised from each source (the revenue effect). The first 
of these can be captured by allowing that a particular source maintains its earlier index 
value whereas all others change to the later measurements. Such a simulation is shown 
in Table 7.4. " It is evident that changes in the tax distributions were the major 
contributory factor in terms of progressivity variations. The revenue effect is shown in 
the table as the difference between the sum of progressivity effects and the overall 
change in index values. The Kakwani measurements suggest that progressivity and 
revenue changes contributed in roughly equal proportion to the decline in health care 
financing progressivity. The picture is slightly altered for the Suits index on account 
of the greater weight it attaches to departures from proportionality at the top end of the 
"I make use of the result that the overall Kakwani and Suits indices are weighted averages of 
the individual component indices (see Chapter 4). 
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Table 7.4: Impact of changes in soUrce progressivity and revenue proportions 
on the overall burden of health care finance 
Kakwani index 
Simulated Difference 
value' from observed' 
Suits index 
Simulated Difference 
value from observed 
Source progressivity effects 
Direct taxes -0.006 -0.021 -0.001 -0.027 
Indirect taxes -0.020 -0.007 -0.017 -0.011 
Total taxes 0.001 -0.028 0.010 -0.038 
Social insurance -0.027 0.000 -0.030 0.002 
Private insurance -0.027 0.000 -0.028 0.000 
Direct payments -0.031 0.004 -0.033 0.005 
Total progressivity effect3 -0.024 -0.031 
Total revenue effect4 -0.022 -0.023 
Overall change5 -0.046 -0.054 
1. Admitting that in 1989/90 the respective source maintains its former index value but all others change, 
2. Numerical difference of the simulated index value in relation to that actually observed in 1989/90. 
3. Sum of source progressivity effects. 
4. Difference between absolute change in index values and total progressivity effect. 
5. Absolute change in index values between 1980/81 and 1989/90. 
distribution (note in particular the change in the tax burden). From Table 7.1 it is clear 
that the principal change in the revenue structure is a fall in the proportion of tax- 
financing, matched by an almost equal rise in the share of out-of-pocket payments. 
Therefore, in the 1980's, the overall burden of health care financing became more 
favourable to the rich mainly as a result of reduced progression in the tax system and 
an increase in the revenues raised directly from consumers. 
The change in the overall finance burden may be put into perspective by 
comparing the results with those of other countries. The obvious point of reference is 
the ECuity study (Van Doorslaer et al, 1993; Wagstaff et al, 1992), on whose 
methodology the present research is based. The ECuity results were arrived at using the 
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Figure 7.1: International Comparison of Health Care Finance Progressivity" 
most recently available household budget survey in each country (in the 1980's). There 
are as yet no time comparisons, but the results provide an instructive means ot'situating 
the portuguese results. Figure 7.1 presents values of the Suits index for the health care 
financing systems of seven EU countries with the comparable estimates made in this 
chapter for Portugal in 1980/81 and 1989/90. " In the earlier period, Portugal had the 
second-most progressive health care system. By the end of the 1980's, however, it had 
slipped to fifth place in the ranking, with only the predominantly, social insurance based 
systems of France, Spain and the Netherlands showing higher regressivity values. 
Naturally, other countries may also have changed their relative position. However, the 
comparison does suggest that, throughout the 1980's, a fundamental change took place 
in the level of health care financing progressivity in Portugal. 
" The results for countries other than Portugal are taken from Wagstaff et al (1992, p. 380). 
" In the Appendix (Figure A5.2) similar comparisons are shown for the various sources of health 
care finance. 
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7.4 Sensitivity Analysis 
I now turn to the issue of robustness. As in Chapter 5, my main concern is with 
examining the reproducibility of the main results in the light of alternative plausible 
assumptions. It should be noted, however, that the analysis is also relevant to other 
work in this area of study. To see this, consider the progressivity estimates made by 
Pereira and Pinto (1993) for the ECuity study. Using the FIES 80, they calculated the 
total health care payments Kakwani index as 0.065. This is almost five points greater 
than the value computed here. The new measurement does not compromise the 
conclusion drawn by Van Doorslaer et al (1993) that, in the 1980's, countries relying 
mainly on tax-finance had mildly progressive financing systems. However, this is 
mainly because the earlier estimate placed Portugal at the extreme of the progressivity 
ranking. If a near proportional value had been computed it is conceivable that the 
present estimate - based on the same data - would show mild regressivity in the early 
1980's. The discrepancy in estimates between the two studies is largely due to the use 
of grouped and ungrouped data. " As shown in Chapter 4, estimation of concentration 
indices from grouped data leads to inaccurate results. However, the curve 
approximation procedure is not the only source of bias. In Pereira and Pinto (1993) 
equivalizing the income variable through application of the Buhmann et al (1988) 
formula to the mid-points of gross-income categories led to downward bias on the Gini 
and consequently to higher progressivity estimates. The results are also distinct because 
of alternative conjectures (ie. a different equivalence scale was applied and the 
incidence of corporate taxation was assumed identical to other direct taxes included in 
the survey). 
What this example shows is not that the earlier results are invalid, but that they 
may be sensitive to methodological choices. Therefore I consider in this section the 
impact of alternative assumptions on the degree of measured inequity. So as not to 
overburden the analysis, measurements are made simply with regard to the Kakwani 
index. The investigation considers six issues over which there is uncertainty in the 
" In the ECuity study, only the Portuguese and UK health care financing estimates were based 
on previously tabulated data. 
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literature: aggregation of health care payments inequality at different points of the 
income distribution; assumptions regarding the incidence of corporate taxation; 
equivalent scale adjustments to the income variable; the method of weighting 
observations; choice of ability to pay proxy; and equivalization of the payments 
distributions. The empirical strategy involves ceteris paribus simulations: for each 
issue only the variable under discussion is allowed to change; all other methodological 
assumptions made in section 7.3 are left unaltered. I do not address issues related to 
data quality, important as they are. Such questions are best handled by contrasting the 
results with those obtained from improved data sources, when these become available. 
7.4.1 Different distributional perspectives 
The first check for robustness involves the use of the parametrically weighted 
Kakwani indices, 7CK(8), defined in equation (4.14). These measures incorporate 
explicit assumptions about the weight attached to different points of the income 
distribution; and may therefore be seen as reflecting alternative judgements about the 
degree of progressivity preference. This is an important issue given that the normative 
basis of health care finance vertical inequity measurement is somewhat debatable (see, 
eg., Aaron, 1992). There are no clear guidelines from policy-makers as to the desired 
degree of progressivity, merely a stipulation that payments be related to ability to pay. 
Economic studies (including the present) have chosen to examine vertical inequity by 
means of standard progressivity indices derived from the concentration approach. As 
suggested in Chapter 4, these measures have desirable properties, but they are simply 
statistical devices that measure deviations from proportionality. In using them, the 
researcher impliqitly accepts that progressivity should be portrayed in terms of relative 
payments distances and relative income distances (between equidistant incomes) and that 
proportionality of payments is the neutral reference system. The measures also have 
specific weighting schemes for aggregating disproportionality which may, or may not, 
accord with the values of the policy maker. 
Computation of generalized progressivity indices provides a partial, but important, 
response to these problems. By varying a single parameter, the robustness of 
progressivity estimates to different distributional judgements (including, perhaps, those 
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of the policy maker) can be explored. Furthermore, the alternative weighting schemes 
of the parametric measures may be seen as emulating the range of measures suggested 
by progressivity indices derived from an explicit normative approach [eg. those of 
Blackorby and Donaldson (1984) and Kiefer (1985)]. If the results obtained from 
varying the distributional judgement parameter point in the same direction, then the 
robustness of conclusions is improved. 
Valuesof nK(5) in the range 8=1 to 8=5 were computed for each the financing 
sources as well as for the total payments distribution. The results are shown in Figure 
7.2 and Table A5.1. For aggregate health care payments (Figure 7.2), the measurements 
generally suggest a shift towards regressivity between 1980 and 1990. The only 
exception is the inequality indifferent index, 8=1.01. Therefore, unless one is 
unconcerned about disproportionality of the payments distributions, it is hard to escape 
the conclusion that the distribution of health care payments became less favourable to 
the poor throughout the 1980's. 
The estimates for the source distributions also tend to confirm the earlier results 
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(Table A5.1). Where there are exceptions, the new measurements may be seen to 
provide further informational content. For instance, the 8=5 index suggests that indirect 
taxes became more progressive in the later period, whereas at lower values of 8 an 
opposite movement is suggested. This is because the 8=5 measure is highly sensitive 
to disproportionality in the lower end of the income distribution, leading it to detect an 
improvement in the position of the very poorest. 'O 
7.4.2 Changing tax-incidence assumptions 
Another area where the results may be challenged is with regard to incidence 
assumptions. Research in the taxation literature has shown that judicious choice of 
shifting assumptions can make a tax system appear either steeply progressive or sharply 
regressive (Whalley, 1984). It is also the case, however, that apart from three types of 
contribution - corporation taxes, property taxes and employer social insurance 
contributions -a set of 'standard' incidence assumptions appears to have gathered wide 
agreement in the partial equilibrium literature (Atkinson and Stiglitz, 1980). Of the 
exceptions, only the first is quantitatively important in the financing of portuguese health 
care. Therefore, two further assumptions are considered in this section with a view to 
evaluating their impact on the earlier conclusions: (i) assuming that corporate tax 
incidence falls exclusively on dividend recipients, and (ii) that the burden is fully shifted 
to consumers in the form of higher priceS. 21 
The results (shown in Table 7.5) confirm that changing incidence assumptions can 
have an appreciable effect on the progressivity of the tax system. For instance, 
estimates of the direct tax Kakwani index for 1980 vary between 0.151 and 0.301; for 
the tax system as whole, between 0.066 and 0.118. Unsurprisingly, the full shifting 
assumption produces the least progressive results. However, the important result from 
" Ibis improvement may also be seen by careful reading of Table 7.1. 
21 The first of these would be likely to hold in the case of a long-run competitive equilibrium 
situation with intersectorally mobile capital. The second, if markets are oligopolistic and firms have 
the power to set their prices to cover what they regard as costs plus a margin for profits. Other 
justifications are also possible [see, eg., Pechman (1985)]. The initial assumption of a 50: 50 split 
between dividend recipients and consumers may be seen as an intermediate compromise between these 
extreme hypotheses. 
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Table 7.5: The impact of alternative assumptions concerning corporation taxes. 
Kakwani indices 
Variant I Variant 2 Variant 3 
1980 1990 1980 1990 1980 1990 
Direct taxes 0.227 0.127 0.301 0.188 0.151 0.071 
Total taxes 0.092 0.047 0.118 0.069 0.066 0.025 
Total health care 
payments 0.019 -0.027 0.036 -0.016 0.002 -0.040 
Notes: Variant I- Incidence falls 50% on capital income receivers and 50% on consumers. 
Variant 2- Incidence falls on dividend recipients. 
Variant 3- Incidence falls on consumers. 
the point of view of this chapter is that the conclusions regarding the evolution of health 
care financing progressivity throughout the 1980's are not altered. Whichever of the 
three variants is chosen there is a shift of some 4 or 5 points in the Kakwani index 
towards regressivity. Thus, once again the earlier results are shown to be robust. 
7.4.3 Sensitivity to equivalence scales 
While shifting assumptions are perhaps the most crucial part of any incidence 
calculation, the 'ability-to-pay' measure is also very important (Whalley, 1984). The 
following three sensitivity analyses consider the impact of alternative specifications of 
this variable, beginning with the effect of equivalence scale relativities. The baseline 
estimates were arrived at by deflating gross household incomes by the OECD 
equivalence scale. For reasons set out in Chapter 5, the choice of this scale was largely 
determined by pragmatic considerations (eg. its frequent use in current portuguese 
research). This detail, together with the uncertainty surrounding the equivalence scale 
issue (Coulter et al, 1992), suggest a need to verify the robustness of the earlier 
measurements to different scale relativities. The approach adopted for this purpose is 
analogous to that followed in Chapter 5. Values of the Kakwani index are computed 
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assuming various equivalent income distributions; namely, through deflation of income 
values by the Buhmann et al (1988) parametric scale with family size equivalence 
elasticities in the range e--O to e=l. " 
The results are presented in Figure 7.3. The most salient point is that the 1980- 
1990 change in the overall payments distribution is robust in terms of all scale 
relativities. Therefore, whichever the relationship between economic well-being, 
household incomes and 'needs' that is assumed, one is driven to the conclusion that 
health care finance became less favourable to the poor over the 1980's. The earlier 
conclusions regarding the time-trend of taxation and direct payments progressivity also 
appear to be upheld. Conversely, the direction of changes in the social and private 
insurance distributions seems to be affected by scale relativities. For example, at low 
e-values the social insurance estimates show a marked decline in progressivity but the 
effect is reversed with scales that are 'generous' to large families. The reasons for this 
are not immediately clear, but it may be noted that in both surveys insurance 
contributions are largely made by smaller families. A possible implication is that 
progressivity estimates for non-universal sources of finance may be sensitive to 
equivalence scale adjustments; particularly if non-income characteristics determining 
participation are correlated with the factors used to construct the scale. 
A further issue of interest is the shape of the relationship between levels of 
progressivity and choice of equivalence scale. For all sources there appears to be an 
inverted U-shaped relation, with progressivity first increasing (regressivity decreasing) 
and then decreasing (increasing) as the value of the equivalence elasticity is 
increased . 
2' This finding is relevant to future research and, indirectly, to policy 
analysis. It means that one cannot simply compute progressivity measures for two 
extreme equivalence scales and assume that intermediate scales will lead to intermediate 
" See equation (5.4) in Chapter 5. 
2' Generally, this result seems to be driven by the interaction of a U-shaped effect on the Gini 
coefficient (first noticed by Coulter et at, 1992a) and an inequality reducing quasi-linear impact on the 
concentration indices (see Figure A5.3 in the Appendix). Recall that for the illness concentration 
indices, exan-dned in Chapter 5, the effect of increasing e was also to reduce the level of measured 
inequality. 
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progressivity estimates. The results also help to put into perspective other research 
findings. The most recent work by the ECuity group (Wagstaff et al, 1994) proposes 
to compare health care finance progressivity across countries by drawing on the 
equivalence scale used by Aronson et al (1994). As shown in Chapter 5, this scale has 
an implicit e-0.44. The present calculations suggest that the scale provides a higher 
estimate of the extent of health care finance progressivity than do other scales currently 
used by economists. 
7.4.4 Weighting by individuals 
If income is used as the 'ability-to-pay' proxy, it raises the question of how the 
income receiving units are to be weighted. Compared to equivalence scale adjustments, 
this issue has received far less attention in the literature. However, it can have a 
considerable impact on the measure of income inequality (Danziger and Taussig, 1979), 
and consequently on progressivity estimates. The earlier results were weighted by 
household (ie. the equivalent household income is counted only once for each 
household irrespective of the number of individual members), a procedure which has 
been common practice in health care finance progressivity analyses. However, recent 
income (re-)distribution studies have generally opted to weight by the number of 
individuals, given that the former approach begs the question of the number of 
individuals affected by economic differences. Like all other questions considered in this 
part of the chapter, the correct approach is debatable. Hence, the value of modifying 
the assumptions to see if they do in fact affect the conclusions that are drawn. 
Individual weighting requires that each individual in the household be attributed 
the household equivalent income (ie. the procedure adopted in Chapter 5). The results 
of admitting this conjecture are reported in Tables 7.6, A5.3 and A5.4 (along with those 
for remaining sensitivity analyses). Individual weighting has the effect of reducing the 
inequality estimates. For virtually all sources of finance, the reduction in the 
concentration index is greater than for the Gini coefficient. Consequently, levels of 
progressivity are reduced in relation to the baseline distribution. The more important 
point, however, is that the magnitudes of changes between 1980 and 1990 are basically 
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the same as for the earlier results. Thus, individual weighting has no appreciable effect 
on overall conclusions. 
7.4.5 Net income as a measure of ability to pay 
A further issue on which there are grounds for disagreement is the use of gross 
income as the reference distribution. Once again this is common practice in the health 
care finance literature. However, it seems illogical to measure the distribution of direct 
payments, private insurance premiums and indirect taxes in relation to this distribution 
since what effectively constrains households are their disposable incomes (ie. after 
direct taxes and other contributions). " This suggests that distinct reference income 
distributions should be used for different types of payment. Future analyses may wish 
to consider this issue in greater detail. Meanwhile, it is useful to measure the impact 
of using disposable income as a measure of ability to pay to calculate the progressivity 
indices reported earlier. The precise income definition that is used is household income 
net of state and local direct taxes and social insurance contributions, equivalized by the 
OECD scale. 
The results indicate quite naturally that the value of the Gini coefficient is reduced 
vis-a-vis the baseline distribution. Inequality in the disaggregated payments distributions 
also declines, leading to varied measurement and intertemporal effects (see Tables A5.3 
and A5.4). The impact on the overall payments distribution is to make the 1980's 
change towards regressivity much smaller than under the baseline assumptions (two 
points of the 7ýK index as opposed to 5). This implies that in the event of 'source- 
appropriate' reference distributions being chosen, the fall in progressivity would not 
be as great as shown in section 7.3. However, the results also indicate that this is 
simply a question of the size of the effect; the general conclusions reached earlier would 
still be valid. 
24 Studies of the progressivity of indirect taxes do in fact adopt net or disposable income as the 
reference distribution [see, eg. Kakwani (1986, Chapter 10)]. 
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7.4.6 The effect of equivalizing payments 
Besides incidence assumptions, there are other plausible conjectures that might 
have been adopted for the payments variables. Chief among these is the equivalization 
of household payments to take account of differences in demographic structure. As in 
the majority of previous studies, the approach was not followed in section 7.3 given that 
it is generally accepted that economies of scale do not operate in health care 
consumption. However, this conjecture only seems valid for direct expenditures and 
even then it is possible to think of exceptions to the rule. With regard to other forms 
of payment, the no-equivalization hypothesis seems harder to defend (eg. the case of 
two families of size I and 5 each with a single wage earner making social insurance 
contributions that provide benefits to all family members). Moreover, recent health care 
financing progressivity estimates have opted to equivalize payments (eg. Wagstaff et 
A 1994). " Consequently, it seems appropriate to measure the impact of adjustments 
for household structure in the payments distributions. 
Household payments towards the health service were equivalized using the OECD 
scale. The progressivity estimates produced by adopting this assumption tend to have 
the opposite effect to the two previous sensitivity analyses. That is, the progressivity 
(regressivity) of progressive (regressive) sources is increased. The conclusions regarding 
the intertemporal change in health care finance progressivity are not greatly affected, 
though the magnitude of the changes is more pronounced than with other assumptions. 
There is almost a7 point difference between the 1980 and 1990 overall payments 
Kakwani indices. Thus, equivalization of payments also leads to the later distribution 
appearing more inequitable than that of the earlier period. 
7.4.7 Combining altemative assumptions 
As a final step in the analysis indices were computed by combining the final three 
assumptions (see Table 7.6). Therefore, besides other conjectures previously laid out 
" Ibis option appears to have emerged simply because of the motivation to measure redistributive 
effect, in which case both income and payments distributions have to be equivalized in order to achieve 
comparability. 
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in section 7.3, the methodology now admits individual weighting of income units, 
equivalized net income as the counterfactual distribution and health care payments 
equivalized by the OECD scale. The purpose of this step is to verify if the results are 
robust to a combination of alternative plausible assumptions, rather than admitting a 
single variation at a time. The results confirm the general intertemporal trends identified 
earlier, in particular the shift from mild progressivity to mild regressivity of the overall 
health care payments distribution. Noticeably, the absolute change in the Kakwani index 
is greater than under the baseline assumptions. 
Therefore, the sensitivity analyses generally show that the earlier estimates are 
robust in terms of alternative methodological assumptions. Although there may be 
disagreement among economists as to particular procedures, some relatively strong 
conclusions can be drawn about the structure and recent course of health care finance 
progressivity in Portugal. 
7.5 Conclusions 
In Portugal, as in many other countries, there appears to be widespread support 
for the objective of health care payments being related to ability to pay rather than to 
use of medical facilities. The goal was a major reason behind the creation of a National 
Health Service in 1979 and, somewhat surprisingly, has also been championed by those 
who now call for an expansion of alternative forms of finance. What is more striking, 
however, is that the debate has unfolded in a vacuum of evidence regarding the 
economic burden of payments. The present chapter has sought to inform the debate by 
examining how the progressivity characteristics of the main sources of finance have 
evolved in recent years and, more generally, how the system has performed with regard 
to the ability-to-pay goal. 
It was shown that, throughout the 1980's, a fundamental change took place in the 
distribution of health care financing. Total payments to the health system, which in 
1980 revealed a mildly progressive structure, had evolved by the end of the decade 
towards a moderately regressive disposition. The burden of health care finance appears 
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to have shifted to middle income groups, with the main beneficiaries being households 
situated in the richest quintile of the income distribution. This change is the result of 
two major trends: on the one hand, reduced progression in the tax system; and on the 
other, an increase in the share of revenues raised directly from consumers. 
It was also shown that alternative forms of finance have quite distinct progressivity 
characteristics. Direct taxes, despite a noticeable change throughout the 1980's, are 
highly progressive. Indirect taxes tend to be close to proportional. The tax system as 
a whole clearly favours the least well-off. Social and private insurance contributions 
were found to be globally progressive in both periods, but this is largely explained by 
the phenomenom of selective coverage of households that are better-off. Out-of-pocket 
payments were shown to be highly regressive and there are signs that a significant part 
of the regressive structure is the consequence of policy choices. On the whole, these 
results tend to confirm the findings of previous studies in other countries. 
It is possible to disagree with the results on two main fronts: the methods of 
analysis and the data used. As to the first issue, in contrast to previous research, 
considerable effort has been given over to measuring the impact of methodological 
choices on the results. Under all the alternative scenarios considered the conclusions 
tend to be very much the same, varying only with respect to the degree of 
progressivity/regressivity. Therefore, the main results would appear to be robust in 
terms of a number of important alternative assumptions. Clearly there are further 
methodological issues that need to be investigated. Future studies might, for example, 
consider the question of measuring progressivity of payments to the NHS, rather than 
for the system as a whole. 
The second issue is far more complex. Doubts may be raised with regard to the 
suitability of budget survey data for examining the broad questions raised by vertical 
inequity analysis of health care financing systems. For instance, the estimated 
distribution of the corporate tax burden can only be seen as a very rough approximation 
to the actual burden. More specifically, trends in the progressivity of the tax system 
may be questioned because of the overlap of the 1989 reform with the survey 
observation period. Given that these trends were identified as a major driving force 
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behind the overall change in the health care financing distribution, there is clearly a need 
for further research using new data sources. However, given present data limitations, 
the estimates in this chapter are as reasonable an approximation to the evolving 
progressivity characteristics of the health care financing system as can be made. 
Future investigation should seek to verify the conclusions by replicating the 
methodology on improved or more disaggregated data. Alternatively, methods that are 
better able to explain the results (eg. econometric analysis based on behavioural 
models) should be employed. This is particularly apt with regard to the distribution of 
out-of-pocket payments. 
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Part 5 
FURTHER METHODOLOGY 
Chapter 8 
Measurement of Social Welfare in the Domain of Health 
"[Nlo-one, as far as I know, proposes that the elimination of 
inequality ... is the sole objective ofpolicy. For evaluating policy, the 
appropriate criterion has to be a measure of welfare which combines 
tendencies of the mean and of the distribution around that mean. 
Pyatt (1985, p. 89) 
8.1 Introduction 
Parts 3 and 4 were concerned with formulating indices of relative inequality and 
applying them in the measurement of inequity in health and health care. Although 
analysis of this type is likely to form the backbone of an economic approach to studying 
the attainment of health-equity objectives in a particular country, it has to be said that, 
from the policy-makers' perspective, it provides a somewhat limited basis for developing 
and evaluating competing strategies. It cannot, for example, address key questions of 
policy such as the trade-off between equity and efficiency or the marginal impact of 
different inputs on the distribution of health. There is, however, a ready answer to this 
dilemma under the normative framework adopted for the thesis: measurement of the 
socio-economic distributions of health and health care constitutes only a part of the 
implied empirical analysis. It provides, in our terminology, incomplete assessments of 
both achievement and advantage. Once these attributes are measured with greater 
adequacy, the type of policy questions referred to can indeed be addressed. 
The objective of the present chapter is to investigate how a general, coherent 
evaluation of society's achievement might be undertaken. In particular, the chapter 
seeks to develop an ethically-founded summary measure, that draws on the information 
content of the inequality indices discussed previously. In so doing it provides a further 
extension to concentration curve analysis in the domain of health. 
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For an individual, achievement is simply the actual level of the functioning 'good 
health' that he enjoys (ie. his health status). Clearly, if we are to measure how a given 
society fares in relation to this attribute, the first task must be to identify the values it 
holds vis-a-vis the health of constituent members. This amounts to specifying a Social 
Welfare Function (SWF) in the particular domain of health. The SWF is a concept 
much used in modem welfare economics but also sometimes misunderstood. A widely 
used textbook describes it as "a relation between a distribution of utility levels among 
society's members and a judgement about the overall satisfaction ... achieved by that 
distribution" (Friedman, 1985, p. 43). Under this definition, the evaluation of the social 
state is based exclusively on the individual utilities that are generated, an approach often 
referred to as 'welfarism' and which is dominant in modem economics. It is, however, 
unsuited to our purpose, given the limited and sometimes inaccurate nature of utility 
information as a basis for social evaluation in the field of health (see Chapter 3). 
Fortunately, the SWF need not be restricted to the 'welfarist' straitjacket. In Bergson's 
(1938) seminal article the concept is simply a representation of the 'goodness' of the 
social state. No specific restrictions are placed on its arguments or functional form and 
the appropriate determination of what is 'good' about a given situation is left completely 
open. In particular, despite the 'welfarist' sound of the term social weýfarefunction, use 
of that concept does not presuppose a utilitarian or welfarist formulation of social 
objectives. Drawing on this eclecticism, it seems altogether more fitting to postulate a 
specific health domain SWF, defined directly over a vector of the population's health 
[ie. W =- W(h), with h= (hl, h29 ... , hJ1. Naturally, there is no question of this 
function being taken to represent the overall well-being of society, but simply that part 
of it which is associated with the population's health. In other words, W represents 
health social weýfare, which is a concept in every sense identical to society's 
achievement. 
The following section considers how the representation given above might be 
further characterized with a view to developing an empirical summary measure of health 
social welfare. The discussion inevitably concentrates on the objectives of equity and 
efficiency, widely conjectured to be the major goals of social intervention in the sphere 
of health. A rare attempt by a health economist at integrating equity and efficiency 
measurement is discussed. Although that approach - proposed by Wagstaff (1991) - 
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shares some of the concerns of the present chapter it is rejected in favour of a more 
direct and ethically appealing method with some traditions in the income inequality 
literature. Two general principles for evaluating the social well-being associated with 
health are defined, and from these follows the specification of an abbreviated social 
welfarefunction of the form: W(h)= V(t1h, Ih), where ph is the average level of health 
in the community and1h is a health inequality index. A question arises as to which of 
the many inequality indices available should be incorporated in this function. Section 
8.3 presents a formal rationale, based on the concept of income related health 
deprivation, for using the health concentration indexCh (ie. an index identical to C. 
in Chapter 4 but defined over health status). This analysis is important in two respects. 
On the one hand, given that our objective is to construct an empirically applicable 
measure of health social welfare, it is better to know the exact basis on which one 
distribution is to be judged superior to another. Equally important, the analysis 
establishes a logical role for concentration indices, which are widely believed, even by 
their proponents [eg. Wagstaff et al (199 1 b, pp. 200-20 1)], to have unappealing welfare 
implications. The principal result of the chapter is a rationalization of a family of 
welfare indices of the type, W. ": PhG - 'CC09where ic is a distributional judgement 
parameter, that allows for a qualified trade-off between equity and efficiency objectives. 
Section 8.4 provides an empirical illustration - drawing on the INS data used in Chapter 
5- which compares levels of health social welfare for Portugal's five regions. Section 
8.5 extends the analysis by disaggregating the family of welfare indices according to 
income class, a point that is of ma or interest given the overall objectives of the thesis. 
A further empirical illustration using the INS 87 is provided in 8.6, this time comparing 
levels of health social welfare by income groups in Portugal as a whole. The final 
section presents some concluding remarks. 
8.2 Social welfare functions and the equity-efficiency trade-off 
The Social Welfare Function is a construct that is rarely used to guide questions 
of measurement or policy evaluation in the health economics literature. Nevertheless, 
the implicit form that underlies the greater part of research in the field is relatively clear. 
In particular, the traditional 'welfarist' approach to evaluating society's well-being seems 
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to have been largely eschewed. There are some important reasons for this (Culyer, 
1989). One is that a particular class of 'extra-welfare information' - the actual health 
of the community, or their achievement in our terminology - is of intrinsic importance 
when evaluating social states. Another reason, inextricably related to the nature of the 
health attribute, is that there is often a case for overruling individual judgements of 
value in favour of those adopted by a perceived or real 'ethical decision maker'. As a 
consequence, the bulk of health economics research that deals with questions of national 
policy would appear to be guided by an implicit SWF that is most naturally and directly 
defined in terms of the objectives of the 'decision maker' vis-a-vis the health 
distribution. There is also widespread consensus that two particular objectives - equity 
and efficiency - stand above all others (cf., eg. Fuchs, 1987; McLachlan and Maynard, 
1982), the implication being that variations in these attributes provide a suitable basis 
for monitoring improvements in society's health welfare. ' 
In this context, logic would suggest that macro-level evaluations of health well- 
being should be based on the combined measurement of equity and efficiency, thus 
enabling the possibility of trade-offs between the objectives to be addressed. Invariably, 
however, empirical studies treat evaluation of the two as separate issues. This is 
particularly true of research that draws on the techniques available for inequality 
measurement, where studies often include a brief discussion on the importance of 
efficiency criteria for policy evaluation, but then go on to measure inequities 
independently of such considerations. In much the same way, research that employs the 
tools of efficiency analysis tends to treat equity as "a competing dimension upon which 
decisions are made in addition to that of the efficient deployment of resources" 
[Drummond et al (1987, p. 33)]. Consequently, very little is done to incorporate 
suitable distributional criteria into actual measurement. As an example, recall the 
discussion of Chapter 3 on the QALY literature, where it was shown that acceptance of 
health maximization as a basis for allocating resources has been unduly hindered by the 
insensitivity of the QALY metric to widely supported distributional value judgements. 
Of course, to an important extent, the dichotomy between equity and efficiency 
1 Another obvious implication is that policy evaluation and health social welfare evaluation 
essentially require the same information basis. 
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measurement in the empirical literature is intentional. There are, after all, a number of 
valid reasons for focusing exclusively on a particular objective (eg. current public 
concern, lack of previous research in that area, etc. ). One suspects, however, that most 
health economists would readily opt for an integrated approach to policy evaluation, if 
the techniques for joint measurement of equity and efficiency were sufficiently 
developed. Yet it is only very recently that such a task has come to be adequately 
addressed (eg. Culyer, 1989; Wagstaff, 199 1; Culyer and Wagstaff, 1991 1992). Quite 
naturally, this research has concentrated on probing conceptual issues. Wagstaff's 
(1991) article does, however, contain a practical suggestion, based on explicit 
construction of an SWF, as to how integrated measurement of the two fundamental 
objectives might proceed. 
Wagstaff suggests that social welfare in the domain of health might be represented 
by the well-known isoelastic SWF, a general form of which is 
if 
(h) a, if 
T*1 
-r =I 
(8.1) 
Individual health status, h,, is assumed to be a continuous variable that can be suitably 
measured on an interval scale, an assumption that will be maintained, for ease of 
exposition, throughout the chapter. The coefficient a, indicates the weight that society 
attaches to the ith person's health status. Recent contributions to the outcome 
measurement literature have suggested that weights such as these can provide all the 
information that is needed to capture specific equity concerns. It is argued, as a 
consequence, that society's health well-being is greatest when a suitably weighted sum 
of health states is maximized (cf. Williams, 1988a; Culyer, 1990). 2 Wagstaff 
disagrees that weights are an appropriate form of representing societal concern regarding 
equity, ostensibly because they cannot reveal aversion to inequality in health outcomes. 
This view does not seem entirely correct: if the weights are a decreasing function of 
' This suggestion was discussed in Chapter 3. Note that if one adopted the view of the early 
QALY literature, that a unit of health is of equal value to whomsoever it accrues, the a, 's would be 
set at the same value for all individuals in the community. 
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Figure 8.1: The isoelastic health social welfare function 
the rank of the health distribution, then a particular form of aversion to inequality is 
implied. Nevertheless, Wagstaff appears to circumscribe the role of weights to 
indicating societal preferences regarding the process of health production (eg. the merit 
of some persons relative to others) or type of health improvements (eg. those that benefit 
a particular age group). 
Specific health output equity concerns are incorporated into the welfare analysis 
through the mechanism of constant elasticity of substitution of the welfare contours 
(I/T), which allows the parameter r to be interpreted as the degree of aversion to 
inequality in health outcomes. This suggestion is exemplified in Figure 8.1 which 
shows, for the two person society, an intermediate and two limiting cases of the 
isolelastic SWF. The axes indicate the health states of individuals 1 and 2, and it is 
assumed (for ease of presentation) that society attaches equal weight to the health of 
these two persons (ie. al=a, =l ). 3 When r=0, social welfare is represented by a 
straight line with slope -1, which implies indifference to inequality in health outcomes. 
3 Tbe effect of allowing a, * a. is to change the slopes of the welfare contours. 
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However, if -z > 0, the contours of the welfare function become concave and some 
aversion to inequality is indicated. The limiting case r -4 oo represents a Rawlsian- 
type criterion, whereby the only concern is with the health of the least healthy person 
in society. Thus, in an important sense, concavity of the SVVT provides a means of 
capturing both efficiency and equity considerations - the former defined in terms of 
greater health output and the latter as less inequality in outcomes. 
A potentially attractive feature of Wagstaff's approach is that it can be used to 
rationalize an empirical measure of health welfare. " Note that (8.1) is similar to the 
SWF underlying Atkinson's (1970) index of income inequality, discussed in Chapter 4. 
Building on Atkinson's method, suppose that the mean equivalent level of health, h, is 
defined as the level of health status, which if equally distributed, would produce the 
same amount of social welfare as that which actually exists. Thus h, is defined 
implicitly by 
W(h he,..., he (8.2) 
el 
)= W(hl, h 21 ..., h,, ) . 
By concavity of the SWF it follows that h. :5p., and hence the fraction of per capita 
health status which could be sacrificed with no loss of social welfare, if the rest were 
to be distributed equally, is given by 
A(h) =I- -ý! . 
(8.3) 
Ph 
A(h) is a measure of Atkinson-type inequality in health outcomes, bounded by zero 
(when everyone enjoys the same health status) and one. ' Combining (8.2) and (8.3) it 
is clear that 
W(hjq h2' "" h. ) = h, = ph[l - A(h)] . 
(8.4) 
Thus, the equally distributed equivalent level of health provides a direct measure of 
" It should be pointed out that Wagstaff does not address this issue directly. The argument 
presented here does, however, seem to be implicit in his approach. 
' From (8.1), maintaining the assumption that a, =I and substituting yi, Ily and e respectively 
with hi, p,, and r, it is possible to compute this measure through the form given in equation (4.2). 
Note that for a given health distribution, the computed value of A(h) is greater the higher the value 
of r that is assumed. 
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health social welfare on the health scale, showing the extent to which health inequality 
reduces the level of welfare below that of per capita health status. Indeed, equation 
(8.4) can be viewed as specifying static trade-offs between efficiency (a higher average 
level of health) and equity (reduced inequality in outcomes). 
Despite the apparent appeal of this argument, the Wagstaff approach has some 
obvious limitations which render the index implied by (8.4) largely unattractive as a 
measure of health social welfare. First of all, the concern for inequality derives 
essentially from the process of aggregating health levels: it is not intrinsic to the 
evaluative structure. Most modem societies, however, reveal an explicit and 
autonomous concern for inequity, which seems to suggest that relative differences 
between health levels should be given a meaning independently of how much they count 
in aggregation across persons. A second related drawback is that A(h) does not 
actually measure inequality in the accepted sense: it is really an index of the welfare- 
loss or inefficiency that arises from a less than optimal distribution of total health. " 
Thirdly, Wagstaff's SWF assumes that the welfare of individuals is unaffected by 
feelings of sympathy, envy or deprivation in relation to others: it depends exclusively 
on own health levels. This seems unreasonable when the interdependence of individual 
welfare has long been recognized as an important issue in determining socially desirable 
distributions of health and health care (cf. Culyer, 1980). Presumably, such phenomena 
could be incorporated as weights aj, but this is unsatisfactory given that no explanation 
is provided of how these weights come about. An alternative which allows individual 
levels of welfare to depend on the interpersonal distribution of health or that of its 
determining variables, seems altogether more adequate. Note that this does not 
necessarily imply sovereignty of individual preferences, but merely suggests that the 
'ethical decision maker' takes into account commonly observed individual phenomena 
in defining society's health welfare. 
A final decisive weakness of the Wagstaff approach is the particular type of 
health-equity concern which it embodies. It is assumed that society preoccupies itself 
with differences in health status per se, whereas what generally motivates concern for 
6 Recall the arguments of Chapter 4 rejecting the Atkinson method as a means for measuring 
inequality in health attributes. 
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inequalities is their systematic relation to economic status. ' The problem which this 
issue raises is seen very clearly in the context of Figure 8.1. Consider the two 
situations, where only the following information is available : (i) individuals I and 2 
are respectively 20 and 80 years old, and (ii) they are both 20 but one is poor and the 
other rich. Although concave welfare contours, indicating aversion to inequality in 
health outcomes, cannot be ruled out in the first case, they are obviously a far less 
accurate representation of societal concerns than for the second case. Yet the Wagstaff 
approach does not distinguish clearly between situations of this type: there is a defacto 
anonymity assumption, unless it is overruled via weights aj. The obvious conclusion is 
that an isoelastic SWF can only handle income related health inequality adequately by 
attaching greater weight to the health of poor individuals. But once again we are faced 
with the problem of exogeneity of the weighting scheme. If socio-economic inequality 
in health is a fundamental concern - as indeed it appears to be in all modern health 
systems - then this concern should be built into the evaluative structure. As Culyer 
(1989) has argued, in the general context of normative analysis of health and health 
care: 
"it seems altogether more preferable to adjust the scheme of things so as to 
incorporate such considerations fully rather than leaving them as a kind of ad hoc 
9escape clause' ... in order to prevent theoretical emasculation 
(... inability to 
discuss in a consistent normative framework some matters that are of evident 
normative importance). " (p. 36). 
Hence, the conclusion to be drawn is that in spite of the importance of Wagstaff s 
proposal, indeed its innovation, the particular form which his argument takes does not 
faithfully represent widely held views on the social welfare associated with health. 
Consequently, an alternative must be sought, and this must begin by identifying the 
fundamental arguments of the health SWF. 
In every evaluative structure, some types of factual matters are taken to be of 
intrinsic importance. They reflect the basic ends of the system and therefore constitute 
7 This oversight is surprising given that Wagstaff has been at the forefront of opposition to the 
use of health domain inequality measures without reference to the distribution of economic position. 
In Wagstaff et al (1991a), for example, he criticizes the work of Le Grand (1987), Leclerc et al (1990) 
and others, arguing that it "fails to capture the socioeconomic dimension to inequality in health" (p. 
546). 
210 
the informational basis of evaluative judgements. For instance, in the traditional 
'welfarist' approach the informational foundation includes only unit comparable 
individual utilities. In the realm of health welfare analysis it seems appropriate to view 
society as having two distinct fundamental aims with regard to the health distribution. 
The first and most basic is that more health is preferred to less. It is denominated here 
as the aversion to sickness principle (ASP). At the community-wide level, it implies 
that the aim will be to maximize the total health or, equivalently, to achieve the highest 
mean level of health status that is feasible. A second widely held value is that 
population differences in health status should not be systematically related to socio- 
economic position. It is referred to, in this chapter, as the aversion to inequity principle 
(AIP). Such an objective underlies much of the concern over health inequities expressed 
in policy documents (see in particular, DHSS, 1980; WHO, 1987). It implies that a 
distribution of health which reveals a lesser degree of socio-economic inequality will 
always be preferred to one where there is more. ' 
These two principles express what are widely acknowledged to be the major 
objectives of health policy: efficiency and equity. Quite clearly, AIP captures the 
essence of equity concerns regarding the health distribution. ASP, on the other hand, 
represents a particular notion of efficiency, that of health maximization. This is the 
definition implicit in Wagstaff's (1991) approach and also that of many other authors 
who have considered the equity-efficiency trade-off in the domain of health (eg. Culyer, 
1988). It is worth reminding that the view is not unproblematic. As it stands, it reveals 
no more than a societal preference for health output growth and hence Le Grand (1991 a) 
has a point when he asserts that "it would seem preferable ... to discuss the issue of any 
trade-offs between growth and equity explicitly, rather than obscuring the issue by 
reference to efficiency" (p. 32). However, if the costs of health producing commodities 
are assumed constant across two societies, then their respective levels of health output 
can logically be seen as measures of relative productivity or efficiency in transforming 
commodity characteristics into health. This is the view adopted here. 
8 At the limit, the implication is that social welfare is maximized at the point where all income 
groups share the same level of health status. Whilst this might be viewed as a somewhat extreme 
equity objective, there is no doubt that modem societies reveal widespread concern for the degree of 
income related health inequality. Therefore, the AIP value would seem to be applicable. 
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If it is assumed that the health variable can be suitably standardized for relevant 
non-income heterogeneity among the population (eg. age and sex), then one reasonable 
specification of social welfare incorporating the ASP and AIP principles is the SWF 
W(h) =V (Ph' Ih) (8.5) 
where ph represents the average health of the population (ie. P. = F, hi/ n) andIh is an 
index of income related health inequity, bounded by zero (when all income groups share 
the same level of standardized health) and one (when the very richest enjoy all the 
standardized health in the community). V is increasing in phand decreasing inIht thus 
representing a societal preference for more health and less income related inequality in 
its distribution. Of course, it could be argued that the informational basis of (8.5) is 
somewhat limited, since it is blind to concerns about the relative merit or age of the 
individuals whose health is being assessed. For instance, the view could be taken that 
personal health losses that are a direct result of unhealthy activities over which the 
individual exercises full control, would not lead to a fall in social welfare (cf. the Le 
Grand approach in Chapter 3). Likewise, health gains experienced by the old might be 
valued less than those of the young (or vice-versa), which would once again have 
implications for overall well-being. Unlike the ASP and AIP principles, however, there 
is not a great deal of explicit, documented public support for these values. Even if such 
opinions are held quite strongly by some individuals (cf. Williams, 1988a), the truth is 
that they seldom figure in policy statements. It seems best, therefore, to exclude them 
from a general evaluation of health well-being. 9 
In the income inequality literature, specifications of the form given in equation 
(8.5), but defined over incomes, have come to be described as abbreviated social 
welfare functions. 10 Particular attention has been given to including the Gini index of 
" This is not to say that other types of analyses should overlook these or other criteria. Indeed, 
there is one other category of information that might be deemed of particular interest: that which is 
instrumentally influential, through its role in determining the intrinsically valued variables implied by 
ASP and AIR Taking account of these indirect influences on health welfare calls for causal analysis 
of the instruments and their consequences. 
10 The term 'abbreviated social welfare function' seems to have been coined by Kondor (1975). 
The volume by Lambert (1989) devotes the whole of Chapter 5 to these type of specifications in the 
context of income distribution. 
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inequality as an argument in the SWF, perhaps as a result of Atkinson's (1970) 
observation that the judgements implied by this measure do not generally accord with 
widely held social values. The new work has shown that the Gini coefficient is an 
admissable measure of inequality in the context of social welfare if one assumes that 
individuals suffer deprivation by virtue of others having income resources higher than 
themselves. " The impetus for this line of enquiry was provided by Sen's (1974) 
axiomatic approach to measuring well-being. He assumed a society of n individuals, 
arranged in ascending order of their incomes: YI 5 Y2: 5 ... :5y, ý , denoted by the vector 
Yý (Y19 Y2% ... , y. ). He then considered the 
following social welfare function: 
R (8.6) W Y, oi(y) 
where vft) is the weight given to person i with income yi. It should be emphasised 
that uj(y) is a function of the whole income distribution and not of yj alone. It is this 
feature which permits the notion of relative deprivation to be incorporated. 
Sen's axioms for the measurement of welfare were as follows. First of all, 
relative equity, implying that if person i is considered worse off than person j, the 
income of the ith person should have higher weight than that of j. Secondly, monotonic 
welfare, whereby a person with lower income is always considered worse off than one 
with higher income. Thirdly and crucially, rank order, implying that weights -Oft) 
should be a decreasing function of the rank of the income distribution. Finally, 
normalization, which states that if income is equally distributed then W= Py, the mean 
level of income. The only SVVT satisfying these four axioms is given by: 
W(S) = p., (l - 2ý) (8.7) 
where ZY is the Gini coefficient. This provides an interesting computable index of 
social welfare, which can be interpreted as the equally distributed equivalent income 
measure for the Gini coefficient (cf. Bishop et al, 1990). Note that it is similar to the 
measure of health social welfare derived in (8.4) for the Atkinson-type index of health 
" An inverse rationale can also be given in tenns of altruistic concern for those that are less well- 
off (eg. Layard, 1980; Pyatt, 1980). 
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inequality, apparently simply substituting one inequality index for another. There is an 
important difference, however, in that the Sen rationale is based on explicit 
consideration of a separate equity concern: the sense of relative deprivation. This is 
captured by taking into account the number of persons who are richer than the 
representative individual. 
In recent years, various rationalizations of (8.7) have been put forward in the 
income inequality literature. Yitzhaky (1979) and Hey and Lambert (1980) placed the 
ethical justification of the Gini coefficient squarely within the theory of relative 
deprivation. This theory offers an explanation of attitudes to social inequality, based on 
an individual's position relative to some 'reference group' in society (cf. Runciman, 
1966). Lambert (1985) and Kakwani (1986) provided an important extension to the 
analysis, by allowing the weight given to inequality, as measured by the Gini, to vary. 
Useful empirical applications of the indices were also presented in Kakwani (1986) and 
in Bishop et al (1990,1991). This work is of great interest to the purpose of measuring 
society's health welfare. Recall that in Chapter 4 the Gini coefficient was shown to be 
a special case of the more general concentration index. This suggests thatCh. the health 
concentration coefficient, might be used as a measure of. income related inequity in the 
SWF depicted in (8.5). If we can further incorporate the reasonable notion that different 
persons may weight the relative importance of ASP and AIP differently, then the 
possibilities for devising a suitable measure of the general welfare associated with health 
are considerably enhanced. The following section develops this suggestion, showing 
that concentration measures have an ethically-sustainable role to play in comparisons of 
well-being associated with the functioning health. 
8.3 A new approach to measuring health social welfare 
There is an interesting parallel between the notion of relative deprivation 
underlying the rationalizations of the Gini index cited above and the way people view 
inequities in the distribution of health functioning. Consider Runciman's (1966) classic 
definition of the relative deprivation condition: 
"A person is relatively deprived of X when (i) he does not have X, (ii) he sees 
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some other person or persons, which may include himself at some previous or 
expected time, as having X (whether or not this is or will be in fact the case), 
(iii) he wants X, and (iv) he sees it as feasible that he should have X" 
(Runciman, 1966, p. 10). 
Is such an explanation valid in the domain of health? In fact, at least two arguments 
can be made in its favour, the most obvious being where X is the health of any one 
individual in society. That person would be relatively deprived of the desired 
functioning 'good health' if she were sick, others of the same age were healthy and it 
was physiologically feasible that her health could be brought up to the level of the 
reference group. From the social point of view, however, it seems more appropriate to 
drop the anonymity assumption and allow that X is a named-functioning (ie. the same 
functioning going to two different persons). 12 Suppose that the population is 
homogeneous apart from differences in health states and income levels and that these 
differences are described by the categories sick-healthy and poor-rich, respectively. 
Runciman's statement above would then run as follows: an individual suffers income 
related health deprivation when (i) he is sick and poor, (ii) there are other persons who 
are healthy and generally rich, (iii) being in good health is desirable, and (iv) it is 
physiologically feasible that he could be a healthy person, but given his income position 
he has less opportunity to achieve that desired state. 
This description is intuitively similar to much of the concern over inequalities in 
health, where observers have placed particular emphasis on the health gap that divides 
rich and poor, and on the view that such differences would not arise were it not for 
reasons that are the direct or indirect result of persons' income position. There is a 
concern that the poor-sick person is somehow deprived in relation to those that are rich 
and healthy. Such income related health deprivation can be defined as the well-being 
foregone because of not possessing the level of health en oyed by others, when that 
difference is considered by society to be avoidable were it not for differences in socio- 
economic status. 
12 Hahn (1971) first used this terminology when he defined the concept of 'named-goods' to 
describe the same commodity going to two different individuals. 
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There are, admittedly, some problems with the argument. Relative deprivation is 
usually conceived as relating to the means for achieving a desired state. Sen (1983), in 
particular, suggests that functioning should be viewed in an absolute sense whereas a 
relative approach is called for in the space of commodities and resources. Culyer (1990) 
goes further by arguing that relativity in health-related commodities hardly matters at 
all and that for health functioning any deprivation that may exist is clearly absolute. 
Nevertheless, health is itself instrumental to other desired functionings (eg. earning a 
living, enjoying leisure time with one's family) and hence there is a case for considering 
socio-economic related health deprivation as worthy of analysis. Indeed, both Sen 
(1983, p. 168) and Culyer (1990, p. 21) unequivocally state that their arguments do not 
imply that inequality in functioning space is an irrelevant issue for public policy. 
Furthermore, the fact that it is the relative differences between rich and poor which have 
inspired preoccupation over inequalities in health cannot be avoided. Without a 
reference group it is doubtful that similar attention would have been drawn to the 
absolute level of health of the poor. It seems useful, therefore, to further explore the 
notion of income related health deprivation in the context of the social welfare 
associated with health. In what follows, a rationale based on this idea is presented for 
an abbreviated SWF of the formW.: V(Phl Ch) and consequently, for an index of 
well-being in the domain of health. The deduction draws on the rationalizations of the 
Gini coefficient cited earlier and particularly on work by Kakwani (1986, pp. 197-202). 
Suppose that income Y is a continuous random variable with probability density 
function ftY) and distribution function F(Y); the proportion of individuals having an 
income less than or equal to yj being F(y). Assume further that health H is also a 
random variable, related to Y by means of a continuous function hi = g(y), with 
g'(yi) >0 for all yj ýt 0. 
Individuals are represented by the well-being functional U[h,, F(Y)], imposed by 
an ethical decision maker. This states that each person's health welfare depends on 
own health and also, crucially, on the income distribution. Given that health is itself a 
function of income, individuals will necessarily compare health states when they 
compare their own income with that of others. In this context, income related health 
deprivation (111)) felt by a person with income yj relative to another with income y, 
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may be defined as follows: 
HD (yi, yj) 
0 
ic(hj - hi) if Yj < yj 
if Yj > yj 
where ic is a constant measuring the degree to which the deprivation is felt. If 1C is 0 
health deprivation is judged as completely unimportant; if ic = 1, the level of income 
related health deprivation suffered by an individual is exactly equal to the difference 
between his health and that of the richer individual; and if ic > 1, individual deprivation 
is greater than the health gap. The last of these cases might be justified on the grounds 
that health is a basic commodity required for living a fulfilling life, and hence, a greater 
weight than the actual health difference should be attributed to the deprivation. For any 
given value of ic, whenever compared income levels are equal or lower, no deprivation 
(or loss of welfare) is assumed, so that the individual's well-being associated with health 
is given by own health, ie. hi = g(y). How6ver, if compared incomes are higher, 
implying a theoretical observation of a higher health state h, = g%), then individual i 
suffers a loss of welfare, which is assumed to be proportional to the differences in the 
two persons' health states. In this case, health welfare is equal to [hi - ic (hj - hi)]. 
Now assume that individual health welfare is determined by a procedure where 
pairwise comparisons are made with other persons. Given that the probability of 
selecting an individual with income y, from the population is f (y) dyj, it follows that 
in all pairwise comparisons the expected health welfare (HW) enjoyed by a person with 
income yj will be: 
Yj 
E[HW I h, I= fhijlyj)dyj +f [hi - ic(hj-hi)]. Ayj)dyj 
(8.8) 
0 Y, 
As a final assumption allow that the level of welfare enjoyed by society is measured by 
the average of individuals' well-being. 
A number of points are worth noting about the assumptions laid out. First of all, 
in contrast to Wagstaff (1991), social well-being associated with health depends directly 
217 
on the income distribution. This is an important feature given that what generally 
motivates concern for inequalities in health are not the differences per se but their 
systematic relation to socio-economic status. Secondly, in the present approach, there 
is no requirement that the deprivation effect have empirical validity at the individual 
level. U[h,, F(Y)] is best seen as a well-being functional imposed by an equity 
conscious ethical decision-maker. In this case, the value judgement implied by the 
framework is that society has as its goal that people are not put in a position whereby 
they feel income related health deprivation. A third point is that the parameter ic can 
be seen as measuring the degree of society's aversion to income related health 
inequality, or equivalently, the extent to which it values AIR As 1C rises greater weight 
is attached to this principle and less to ASP. 
Finally, it is acknowledged that the present analysis does involve an apparently 
restrictive assumption about possible combinations of health and income chosen for 
comparison by the reference individual. By defining health to be an induced random 
variable which is positively related to income, we are in effect ruling out two 
empirically observable situations, namely ( hi ; >- h, and yj < yj I and I hi < h, and yj ýt yj). 
Clearly, it could be argued that there are some grounds for relaxing the assumptions 
hi = g(Yd with g'(y, ) > 0. From the point of view of society, however, it is less 
important that exceptions can be found. What is at stake is whether this assumption 
generally reflects underlying views and factual evidence. In fact, the hypothesis that 
health is a positive function of income clearly underlies the inequality in health debate 
and it is one for which much empirical evidence can be advanced. For instance, in the 
volume by Van Doorslaer et al (1993) all the country reports show a positive (negative) 
relation between health (morbidity) and income no matter how the health variable is 
defined. The empirical analysis of chapters 5 and 6 also points in the same direction. 
The assumption could be relaxed by defining hi = g(y) + F-i , where ci is a 
stochastic term with zero mean, constant variance and non autocoffelation. In this case 
HD might be interpreted as an expected measure, ex-ante to the realization of the health 
state. It is then possible to accomodate relevant ex-post cases such as th, ý! h, and 
yj < yj). Since individual health welfare is determined by pairwise comparisons, this 
stochastic definition leads to the same result reached below (by virtue of the expected 
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value of F, being zero). Therefore, I use the deterministic specification for ease of 
exposition and because it reflects underlying views and general factual evidence. 
Recall from Chapter 4 that the health concentration curve expresses the 
relationship between Ffg(y)] and F(y). If individuals are arranged in ascending order 
of their incomes, FI[g(yi)] = FI(h), the proportion of health enjoyed by persons with 
incomes equal to or below y, , is given by: 
Y, 
Fl(h) f Hfll) dY (8.9) 
E[hil 0 
where E[hil = ph = average level of health status. Substituting (8.9) into (8.8) gives the 
following health welfare curve (detailed mathematical steps are shown in Appendix 6): 
W(h) = hi - icph[l - Fl(h)] + Ichi[I - F(yi)] (8.10) 
where W (h) is the expected welfare enjoyed by an individual with income yi and 
F(y) = J00fly)dyj is the probability distribution function of income. 
Suppose now that income yj corresponds to the 100pth percentile, then the health 
concentration curve is represented by a function Gh(p) = 171(h), where p= F(yj) and 
0 :5p :51. G, (p), which is obtained by eliminating yj and hi from the distribution 
function of income and the first moment distribution function, Fj(h), is interpreted as 
the fraction of total health received by the lowest pth fraction of individuals. It 
satisfies the following conditions (Kakwani, 1980: pp. 157-8): 
if p=0, Gh(p) = 
if p=1, G, (p) =1 
GAP) - 
dF, (h, ) 
dF(, v, ) 
Gd2 
FI[h, l 
h 
(P) 
dF 2(yi) 
hi 
-> Ph 
hi' 
Ph fly d 
Given that h, ' = g'(yi) is positive, it follows that FI(h) < F(y) and that the concentration 
curve will fall below the egalitarian line. Using these relationships in (8.10) yields the 
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average health well-being enjoyed by an individual at the 100pth percentile: 
W(h) =ý (p) = Ph[ Gh '(p) (I + ic - lcp) - ic + ic Gh(p) I* 
Given that social welfare has been defined as the average of individual welfare, the area 
under (8.12) can be interpreted as the average health well-being enjoyed by society: 
II 
f 4<p)dP "'- Ph 
f[ Ghl(p) + ic - icp) - ic + rGh(p) I dp 
(8.13) 
00 
which on evaluating the integrals leads to: 
1 
W(h) = gh [I-r, (1 -2G P) 
(8.14) f 
h(p) d 
0 
Since the health concentration index, Ch, is defined as one minus twice the area under 
the health concentration curve, JO' Gjp)dp, this equation rationalizes a family of social 
welfare functions of the type: 
Wic V(Ph' Ch) PhO Ch) ic ýt 0 (8.15) 
The indices W. implied by (8.15), provide the basis for empirical measurement 
of the social well-being associated with health. It should be noted that W,, allows the 
weight to be given to the health concentration index to vary, and hence the terms of the 
trade-off between income related health inequality (equity) and health output 
(efficiency). Whenever ic = 0, implying that society does not value AIP at all (ie. does 
not recognize deprivation effects), W,, is given simply byp,, a measure of well-being 
completely insensitive to changes in the social distribution of health. However, if AIP 
is valued (ie. ic > 0), the inequity-efficiency trade-off is given by: " 
Ch dpl, 
- 
Y, ch (8.16) 
gh dCh 
Iv 
1- TCh 
This implies that a reduction of [KCh / 1-icC. 1 percentage points in the average level of 
13 Equation (8.16) expresses the elasticity of substitution between the arguments of the SWF. It 
is obtained by totally differentiating equation (8.15) [See Lambert (1989), Chapter 51. 
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health status will be accepted by society, in order to achieve a I% reduction in inequity. 
Clearly, the more unequal the existing socio-economic distribution of health, and the 
stronger the deprivation effect that individuals are assumed to feel, the greater will be 
the accepted reduction in mean health status. 
8.4 An empirical application 
The family of welfare indices developed above has a number of potential 
applications. The most obvious are in comparing the performance of health systems and 
in examining the intertemporal health achievements of a particular country. The data 
requirements for such analyses are relatively modest. One essentially needs access to: 
(i) a suitable per capita health indicator for each country or time period-, (ii) an estimate 
of the respective health concentration coefficients, obtained by crossing individual or 
grouped information on health, income and demographic characteristics; and (iii) an 
assessment of society's relative valuation of the ASP and AT principles. Items (i) and 
(ii) are readily available in a number of countries. For instance, the volume by Van 
Doorslaer et at (1993) presents data on the prevalence and income distribution of 
chronic illness in eight european countries that might easily be used for a cross-national 
comparison of the social welfare associated with chronic conditions. Similarly, Propper 
and Upward (1992) present average levels of illness and income-indexed concentration 
indices for a number of morbidity indicators available in various samples of the UK 
General Household Survey in the period 1974-87. Such data could be used to assess 
the time-trend of health social welfare in the UK. 14 Item (iii) is more problematical. 
Ideally, experimental methods should be used to try to elicit values of the inequality 
aversion parameter ic. In the short term, in the absence of firm guidance from policy 
makers or the public at large, one might opt for a strategy of calculating health welfare 
" It might be argued that because of cultural and temporal variability in survey reporting, cross- 
country or longitudinal comparisons of morbidity levels will bias the social welfare estimates. 
However, such differences are not necessarily greater than those between persons from different 
income groups. The referenced studies implicitly assume that the decision to report illness is 
unaffected by cultural norms related to income position. As a number of sociological studies have 
shown, this is not necessarily true (d'Houtaud and Field, 1984; Blaxter, 1989). The obvious point to 
remember is that social welfare appraisals would benefit from more refined health status measures; but 
so too would estimates of the level of health inequality. 
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levels for each of several different values of 1c. 
The W. indices may also be used to compare levels of health social welfare across 
geographical areas of the same country. Such an application is illustrated in this section, 
with numerical estimates being provided for Portugal's five continental regions: the 
North, Centre, Lisbon and Tagus Valley, Alentejo and the Algarve. The data are drawn 
from the 1987 National Health Survey (INS) described in Chapter V5 Table A7.1 
(Appendix 7) shows various background statistics computed from the survey. The main 
points of interest for the analysis that follows are: (i) distinct demographic compositions 
of the regional populations, with average age increasing and average family size 
decreasing as one moves from northern to southern areas; (ii) higher than average health 
care consumption in the Lisbon and Tagus Valley region; and (iii) low income levels 
coupled with high levels of inequality to the north in contrast to the richer but less 
unequal regions of the south. These patterns are in agreement with macro-level 
observations (see, eg., Pereira et al, 1987). 
Given that the INS only collects morbidity data, the analysis actually measures the 
level of social 'illfare' (ie. the converse of social welfare). Three morbidity indicators 
were used: 
(i) limiting chronic illness, a dummy variable representing persons who declared 
'disability' (bed days, off work days or restricted activity) in a two week reference 
period, with the incapacity resulting from a medical condition present for at least 
three months; 
(ii) disability and illness, a further dummy variable representing persons who declared 
'disability' and 'illness' (no disability but felt unwell) in a two week r. p.; and 
(iii) number of sickdays, computed by aggregating bed days, off work days and 
restricted activity days in a two week r. p., with bed days being subtracted for any 
individual that simultaneously reports off work days. 
Since there is some overlap in the informational content of the measures, a degree of 
caution is advisable when considering congruence and dissimilarity in the results 
15 Recall that the sampling design yields representative estimates at the regional level. 
Geographical delimitations may be found in the map shown in Appendix 2. 
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provided by each one. Nevertheless, the measures provide some indication of particular 
aspects of an individual's health condition: respectively, the susceptibility to functional 
limitation due to longstanding conditions, general lack of health whether of a limiting 
or subjective nature and the degree of illness severity as measured by the time duration 
of incapacity. 
If valid comparisons of health social welfare are to be made, it is necessary to 
remove collinearity with demographic factors. This was accomplished by means of 
direct standardization (see equation 5.3). Average levels of illness in the regions were 
age-sex standardized by the national population. The concentration indices were 
calculated (through the linear approximation method) using income decile groups of the 
population in each region and standardizing by the age-sex distribution of the national 
population. Thus, the regional estimates are made on the assumption that each region 
has the demographic composition of the country as a whole. 
The income definition is the same used in Chapter 5: namely, individual 
equivalent disposable income using the OECD scale. Estimates of health social welfare 
were computed according to four different values of the inequality aversion parameter 
ic, in the range x--O to x--3. 
The results are presented in Figure 8.2, which shows regional variation in health 
social illfare relative to the national average (= 100). 16 The three morbidity variables 
show roughly similar patterns. The North reveals stable levels of social illfare, close 
to the national average, irrespective of the weight attached to the ASP and AIP 
principles. The Centre has high levels of social illfare which tend to be judged slightly 
less disadvantageous the greater the concern for income related health deprivation. The 
Lisbon and AlenteJo regions perform relatively well at all values of 1c, with social illfare 
generally below the national standard. For the general disability and illness variable the 
relative advantage of the Lisbon region declines as ic is increased, a fact which seems 
largelly attributable to high levels of inequality in subjective illness. The most striking 
results are, however, for the Algarve region which generally presents the worse health 
16 The actual computed values, measured on the morbidity scale, are shown in Table A7.2. 
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illfare levels according to the deprivation indifferent index ic = 0. Once the value of 1C 
is increased, the relative position of the Algarve population improves significantly. 
Thus, for the sick days variable at ic = 3, health social illfare is only 5 per cent higher 
than the national average against 25 percent for the deprivation indifferent index. In 
terms of relative positions, a deprivation conscious societal appraisal (IC = 3), will judge 
the performance of the North and Algarve regions as roughly equal, which is in marked 
contrast to the inequality indifferent evaluation. The reason that, as ic is increased, the 
health of the Algarve population is judged less disadvantageous is, of course, that 
income related health inequality is lowest in that region (see Table A7.3 in the 
Appendix). Similarly, the relative decline in the performance of the Lisbon region is 
due its having the most extreme socio-economic health differences. 
The estimates show that when there is a concern for the economic distribution of 
health, social judgements on the relative position of different populations can change. 
This result has implications for regional resource allocations. For instance, suppose that 
health care resources were apportioned on a per capita basis and that in future the 
policy maker wished to compensate regions with lower levels of health by attributing 
them higher levels of health care resources. Given the present findings, he would be 
driven to substantially increase the share of public funds to the Algarve region. 
However, if health inequity were a fundamental social concern (as it appears to be in 
most countries), then the allocation mechanism should logically be less generous to the 
Algarve. 
Clearly, we have a long way to go before such implications can be put into 
practice. There is obvious scope for improving the estimates by using more refined 
indicators of population health. Once these are available the informational significance 
of health social welfare measurements will be greatly increased. There is also a need 
to clarify societal preferences with regard to the trade-off between health output and 
inequity in its distribution (ie. the appropriate value of 1C). The empirical illustration 
nevertheless shows that conventional health output evaluations can be informatively 
weighted by ethically-founded distributional details. 
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8.5 The distribution of health social welfare by income groups 
Given that the focus of the thesis is on equity, it is important to know how health 
social welfare is distributed across groups of the population with differential command 
over resources. This section extends the analysis developed in 8.3 so as to permit 
measurement of this issue. In effect, it shows how a society that values both the AT 
and ASP principles, will gauge the health situation of different income groups. 
Suppose that a society is most concemed about the health of the poorest 100p, 
percent of the population, perhaps on the basis that these persons fall below some 
accepted poverty line and are judged as having relatively less opportunity to improve 
their health status than their economically better-off peers. Using equation (8.12), the 
average level of health welfare of this Poorest group is given by 
Pi 
W(P) f lii, [Gk'(p) (I+lc-icp) - ic + icGx(p)]dp 
(8.17) 
Pi 0 
which on evaluating the integrals leads to" 
W(p) -th 
Pt (8.18) 
[GA(p) + ICGI, (Pl) - lcp, G,, (pl) - lcpl + 21cf Gh(p)dpl 
Pi 0 
Since G,, (p, ) is the proportion of total health held by the poorest p, decimal fraction of 
the population, it follows that the mean level of health status of this group will be: 
ph Gh(pl) 
Php, ": 
P, 
and that the health concentration coefficient, in the population formed by these 
individuals, can be written as 
17 See Appendix 6 for detailed mathematical steps. 
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PI 
ChF, 2f Gl, (p) dp (8.20) 
p, Gl, (pl) 0 
Using both these results, (8.18) simplifies straightforwardly to 
W(P) ! '- Php, - lC I (11h - Phpl) +PI Php, Chp, I' (8.21) 
This equation is easily computed from survey data as a measure of the average 
level of health social welfare enjoyed by the poorest group in society. Furthermore, the 
result generalizes to other percentile groups of the population ordered by income. Note 
that pW(p) is the area under the welfare curve up to the 100pth percentile. It follows 
that the area under this curve between the 100PI to 10OP2 percentiles will be 
P2 W(P2) - PI W(P) * 
(8.22) 
Therefore, the average health social welfare of individuals whose income is situated 
between the 100p, and 10OP2 percentiles is given by 
W(P, P') lp, W(P) - Pý W(P, ) (8.23) -(P2 PI) 
This equation permits the computation of health social welfare enjoyed by any income 
group. For instance, the average welfare of the second income decile is obtained when 
p, = 0.1 and P2 = 0.2; for the third decile, when p, = 0.2 and P2 = 0.3; and so on. Given 
that health surveys generally record income variables in discrete intervals, this result has 
some practical relevance. 
The analysis set out here plainly shows that measuring health welfare by income 
group is distinct from measuring income-related inequality in the distribution of health. 
For example, suppose that we adopted a shares approach to equity measurement and 
concentrated on the poorest group in society. Under the inequality method, standard 
concentration analysis would quantify the ratio p1phP, / pPh, thereby establishing the 
share of total health held by the poor. The corresponding share of total welfare, on the 
other hand, is given by pjW(pj) / pW(p). Equations (8.21) shows that the two 
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measurements will only coincide if society does not value socially related health 
deprivation (ie. when x= 0). If a concern exists, however, the observed health of the 
poor has to be corrected by two ic-weighted factors in order to arrive at their average 
level of welfare. The first of these is the absolute difference between the average health 
status of the poor and that of the population as a whole. A ceteris paribus increase 
(decrease) in this health gap will naturally decrease (increase) the welfare of the poorest 
group. The other factor which affects health welfare among the class of poor persons 
is shown by the third term in equation (8.21). It implies, quite logically, that ceteris 
paribus increases in the extent of health inequality within the group will also decrease 
their level of welfare. 
8.6 A further empirical illustration 
This section provides an empirical illustration of the measures developed in section 
8.5. The objective of the analysis is to establish levels of health social welfare for 
income ranked percentiles of the portuguese population. This is an important issue in 
the light of the normative meaning given to the term inequity throughout the thesis. We 
have been essentially concerned with measuring inequality in achievement and 
advantage attributes that is systematically associated with inequality in the extent of 
choice over commodity bundles. Measurement of the distribution of social welfare by 
income groups may be seen to provide a more accurate portrayal of economic 
differences in health achievement, than the more common endeavour of measuring 
income related health inequality. Like the overall social welfare measure W,,, the 
disaggregated income group indices provide a balance between aggregative and 
distributional policy goals. 
The data base and variable definitions are the same used in the earlier illustration. 
Attention is focused on measuring the distribution of health social welfare by quintiles 
of equivalent income. In order to remove the confounding influence of intervening 
demographic variables the distributions were standardized for age and sex by the direct 
method. The procedure is basically the same used in Chapter 5, with the distinction that 
it is carried out on income ranked subsamples of the INS data rather than on the sample 
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as a whole. Thus, for the poorest 20 per cent of the population, standardized average 
levels of morbidity for income segments of that population were calculated on the 
assumption that each has the age-sex distribution of the group as a whole. Likewise for 
the poorest 40,60,80 and 100 per cent of the population. The segments within the 
percentile groups were given by the income vingtile divisions for the sample as a whole. 
The resulting information allows computation of (i) standardized average levels of 
illness for each of the five percentile groups, and (ii) the respective illness concentration 
indices (estimated using the linear approximation method). These are the key inputs to 
estimation of the health social welfare indices implied by equations (8.21) and (8.23). 
The empirical analysis uses measures defined for each of four values of the inequality 
aversion parameter, in the range ic =0 to ic = 2. 
The results are presented in Figures 8.3 and 8A. " The first of these shows 
average levels of social illfare associated with the morbidity distribution for cumulative 
percentiles of the income ranked population. In other words, the graphs show the social 
illfare curves implied by equation (8.21). Figure 8.4 is based on estimation of equation 
(8.23). It shows the variation in average levels of health social illfare enjoyed by 
equivalent income quintiles, relative to the population average. 
The evidence is easily summarized. With one exception, health social welfare 
increases (illfare decreases) with income for all three health indicators and at all values 
of -K. The exception is for the disability and illness indicator where the second quintile 
has a lower level of welfare than the first. Generally, it may be concluded that the 
social welfare associated with the health of richer persons is higher than for the poorest, 
no matter how much normative weight is given income related health inequality. 
Unsurprisingly the welfare difference between poor and rich is greater the higher the 
value of ic assumed. For example, for the sickdays variable, at ic =0 the health social 
illfare of the poorest quintile is twice that of the richest. At ic =2 it is almost three 
times as great. If society values both the ASP and AT principle, these results indicate 
that distributional comparisons of health status levels tend to underestimate the true 
degree of inequality. 
'a The computed numerical values are shown respectively in Tables A7.4 and A7.5. 
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8.7 Conclusions 
This chapter was motivated by an implicit requirement of the capabilities approach 
to health-equity analysis: that of making an overall assessment of society's achievement. 
This problem is equivalent to measuring the social well-being associated with the health 
distribution, an area of analysis that has received insufficient attention in the health 
economics literature. It is possible to shed light on this question by drawing on 
developments in other areas of economic science, particularly work that investigates the 
problem of income distribution in the context of social welfare. It was argued that the 
approach adopted by Wagstaff (1991), which draws on Atkinson's (1970) well-known 
contribution, suffers from a number of limitations. An alternative approach, also based 
on work in the income inequality literature, was presented. It has three crucial 
distinctions in relation to Wagstaff's method: (i) it assumes that health social welfare 
evaluation involves two separate efficiency and equity considerations, and that people 
may attach different weight to these; (ii) the equity concern is motivated by the 
observed systematic association between health and income inequalities and not by 
health differences per se; and (iii) the interdependence of individual well-being is 
explicitly recognized and explained through the notion of income related health 
deprivation. All of these seem reasonable if a coherent ethically-founded evaluation of 
health social welfare is sought. 
The principal result of the Chapter is a rationalization of a family of welfare 
indices that allow for a trade-off between equity and efficiency considerations (equation 
8.15). Ibis result, which is based on a similar rationale for the Gini coefficient 
provided by Kakwani (1986), is important in a number of respects. First of all, the 
indices provide assessments of achievement on the health scale, that take due account 
of the size of health output and the way this output is distributed among different 
income groups. Consequently, they provide a means of integrating equity and efficiency 
analysis through a single summary measure. Added to the fact that the indices are 
easily interpreted, this should mean that they have a potentially promising role to play 
in policy evaluation. Secondly, it has been shown that concentration coefficients, 
recently the most important indices used by health economists to study inequity, are 
admissable summary measures of inequality in the context of social welfare. Finally, 
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it should be noted that the rationale provided could be generalized to encompass other 
variables whose systematic association with income levels is a source of social concern. 
Therefore, the present analysis also has implications beyond the health economics 
sphere. However, it does not provide a complete answer to the underlying problem of 
the policy-maker: that of trading the nation's health against other social goals. The 
SWF on which the analysis is based merely represents that part of the overall well-being 
which is associated with the population's health. 
The empirical illustrations show that the proposed indices can be used to examine 
questions of evident normative importance. The comparison of health social welfare 
across geographical entities shows that the Centre and Algarve regions have consistently 
worse levels than other parts of Portugal. However, if there is a concern for the 
economic distribution of health, the position of the Algarve becomes less 
disadvantageous. The analysis may easily be applied to cross-country or longitudinal 
comparisons. The former raises the problem of cultural variability in survey reporting 
of health status levels (eg. for a given objective level of illness, the populations of 
southern europe might reveal a higher propensity to declare than their more stoic 
neighbours to the north). However, such differences, if they exist, are not necessarily 
any greater than those between persons from different socio-economic groups. 
Comparisons between rich and poor, or individuals belonging to particular occupational 
groups, are after all the basis of most health domain inequity evaluations. What the 
approach of the present chapter does imply is that more refined measures of health 
status are required. Once these are available, the type of comparisons shown in 
section 8.6 may come to be seen as a more useful exercise than simply measuring 
relative inequality in health status levels. Future analyses should consider how the 
overall index Wic may be further decomposed to show levels of social welfare associated 
with the health of specific population groups (eg. those defined by age, sex, education, 
employment status, and so on). 
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Chapter 9 
Measurement of Inequity in the Delivery of Health Care 
"As with any pioneering effort, observers canfind issues that are 
left hanging or that are subject to challenge. Indeed, the essence 
of seminal contributions is that they spawn additional research 
to correct, modify and extend the initial effort" 
Aaron (1992, p. 467) 
9.1 Introduction 
This chapter discusses indices of concentration aimed at measuring vertical and 
horizontal inequity in the delivery of health care. In common with Chapter 8, it seeks 
to provide conceptual groundwork to future empirical research, whether in Portugal or 
in other countries. 
Recall from the discussion in Chapter 3, that the normative basis for examining 
inequity in the delivery of care derives from a fundamental concern for the distribution 
of health capability. Health care is important because of its instrumentality as an agent 
for the improvement of health (or the minimization of ill-health). Hence, inequity in the 
distribution of health care needs to be analysed because of its contribution to inequity 
in the distribution of health. This line of reasoning suggests that the focus of (inequity 
in delivery) empirical analysis ought properly to be on the care received by individuals; 
and not simply on their access to the health care system. As a corollary, portuguese 
policy statements (see Chapter 2) are given the following interpretation: an equitable 
health care delivery system is that in which the care received by individuals is 
distributed according to need, rather than economic and social circumstances. 
An innovative approach to measuring economic related violations of distribution 
of health care according to need is that of the ECuity group [see, eg., Wagstaff et al 
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(1989), Wagstaff et al (1991a, b) and van Doorslaer et al (1992)]. The present analysis 
aims to review, appraise and extend the concentration curve-based tools used by these 
authors when examining inequity in the delivery of care. An important feature of the 
discussion is the use of the continuous random variable framework employed in 
preceding chapters. The method allows general properties of the various ECuity indices 
to be conveniently determined and helps to distinguish conceptual from data-specific 
features, something which is not always clear in the descriptions provided by the ECuity 
researchers. Indeed, it serves to highlight an inconsistency in Wagstaff et al's analysis 
and leads subsequently to its reformulation. It is argued that the ECuity delivery-side 
analysis can only be accepted as measuring horizontal inequity under quite restrictive 
data assumptions, and that it is best reinterpreted as measurement of vertical inequity. 
Accordingly, a new index of horizontal inequity is developed, which brings the ECuity 
analysis more in line with methods currently employed in other areas of economics. 
The new measure, which is based on the correspondence of rank positions in the 
utilization and health status distributions, is more general than those previously available 
to health economists. 
It should be noted that the analysis does not deal explicitly with empirical 
specification. The issue is only raised as a means of highlighting specific conceptual 
attributes of the measures under discussion. For reasons largely related to data 
availability, the ECuity work has proxied 'health care utilization' by the value of health 
care expenditures and 'need' by initial or presenting health status. Proxying 'need' by 
health status is a common approach in the health economics and health services research 
literature (eg. Le Grand, 1978; Aday et al, 1980; Puffer, 1986). The use of 
expenditures to measure 'utilization' is less common but nevertheless necessary if one 
wishes to aggregate heterogeneous forms of health care consumption. There is, however, 
some controversy surrounding the validity of these simplifications [see, eg., Culyer 
(1991)]. It is assumed for present purposes that they are in fact useful for studying 
inequity in the delivery of care. An implication for the discussion which follows is that 
the term 'expenditure' is used as a synonym for 'utilization' or 'treatment'. Similarly, 
'illness', 'ill-health' and 'morbidity' are used as synonyms for 'need'. 
The chapter is structured as follows. Section 9.2 describes the ECuity approach 
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to measuring inequity in the delivery of health care. It reinterprets this analysis as 
measurement of vertical inequity and proposes a number of new indices based on the 
analysis undertaken in Chapter 4 (eg. a Suits index of inequity in health care and 
generalized versions of the ECuity indices). In Section 9.3, an alternative measure of 
horizontal inequity in delivery is developed. The final section summarizes and 
concludes the analysis. 
9.2 The ECuity approach to inequity in health care delivery 
The ECuity approach to measurement of inequity in the delivery of care is 
conceptually similar to that of the finance side analysis (see Chapter 4). Distribution 
of health care according to need (health status) can also be interpreted in terms of both 
horizontal equity (the requirement that persons with equal presenting health situations 
be treated equally) and vertical equity (the requirement that persons with unequal health 
status be treated in an appropriately dissimilar way). The ECuity research ostensibly 
focuses on the former of these, searching for violations of the horizontal principle that 
are related to income [Wagstaff et al (199 1 b, pp. 169-70); van Doorslaer et al (1992, p. 
390)]. It will be argued that the concentration-based indices suggested by these authors 
can only be interpreted as measures of horizontal inequity under quite restrictive data- 
related assumptions. In general, they actually measure departures from proportionality 
of the utilization distribution vis-a-vis the distribution of 'need' (when both are indexed 
to income levels), and are therefore, best seen as indices of vertical inequity. 
The first ECuity index was initially suggested by Wagstaff et al (1989) as an 
extension to Le Grand's (1978) pioneering approach to measurement of equity in 
delivery. Le Grand used 1972 GHS data to compare the shares of NHS medical 
expenditures received by socioeconomic groups (SEG's), with their respective shares of 
ill-health. Two results presented in the study became the focus of much public debate 
on the equity of the NIHS. They were, (i) that the top two SEG's received 40% more 
health care expenditure per person ill than the bottom two (the use-need ratio); and 
(ii) that the top two SEG's received 16.8% of NHS expenditure but contained only 
13.9% of persons reporting illness, whereas the bottom two SEG's received 27.3% of 
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expenditure but contained 31.9% of persons ill. It was the second of these calculations 
which led to the Wagstaff et al (1989) index of inequity in delivery. 
In Figure 9.1(a), the curve G. (p) is an illness concentration curve of the type 
defined in Chapter 4. It provides the benchmark against which to assess the fairness of 
the utilization distribution. Consider next the variable HC, representing utilization of 
health care. Assume that, like M, it is related to income by a continuous function, say 
h(Y). It follows that a utilization concentration curve can be generated by plotting the 
cumulative proportions of the income ranked population, p= F(y), against the 
proportions of care received, Gh, (p) = FI[h(y)]. If h'(y) >0 for all y ý. - 0, Ghc(p) is 
convex to the p-axis and falls below the diagonal, implying that higher income groups 
receive a higher share of health care relative to their population share; if h'(y) < 0, 
then Gh, (p) is concave to the p-axis and lies above the diagonal (as shown), signifying 
that poorer income groups are more intensive users of health care. 
Following a Le Grand-type approach, income related inequities in the delivery of 
care can be exan-dned by comparing GhC(P) with G. (p). Thus, 
0.1 
a' 
x 
Co 
u 0, v 
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if G,, (p) coincides with G. (p), it is implied that health care is distributed across 
income groups in exact proportion to illness, signifying an equitable distribution 
in delivery; 
(ii) if G,,,, (p) lies everywhere below G. (p), higher income groups receive 
proportionally more medical care in relation to their levels of illness, in which 
case there is inequity favouring the rich [the case shown in Figure 9.1(a)]; and, 
(iii) if G,. (p) lies everywhere above G. (p), higher income groups receive 
proportionally less medical care in relation to their levels of illness, and there is 
inequity favouring the poor. 
Furthermore, the extent of inequity can be measured as twice the area between Gh,, (p) 
and G. (p), which is equivalent to the numerical difference between the concentration 
indices for utilization and morbidity: 
I 
IK-LG =2f [G. (p) - Gh, (p)ldp (9.1) 
0 
= Ch, - C. 
where is a utilization concentration index defined analogously to C. (see Chapter 
4). ' 'K-LG measures disproportionality of the health care distribution in relation to the 
distribution of illness, when both are indexed to income. If 'K-LG > 0, there is inequity 
favouring the rich. Maximal pro-rich inequity of the delivery system is given by I-C. 
(= +2.0, when only the poorest person is sick but the richest uses all health care 
provided). If IK_LG < 0, the delivery system favours poorer individuals, with maximal 
pro-poor inequity given by -1-C. (= -2.0, when only the richest person is sick but all 
health care expenditures go to the poorest). The situation where 'K-LG =0 signi ies that 
there are no systematic departures from proportionality, in which case the distribution 
of health care across income groups relative to their need, can be described as equitable. 
It should be apparent that the 1K-LG index is the delivery side analogue of the 
Kakwani index of payments progressivity presented in Chapter 4. It follows that the 
ECuity researchers could equally have proposed a Suits index of inequity in delivery: 
1 All indices described in this chapter are sununarized in Appendix 3. 
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I 
IS-LG =2f [q Gh, (q *)] dq 
(9.2) 
0 
where q* = G. (p). Like its finance-side counterpart, Is_LG varies from -1.0 (maximal 
inequity favouring the poor) to +1.0 (maximal inequity favouring the rich). The 
graphical representation of this index is shown in Figure 9.1(b), which uses the same 
information content of Figure 9.1(a) to generate a relative health care concentration 
curve Gh, (q*). 
Which of the two indices is the more appropriate for measuring Le Grand-type 
inequity? In terms of graphical representation, IK_LGis likely to be preferred since it 
reveals inequality in the underlying distribution of need as well as the departure from 
proportionality of the utilization distribution in relation to need. However, the main 
criterion of choice should rest on the normative judgements implied by each measure. 
'K-LO assigns weights according to household rank in the income distribution, which 
implies that greater weight is given to changes in health care utilization and morbidity 
ocurring around the mode of the income distribution. Is-LGhas a different weighting 
scheme. It assigns weights according to cumulated shares of total morbidity ranked by 
income. If poorer income groups reveal a higher propensity to ill-health (as we found, 
in Chapter 5, to be the case for Portugal), maximum significance is given to changes in 
health care utilization ocurring at levels of income below the mode. If there is particular 
concern for inequity in health care affecting lower income groups, the Is-LGmeasure 
appears superior to'K-LG* 
Empirical application of equations (9.1) and (9.2) is likely to provide a biased 
picture of inequity in the distribution of health care if the population is heterogeneous 
in relevant demographic characteristics along the income distribution. Le Grand (1978) 
faced up to this problem by standardizing the SEG related utilization and morbidity 
distributions by age and sex (ie. the same procedure used with respect to morbidity in 
Chapters 5 and 8). In the volume by Van Doorslaer et al (1993) the results of such 
calculations are only discussed in a few of the country reports, and then only briefly. 
Much more emphasis is given to the unstandardized values of IK-LG. 
239 
Wagstaff, van Dooorslaer and Paci (1991b) later argued that, even if the 
population shares of M and HC are standardized, the, K-LGindex is still a biased measure 
of the degree of inequity. ' They based their critique on three shortcomings: "(i) a 
failure to allow for the possibility that the non-sick may be consumers of health care as 
well as the sick, (ii) a failure to allow for the possibility that the chronically and acutely 
sick may ... receive 
different amounts of health care, and (iii) the use of an inappropriate 
procedure for standardizing for demographic factors" [Wagstaff et al (1991b, p. 189)]. 
Building on the empirical approaches of Collins and Klein (1980) and Puffer (1986), 
which do not suffer from these drawbacks, they then suggested a new concentration 
measure of inequity in the delivery of care. ' This index - denoted here by Iwvp - differs 
from 'K-LGin taking the income ordered population shares as the reference distribution 
against which to judge the fairness of the delivery system. For this procedure to be 
consistent with the normative notion of utilization according to need it is necessary to 
standardize the expenditures shares by variables that proxy differences in need (eg. age, 
sex and, of course, morbidity). The standardized figures, can be interpreted as the 
expenditure each income unit would receive if it had the age, sex and morbidity of the 
population as a whole. 
Assuming that standardized expenditure HC* is a continuous random variable 
related to income by means of the function h*(Y), and has analogous properties to those 
defined for M and HC, it is possible to define a standardized utilization concentration 
curve, Ghc*(p). This curve, shown in Figure 9.2, is interpreted as the proportion of HC* 
going to the lowest pth fraction of income units when these are arranged in ascending 
order of incomes. If there is inequity favouring the rich, G,, *(p) lies below the diagonal, 
whereas the opposite is true if there is inequity favouring the poor. 
The index lwvp is defined as an area measure between Gh,, *(p) and the 45 degree 
line: 
2 See also O'Donnell and Propper (1991a). 
3 The critique also led them to a useful regression based test for inequity in the distribution of 
health care consumption [Wagstaff et at (1991b, pp. 189-91); Van Doorslaer et at (1992, pp. 395- 
397)]. Given that the focus of this chapter is on index number approaches, the test is not discussed. 
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I 
iwvp =I-2f GL(p) dp 
(9.3) 
0 
It is bounded by -1.0 (corresponding to maximal inequity favouring the poor) and +1.0 
(maximal inequity favouring the rich). It takes a value of zero when there is no 
systematic association between standardized expenditures and a person's rank in the 
income distribution. The normative judgements implied by the measure are 
straightforward: greater weight is given to changes in standardized health care 
consumption around the mode of the income distribution. ' 
Based on the analysis developed in Chapter 4, one may also define parameterized 
versions of each of the three indices discussed above: 
4 The IK-LO and Iwvp indices have been used by Pereira (1992) and Pereira and Pinto (1993) to 
examine health care inequity in Portugal. The analyses draw on the 1987 National Health Survey used 
in Chapters 5 and 8 of this thesis. Using the IK-w index shows that health care delivery is 
unambiguously favourable to the better-off. If the Iwvp measure is used the results are less conclusive 
but they still point to a slight pro-rich bias. 
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(i) The family of generalized Le Grand-type Kakwani indices 
I 
IK-Z, 
G(8) =8 
(8 - 1) 
f (1 -P)8-2 [G. (p) - Gk(p)] dp (9.4) 
0 
= ck(a) - C. M 
, 
(8) is a generalized health care concentration coeff where qc icient. 
(H) The family of generalized Le Grand-type Suits indices 
1 
IS_LG(8) =8 (8 - 1) 
f (I -q 
*)8-2 [q Ghc (q *)] dq (9.5) 
0 
(iii) The family of generalized WVP indices 
I 
iwvp(8) =I-8 (8 - 1) 
f (1 -P)8-2 GL(p)] dp (9.6) 
0 
Once again, the sign properties of these indices are identical to their standard analogues. 
Values of 8=2 represent the respective standard indices. Measures of vertical inequity 
in delivery that are sensitive to the position of poorer persons are obtained if 8>2, 
and indifference to inequity is implied by measures that are computed with values of 
8-+ 1. 
The relative merits of the approaches underlying the ECuity delivery-side indices 
have been the subject of vigorous debate [eg. Le Grand (1991), O'Donnell and Propper 
(1991a, b), Wagstaff et al (1991b, c)]. Curiously, this discussion provides limited 
guidance as to which of the measures is generally more appropriate, ' since it deals 
largely with empirical matters. In particular, the debate concentrates on the implications 
of using categorical illness data as the measure of need. 5 At the same time, basic 
conceptual issues have been left unattended to. Thus it appears, from the debate, that 
the Iwvp index provides a conceptual advantage over the Le Grand-type indices since it 
IA possible explanation for this 'bias' in the exchange is that virtually all important work on 
equity in the delivery of care has been carried out in the U. K., drawing on data from the General 
Household Survey. Categorical illness data are the only morbidity measures available in that survey. 
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addresses the issue of the non-sick also being consumers of health care. Ultimately, 
however, this edge is the result of specificities in health survey data. In a world where 
ratio-scale measures of illness were readily available, the three indices would provide 
virtually identical results when applied to whole populations. Even if these measures 
are not available but one is able to operate with traditional health survey indicators that 
characterize the severity of illness rather than its prevalence (eg. the number of 
disability days), much of the difference between the results provided by IWvp and the 
IK-LO and Is-La indices vanishes, since both the sick and non-sick population are used in 
determining the reference distribution of need. ' 
In all publications deriving from the ECuity research, 
IK-LGand Iwvp are taken to 
be measures of the degree of horizontal inequity (ie. income related violations of equal 
treatment for equal need). This interpretation is not, however, particularly compelling. 
Generally, the indices actually measure departures from proportionality of the income- 
ranked utilization distribution (standardized for equity relevant characteristics or not) in 
relation to some reference distribution (income-ranked illness or population shares). In 
each case, there is an implicit assumption that inequality in the distribution of health 
care is fair if it is proportionate to inequality in the reference distribution. This is 
usually accepted to be a vertical equity principle, and indeed in the finance side analysis 
analogous indices are used to measure that same principle! 
Of course, vertical equity, if interpreted in the Aristotlean sense of unequal 
treatment in proportion to the unequal situation, has a logical corollary in the principle 
of equal treatment of equals. In empirical applications, this association sometimes leads 
to a thin data-related dividing line between measurement of vertical inequity and its 
horizontal counterpart. This seems to be the case with the ECuity research. It is 
r' This contention requires that the Le Grand-type indices are standardized for demographic 
differences along the income distribution. The point seems to be implicitly accepted in the later 
publications of the ECuity group [eg. Van Doorslaer et al (1993, pp. 78-80)]. 
7 It is interesting to note that in Le Grand's (1978) article there is no claim, explicit or implicit, 
that horizontal inequity is being measured. Such an assertion is, however, made in his later book [Le 
Grand (1982, p. 46)]. Perhaps due to this or simply because of the overwhelming emphasis given to 
the horizontal equity principle in British health policy documents, subsequent research has always taken 
for granted that Le Grand's initial analysis was directed at that issue. 
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implicitly assumed that indices such as IK_LG and lwvp can measure the degree of 
horizontal inequity, provided that 'equals' can be identified. This raises the question of 
how 'equals' are to be distinguished in empirical analysis? The answer provided by the 
ECuity researchers is to assume that any two persons share the same level of need for 
health care if they answer positively to a survey question of the type "Do you have any 
long-standing health problem or chronic illness? " However, this is a particularly strong 
assumption which is ultimately contradicted by the results reported in the study. The 
analysis for Denmark, for example, shows that if the number of chronic conditions are 
used (rather than relying on information of whether the individual suffered from a 
chronic illness) the values of the lwvp index are significantly affected. More detailed 
information on illness leads to index values which show inequity to be less favourable 
to the poor [Van Doorslaer et al (1992, pp. 404-5)]. ' The main reason for this effect 
appears to be that within crude morbidity categories there are income related variations 
in the severity of illness which generally favour the rich. 
A possible answer to this problem - using the the same widely available health 
survey data - would be to disaggregate the analysis, either by illness-type or by number 
of conditions or illness days, thereby identifying persons in 'equal need' more 
accurately. However, there are at least three reasons why it might not be advisable to 
measure horizontal inequity in this particular manner. One, is that the level of 
disaggregation required to make the analysis meaningful will tend to overburden 
empirical work. The number of what might be accepted as 'equal health situations' is 
immense and the researcher could conceivably end up carrying out a separate analysis 
for each. Related to this is the second point, that it may be difficult to obtain agreement 
on what exactly constitutes an 'equal health situation'. For instance, how would one 
decide if a person suffering from a stomach ulcer is equal or not to one suffering from 
chronic bronchitis? Arguably, given the present state of knowledge regarding such 
prioritization of 'needs, it would be wiser for economists to opt for a notion of 
horizontal equity that is less demanding in terms of information requirements. Finally, 
even admitting that disaggregations were accomplished in an acceptable manner, it 
a The country chapters from the Netherlands, U. K. and Portugal in van Doorslaer et al (1993) also 
report information from other studies which cast doubt on the assumption; as indeed does the research 
reported in Chapter 5 of this thesis. 
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would still leave open the question of how vertical inequity in delivery ought to be 
measured. If an index number approach was sought, the most suitable candidates 
would, quite probably, be1K-LG9 Is-LO and IwvF, which would suggest that there is no 
conceptual difference between horizontal and vertical equity, merely an empirical one. 
' 
In conclusion then, (i) the difference between LG- and WVP-type inequity 
ultimately rests on the nature of categorical survey data; and (ii) each of the indices 
described can only serve as measures of horizontal inequity if persons with 'equal levels 
of health status' can be unambiguously identified. In this chapter it is assumed that the 
second proposition is unlikely to be attained with traditional health survey data, and that 
it is therefore more appropriate to adopt the indices' more obvious interpretation as 
measures of vertical inequity. Their relative merits then depend simply on the 
descriptive properties and the normative judgements which they imply. Given, however, 
that policy statements often make reference to income related violations of the horizontal 
equity principle, the problem can hardly be left unexamined. Consequently, attention 
is next turned to an alternative method for measuring horizontal inequity in the delivery 
of health care. 
9.3 A new index of horizontal inequity 
When studying the redistributive effects of tax and transfer policy, modem 
approaches in Public Economics make a crucial distinction between horizontal and 
vertical equity principles. Plotnick (1981), for example, argues that "the principle of 
horizontal equity addresses the fairness of a process of redistribution, a measure does 
not, and should not attempt to compare the actual extent of redistribution or change in 
inequality to some exogenous criterion" (p. 283). Vertical equity, on the other hand - 
he goes on to argue - is an end-state principle: it compares the observed distribution 
9 It is important to note that none of these arguments signify that the ECuity approach is irrelevant 
to measurement of horizontal inequity. The logic of direct evaluation of whether 'equals' are treated 
equally is itself appealing, and has strong traditions in the taxation literature (eg. Johnson and Mayer, 
1962; Berliant and Strauss, 1985). What is being questioned is the over-reliance of the approach on 
restrictive data-related assumptions. 
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of an attribute to an ideal distribution. This distinction has important implications for 
measurement and has led to the term horizontal equity (HE) being assigned a precise 
meaning in the context of redistributional analysis. HE is said to hold if the 
redistribution brought about by a tax or transfer does not alter the rank order of units 
by utility level. This idea, initially proposed by Feldstein (1976), forms the basis of 
some well-known summary indices of horizontal inequity: namely the Atkinson (1980)- 
Plotnick (1981) concentration index and the measures suggested by King (1983) and 
Cowell (1985), which draw respectively on the normative and axiomatic approaches to 
inequality measurement. In this section the underlying method used by Atkinson and 
Plotnick is applied, in a partial symmetry framework, to the issue of horizontal equity 
in health care delivery. 
It could be argued that the notion of horizontal equity as absence of utility rank 
reversals is irrelevant to health care delivery. It is conceivable, for instance, that public 
intervention in health care carries an implication to the contrary. Policy makers might 
view subsidised consumption of health services as some sort of 'social wage' which 
raises the utility levels of the poor beyond that which the economic sphere provides 
them. However, it should be noted that the application provided here is based, like the 
rest of the thesis, on the 'extra-welfare' approach which underpins much of modem 
applied health economics (Culyer, 1989). It bypasses the utility criterion and 
concentrates simply on the relationship between utilization and need, which are taken 
to be the entities of ethical interest. In common with the ECuity approach, it is assumed 
that society aims for a distribution of resources in health care delivery that reflects the 
distribution of need (measured by presenting health status). 
Consider, therefore, the following definition: 
D 9.1. A horizontally equitable health delivery system is one that preserves the 
same rank order of units in the utilization distribution as in the underlying 
distribution of need (proxied by individual morbidity levels). 
This conception encompasses the classic definition of equal treatment of equals. 
Logically, any two persons that share the same rank in the illness distribution will also 
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have the same level of health. They will be 'treated equally' if, and only if, their rank 
positions are identical in the utilization distribution (ie. enjoy the same level of 
expenditure). However, the definition is also more general and conceptually complete. 
As King (1983) observes: "In practice, ... no two individuals are ever identical, and the 
principle of equal treatment of equals has little empirical significance unless it can be 
usefully extended to include and unequals treated accordingly" (p. 101). This view 
might raise the objection that HE refers only to equal treatment of those with equal need 
and that non-correspondence of ranks is really a vertical equity principle. But this 
conclusion does not follow. Vertical inequity comparisons measure the distance between 
an observed distribution and an ideal one. They ignore the question of rank reversals. 
Therefore, the above specification does relate to the question of horizontal equity, but 
it is a 'stronger' form of HE than that implied by the narrow 'equals treated equally' 
view (Jenkins, 1988b). 
Definition 9.1 says nothing, however, of income related violations of the HE 
principle, which have been the primary focus of studies by health economists (and of 
policy concerns in Portugal). In order to tackle this problem consider also: 
D 9.2. For any mutually exclusive and equity relevant K partitions of the 
population, inter group differences in the achievement of HE are given by 
comparing the respective K measures of within group horizontal inequity. 
If the K partitions are income ranked percentiles of the population, it is possible to 
compare the degree to which HE is being achieved in each income grouping. Thus, 
the question of income related violations can be addressed, but there is no requirement 
that persons in 'equal need' be identified through arbitrary categorization based on 
survey data. The approach shifts the issue of inter-personal comparability from the 
variable 'morbidity' to the variable 'income', where a broader base of agreement about 
partitions (eg. percentiles) is likely to be forthcoming. In this sense at least, the method 
should facilitate applied work. Note, however, that it requires access to ordinal 
morbidity indicators with a reasonable number of classes or a transformation that 
assumes an underlying latent morbidity variable (see Wagstaff and van Doorslaer, 1994), 
so that the ranking of need can be established. 
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Following Cowell's (1980) discussion of comparability in inequality measurement 
the approach is labelled one of 'partial symmetry'. Individuals within each income 
group are treated anonymously by the analysis, but differentially between groups, given 
that income position is seen as relevant to horizontal inequity calculations. Thus, 
partially symmetric summary measures are computed - one for each income partition - 
and then compared to those of other groups. " 
Assume that the population can be divided into K (k = 1, ..., K) mutually 
exclusive income partitions. To devise a measure of horizontal inequity in the kth 
group, we proceed very much as before drawing on the continuous variable framework 
for expositional reasons. Allow that illness M is a continuous random variable with 
p. d. f. ftM), distribution function F(M) and mean p.. " In contrast to Section 9.2, no 
strict relationship between income and health is conjectured. The proportion of 
individuals having an illness level less than or equal to m is given by r= F(m) = 
Jomj(M)dM, while the proportional share of total morbidity experienced by units having 
an illness level less than or equal to m is given by F, (m) = I/p. 
f0m MftM)dM. 
Both these functions vary from 0 to 1. The relationship between them defines the 
Lorenz curve for morbidity, shown in Figure 9.3 as L. (r). 
Next assume that health care utilization, HC, is related to morbidity by the 
continuous function hc = g*(m), and that g"(M) ý: 0 for all M ý: 0. It follows that the 
Lorenz curve for the health care distribution, L., Js) in Figure 9.3, is obtained from the 
relationship between s= F[g*(m)] = F(hc) = 
jO"f(HQdHC and F, [g'(m)] = F, (hc) 
, 
(s) and L. (r) are standard Lorenz curves: I /phc Johc HCf(HC)dHC. Note that both 11, c 
in each case, persons are ordered on the abcissa by ascending levels of an attribute, the 
corresponding shares of which are shown on the ordinate. The relative configurations 
shown in Figure 9.3, indicate that there is less inequality in the distribution of health 
care, from whence it could be argued that there is vertical inequity in delivery within 
10 A similar approach has been suggested by Jenkins (1988b) for measuring horizontal inequity 
in taxation. He describes his method as taking a position intermediate between the utility reranking 
approach and the traditional 'equals treated equally' view. 
11 In order to facilitate notation subscripts k are not presented, but it is important to recognize that 
the analysis pertains only to the kth group. 
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Figure 9.3: Standard Lorenz curves for morbidity and health care 
and a concentration curve for health care ordered by morbidity 
the kth group. Comparisons of L. (r) and 1,,, . 
(s), however, reveal nothing about 
horizontal inequity in the sense defined above, since a given s fraction of individuals 
may not be the same persons that are included in the equivalent rth decimal fraction. 
Consider a new curve G,, (r), which shows the relationship between F(m) and 
FI(hc) = F, fg*(m)]. In other words, this is the concentration curve for health care 
utilization when units are arranged in ascending order of illness levels. Ghc(r) has the 
following properties" 
(i) G,. (r) lies below (above) the diagonal iff 11g,. (m) = g"(m) -m/ g"(m), the 
elasticity of health care utilization with respect to health, is positive (negative) 
everywhere; 
(ii) Gbc ft) lies below, on or above L. (r) iff 11g., (m) is greater than, equal to or less 
12 See Kakwani (1980b, Chapter 8) for general proofs of the first three properties and Atkinson 
(1980) for a proof of the fourth. 
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than unity at all values of rn; 
(iii) if the function g*(m) has a continuous derivative g"(m) strictly positive for all 
m 2: 0, G,, (r) coincides with 4, (s); 
ý(S). (iv) for all values of m, 
G,. (r) lies everywhere on or above 1-1, c 
An important implication of these properties is that, if the ranking of all units in the 
morbidity distribution corresponds to the ranking in the health care distribution then 
G,. (r) = Lh, (s) for all r and s. This suggests that the degree of horizontal inequity can 
, 
(s) and Gjr). be indexed by measuring the area between 
Lh, 
For each of the curves exemplified above, area measures can be calculated. Call 
Z,,, the Gini for morbidity, 4,, the Gini for health care utilization, and 
ChCA' the 
concentration index for health care. As with any Gini measure 
ZnVk and 4dk each 
vary from 0 to 1. 
Chc&*' on the other hand, is bounded by -Zhcjk and 
ZhCjk. 13 
The extent of horizontal inequity within the kth income group can be measured 
as: 
HIk `2 
Zhdk - CLk (9.7) 
2 Zhdk 
which is a variant of the Atkinson/Plotnick index of horizontal inequity. The numerator 
measures the extent of non-correspondence in ranks between the health and health care 
distributions within the kth group. Note that non-correspondence of rank positions in 
other income groups has no effect on a given index of within group horizontal inequity. 
13 A proof of this proposition can be obtained by substituting the relevant values in equation (4.9) 
of Chapter 4 so that it reads: 
C4k =R 
[g *(m), r(m)] Z hclk R Eg *(m), r(g *(m))] 
If g*'(m) ; -> 0 
for all m, rn and g*(m) will have exactly the same ranking, in which case the correlation 
between g*(m) and r(g*(m)) will be equal to the correlation between g"(m) and r(m). It follows that 
Cýý is always positive and equal to Zjj. If g*(m) <0 for all m, m and g*(m) will have exactly 
opposite ranking and the correlations R[g*(m), r(m)] and R[g+(m), r(g+(m))] will be of the same 
magnitude but opposite sign. In this case, Cýý is equal to minus one times 7,,,. If g+(m) is not a 
monotonic function, -7,, & :5 Ch, ý* :54, &. 
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The denominator, which is equivalent to the maximum possible area between Itc(s) and 
G, jr), provides a normalization which ensures that 'Hk is bounded by zero and one. If 
Hlk ý 0. the ranking of units by morbidity corresponds to the ranking by health care 
utilization, in which case horizontal equity is said to hold. There is equal treatmentfor 
equal need in the sense that each person attains the same ranking in the health care 
distribution as he/she holds in the distribution of illness. Values of Ink ýý' 0 reveal 
that one or more persons do not have equivalent rankings. With the limiting case of 
Hlk ý- 1, it is implied that the person with the lowest ranking in the morbidity 
distribution is also the one who receives the highest value of health care utilization or 
expenditure. 
The partial symmetry approach emphasises that information disaggregated by 
equity relevant characteristics is important. Therefore, differences in the attainment of 
HE across income groups are obtained by comparing the K measures of within-group 
horizontal inequity. If, for example, there are two income groups - poor and rich - and 
Hý < HIrw then it is implied that horizontal inequities in health care delivery favour the 
poor. In some situations, however, the overall level of horizontal inequity may also be 
a factor in social decisions. For these, the computation of a population index through 
straightforward weighted aggregation is suggested: 
K 
C) k 
HIk (9.8) 
where wkis group Ps population share and Yk o)k= 1. Such an index can also be used 
as the denominator when measuring relative dispersion in Hlkvalues. 
Table 9.1 exemplifies some hypothetical horizontal inequity comparisons of 
income quintiles ordered from poorest to richest. In distribution A, the HIkindices for 
the better-off reveal lower values than those of poorer groups. This implies that the rich 
are more successful in obtaining health care resources that are consistent with their 
levels of need, which would point to horizontal inequity favouring the rich. Distribution 
B shows the reverse situation. In distribution C there are no differences between the H1k 
indices leading to the conclusion that horizontal inequities are not related to income 
position. Suppose, however, that a decision maker places some value on the level of 
overall horizontal inequity, then it is possible that distributions A and B would be 
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Table 9.1: Comparison of horizontal inequity measures 
for different income groups 
Income Hypothetical distributions 
Quintiles 
A B C D 
1 0.5 0.1 0.5 0.2 
2 0.4 0.2 0.5 0.2 
3 0.3 0.3 0.5 0.15 
4 0.2 0.4 0.5 0 15 
5 0.1 0.5 0.5 
J 
0.15 0.15 
Overall 0.3 0.3 0.5 0.17 0.17 
preferred to C, given that overall H'KC> HIK A=MKB. Such a possibility is all the 
more transparent if distribution C is compared to distribution D. In the latter, there is 
once again horizontal inequity favouring the rich but of a much reduced degree in 
relation to A. It could be argued that the small absolute and relative differences 
between the M. 's do not warrant concern and that distribution D is preferable to C. 
Thus, the approach allows for the fact that the overall level of horizontal inequity is also 
important for social decisions. 
The 'partial-symmetry rank-correspondence' approach outlined here has a number 
of advantages over previous efforts by health economists to index horizontal inequity 
in delivery. One such advantage is given by its inherent flexibility. The weights (okin 
equation (9.8) could be viewed as 'discrimination coefficients', with those groups 
recognized as more deserving receiving greater weight in assessments of the overall 
level of horizontal inequity. Furthermore, the approach can be readily extended to 
examine any ethically relevant violations of the HE principle. It is simply a matter of 
identifying non-trivial partitions of the population (eg. regions, occupations, age groups) 
and calculating partially symmetric indices for each group. A certain flexibility is also 
implied by the possibility of value trade-offs between group and population inequity, as 
exemplified in Table 9.1. This might appear to provide a somewhat imprecise 
measurement of inter-group inequities, but in fact it highlights a further strength of the 
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approach, which is the richness of the information content. Not only are we able to 
observe the degree of horizontal inequity across groups but also its relation to the 
overall level. 
However, the main advantages of the approach are that it provides a conceptual 
distinction between measurement of horizontal and vertical inequity and facilitates 
empirical work on system-wide violations of the HE principle. Under the ECuity 
method, the difference between horizontal and vertical inequity is not specified but 
appears to be given simply by the nature of the morbidity data being used. In the 
present approach, HE is given by correspondence of rank positions in the health and 
health care distributions (the difference between ZhjkandCh,, k'), Vertical inequity, on 
the other hand, represents deviations of the health care distribution in relation to an ideal 
allocation (eg. the difference between 4dk and ZJ. The ECuity method appears, at 
first hand, to be less demanding in terms of information requirements. However, the 
procedure can only produce meaningful evaluations of 'horizontal inequity' if (i) health 
status measures that allow for unambiguous identification of persons in 'equal need' are 
available (which is generally not the case); or (ii) the information on morbidity is highly 
disaggregated by pathology (in which case empirical work becomes cumbersome). For 
system-wide assessments of horizontal inequity (related to income or other ethically 
relevant categories) the approach suggested here is more appropriate. It changes the 
nature of the assumptions regarding interpersonal comparability in the morbidity 
distribution. There is no requirement that persons in 'equal levels of health status' be 
distinguished directly from the empirical base. By substituting the concept 'utilization 
equivalence within health status groupings' with the more amenable concept of 'rank 
equivalence', the approach therefore facilitates empirical work. 
9.4 Conclusion 
The ECuity approach to studying inequities in the delivery of health care 
constitutes a significant development on earlier work by Le Grand (1978), Collins and 
Klein (1980) and others. The major contribution appears to have been the introduction 
of index numbers that allow the extent of inequity to be quantified. All ECuity research 
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to date claims to have to have measured the attribute of horizontal inequity. However, 
this interpretation is only valid under quite restrictive data assumptions. The present 
chapter has argued that the ECuity indices, which measure departures from 
proportionality of the utilization distribution vis-a-vis the distribution of 'need' (when 
both are indexed to income levels), are best seen as measures of vertical inequity. This 
interpretation is consistent with other uses of the concentration curve methodology in 
other areas of economics, including the ECuity approach to finance-side inequity (see 
Chapters 4 and 7). Other indices of vertical inequity in delivery were also proposed: 
namely, a Suits index of Le Grand-type inequity that attaches greater weight to 
inequalities at the bottom end of the income distribution; and generalized versions of 
the IK-LG, Is-LG and Iwvp indices that permit preferences regarding the degree of equity 
to be achieved to be made explicit. Finally, the chapter proposed a new index of 
horizontal inequity in delivery. This measure is based on the correspondence of rank 
positions in the utilization and health status distributions. Given that it bypasses the 
need to empirically identify persons with 'equal levels of health status', it should 
facilitate applied work. However, it does require the researcher to have access to 
morbidity indicators with a reasonable number of classes (or transformations that 
assume an underlying latent morbidity variable), so that the ranking of health status 
may be established. 
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Part 6 
CONCLUSIONS 
Chapter 10 
Equity, Health and Health Care in Portugal: 
Summary and Implications 
Following the publication of the Black Report, a vigorous scientific debate has 
developed on the nature, extent and causes of inequity in the sphere of health. It has 
spanned a great many countries with particular incidence on the european continent. 
Most of the research has been undertaken by epidemiologists, demographers and social 
scientists. Economists initially took a back-seat in the polemic but, more recently, have 
begun to uncover the immense corpus of knowledge in the discipline that may be used 
to study the problem. In the policy arena, despite some hesitation by national 
governments, reduction of health-inequity has remained a priority issue. Most, if not 
all, developed countries profess to safeguard the position of econon-flcally disadvantaged 
individuals, and many have devised policies aimed at abating what are perceived as 
unjust health and health care distributions. 
This study has been primarily concerned with measuring the structure and time 
path of health-inequity in Portugal, a country where despite the evident concern of 
policy-makers, detailed empirical knowledge of the problem is scarce. It has also sought 
to examine and develop economic measurement procedures that are able to shed light 
on the question, whether in Portugal or abroad. By way of conclusion, the present 
chapter provides a summary of the thesis and identifies the main implications for policy 
initiatives and economic analysis of equity in the domain of health. 
The thesis began with an overview of issues relevant to the study of health- 
inequity in Portugal. Basic features of the health and health care systems were 
described and policy statements and previous research were examined. Given the 
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somewhat opaque nature of policy objectives, the study proceeded to examine various 
distribution rules that might shed light on the concerns expressed by portuguese policy 
makers and be used as a means of organizing empirical research. An alternative rule 
based on Sen's notion of equality of capabilities was proposed, and from this analysis 
an agenda of positive investigation was developed. 17he key features of the approach 
are a focus on (i) the actual levels of the functioning 'good health' that individuals with 
differential command over resources obtain, and (ii) their experience in the space of 
commodities that are instrumental to attainment of the desired functioning. Whilst this 
approach fails to capture the complete essence of Sen's framework, it has the advantage 
of converging on specific issues identified in policy statements and of producing results 
that are comparable with previous research. 
The study then set out the means by which inequity in health and health care was 
to be measured. It adopted the concentration index approach recently used by other 
authors. The normative and statistical properties of health inequality and health care 
finance progressivity indices were clarified and new measures that take due account of 
alternative social judgements concerning the degree of equality preference were 
introduced. The analysis also laid the basis for further theoretical innovations in the 
latter part of the thesis: namely, a rationalization for a family of indices that measure 
social welfare in the domain of health (defined over the twin policy attributes of equity 
and efficiency); and a new index of horizontal inequity in the delivery of care, based on 
the correspondence of rank positions in the utilization and health status distributions. 
Each of the new developments provides measurement tools in areas where previous 
research was either silent or debatable. 
Empirical analysis was directed at four issues. First, the economic distribution of 
morbidity. Strong evidence was found showing that the burden of illness in Portugal 
is generally unfavourable to poorer income groups. In particular, these groups tend to 
suffer from more severe conditions and reveal slower recovery periods. When the data 
were disaggregated by age, it was found that poor middle-aged individuals are 
particularly disadvantaged. In contrast, there appears to be no economic differentiation 
in the health experience of children and adolescents (although this evidence may be 
unreliable due to the nature of available morbidity indicators). The second issue 
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addressed was the time-trend of inequity in infant mortality. The findings suggest that 
the degree of pro-rich bias is currently much lower than in any period since the early 
1970's. There are, however, important counteracting trends. Close-to-birth mortality 
inequity seems to have been largely eradicated; but the distribution of post-neonatal 
deaths is once again becoming less favourable to the poor, after showing the greatest 
improvements during the 1970's. 
The third empirical analysis was aimed at measuring the degree of progressivity 
of the health care financing system in the period 1980-1990. The main finding was that 
the system evolved from being overall progressive to overall regressive. The burden of 
payments shifted to middle income groups, with the main beneficiaries being households 
situated in the richest quintile of the income distribution. The intertemporal change 
resulted from two major factors: reduced progression of the tax system and an increase 
in the share of revenues raised directly from consumers. It was also shown that 
alternative revenue raising sources have distinct progressivity characteristics. Portuguese 
taxation is moderately progressive and out-of-pocket payments are highly regressive. 
Social and private insurance contributions were found to be highly progressive, but the 
result is largely attributable to selective coverage of better-off households. 
A fourth issue - distribution of social welfare associated with the health 
distribution - was examined in less detail, given that the purpose was simply to illustrate 
the new measures proposed in the study. Nevertheless, two findings are worthy of note. 
Geographically, the Centre and Algarve regions have consistently worse levels of health 
social welfare than other parts of the country. However, if there is a concern for 
inequity the position of the Algarve becomes noticeably less detrimental. This result 
has obvious implications for regional resource allocation mechanisms that aim to 
compensate areas with lower levels of health by attributing them higher amounts of 
health care resources. Disaggregation of health social welfare by income groups 
showed that it is highest for the rich irrespective of the social preference for equity or 
efficiency. The results also suggest that, if society is concerned about income related 
health deprivation, distributional comparisons of health status levels tend to 
underestimate the true degree of inequality. 
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Given that the focus of the thesis has been on measurement rather than 
explanation, the scope for making policy recommendations is limited. Nevertheless, 
some general implications can be drawn. The morbidity results suggest that there is a 
need to enhance the health investment opportunities of the poor. Possible interventions 
include food subsidies; improvements in housing and working conditions; better access 
to education; and more generally, income redistribution policies through the tax and 
benefit system. If health care is deemed instrumentally important in attaining health 
potential, then effective health care services should be made equally available to all. 
This may require adjustments to payment mechanisms; training of medical personnel to 
improve their awareness of the particular health difficulties faced by the less well-off-, 
or prevention and rehabilitation measures specially targeted at the economically 
disadvantaged. Which of these or related policies is the most appropriate can only be 
determined by explanatory analysis. The results do suggest, however, that priority 
should be given to alleviating the unequal burden of illness supported by middle-aged 
poor individuals. The large differential has inevitable resource consequences in the form 
of lost production and increased use of public health and social services. It also imposes 
high costs on poorer families if breadwinners have to withdraw from the labour market. 
The infant mortality results do not signify that equitable distribution is no longer 
an issue in this area. The recent downturn in post-neonatal inequity and the position of 
the very poorest are two specific questions that need to be monitored carefully. 
Although many of the social and economic circumstances which lead to infant deaths 
no longer apply in Portugal, some deaths could probably be avoided. This might best 
be achieved by targeting social support at persons in extreme poverty. Equally, the 
results imply that it may be useful to target non-economic factors known to affect the 
survival chances of infants (eg. very young mothers or the spatial distribution of 
medical technology). 
The progressivity results indicate that a greater emphasis on out-of-pocket 
payments, as recently advocated by the Minister of Health, is likely to involve poorer 
income groups supporting a higher share of the health care financing burden. Such an 
outcome might be avoided if NHS co-payments are related to ability to pay. The results 
show that expenditure on pharmaceuticals - the main area where the NHS fails to 
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differentiate between consumers on the basis of income - is the principal factor affecting 
the highly regressive structure of direct payments. It is unclear from the results if a shift 
towards more insurance financing would make the system more or less progressive. 
However, evidence from other countries suggests that increased population coverage 
would tend to lower progressivity levels and even make the distribution of insurance 
payments regressive. Despite a noticeable fall in the progressivity of the tax system, tax 
revenues still appear to be the choice instrument for lessening the burden of health care 
payments on the poor. Perhaps the most important feature of the results, however, is 
that solidarity in financing has been diminishing at a rapid pace. This observation needs 
to be borne in mind when considering reform the health care financing system. 
Although this study has gone some way to uncovering the health-equity profile of 
the portuguese population, many questions have been left unanswered. The empirical 
strategy was deliberately aimed at measuring the extent of inequity, and even then at a 
general level, given that previous research is so limited. There is still a case for 
pursuing this type of research in future. Within the next two years new data from 
national health interview and budget surveys will become available. It would be useful 
to replicate the present analyses on those data and more generally to continue to monitor 
developments in inequity levels. Similarly, the methods discussed in the latter part of 
the thesis should be subjected to detailed empirical application. Research efforts should, 
however, be mainly directed at examining the causes and policy implications of the 
broad level relationships identified in the study. Two basic strategies appear the most 
promising. First, using the same measurement procedures after further data 
disaggregation. For example, the progressivity analysis might be carried out on 
payments to the NES rather than to the system as a whole; or one might examine the 
impact of tax deductibility of health care expenditures on the overall level of 
progressivity. The finance side techniques could also be used to measure the 
redistributive impact of reform proposals through simulation analysis. Ultimately, 
however, the evidence produced in the thesis calls for causal analysis based on 
behavioural models. This should allow us to verify, for instance, the precise 
mechanisms whereby poorer individuals end up with lower levels of health than those 
that are better off, and eventually to design policies that effectively remedy the situation. 
Much of the thesis has been concerned less with the portuguese situation and more 
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with developing economic procedures for analysing inequity in the domain of health. 
It is useful to also review the implications in this respect. A first point is that the 
ethical framework adopted for the thesis suggests that the common empirical focus on 
issues like socio-economic inequalities in health status and health care utilization is not 
as misconceived as some authors have suggested. Such research may be seen as a 
practical compromise (imposed by data limitations) aimed at assessing unequal 
opportunity to realize health potential. It does not provide all the necessary information 
but nonetheless offers useful insights into accomplishment of the underlying goal. 
Second, the thesis suggests an important future role for health-inequity measures 
that take due account of alternative social judgements. Researchers have typically used 
indices that entail (possibly) unappealing assumptions about the weight attached to 
inequity at different points of the reference distribution. Such measures also presume 
a degree of agreement about equity judgements, which is rarely found in practice. 
Income inequality analysts long ago recognized these problems. In future, health 
economists should adopt a similar posture when measuring the extent of health domain 
inequity by employing parametric measures. The concentration based indices applied 
in this study are one possibility but another is the family of generalized entropy indices 
which have the advantage of being additively decomposable. This property is 
particularly useful if there is an interest in the relationship between variables that 
contribute to health and health care differences and observed levels of inequality. 
Indirectly, the use of parametric indices also points to another desirable development. 
In the past health economists have been essentially concerned with global inequity 
levels. It may be instructive in future to focus on specific parts of the income 
distribution. For example, by comparing health status levels of persons above and 
below some accepted poverty line or by computing measures of local progression when 
assessing progressivity of the health care financing system. 
Third, the thesis has proposed a clear demarcation between measurement of 
horizontal and vertical inequity in the delivery of care. The approach, which involves 
considering horizontal violations as non-correspondence of rank positions in the health 
care utilization and health status distributions, brings current methods employed by 
health economists more in line with those used in other areas of economics. Future 
research should provide empirical applications of the new indices in order to better 
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evaluate their potential. These investigations may require more refined health status 
measures than are usually employed, possibly involving statistical transformations of 
categorical morbidity variables. 
Another avenue opened up by the present research is integrated measurement of 
the equity and efficiency attributes of health distributions, described here as assessment 
of health social welfare. In the past, the performance of health systems with regard to 
distributional and aggregative goals has been examined in isolation; largely, one 
suspects, because of the underdevelopment of techniques for joint measurement. This 
study has shown that health concentration indices have an ethically founded role as 
measures of inequity. The new indices of health social welfare allow for an explicit 
trade-off between income related inequity and health maximization. They have a 
considerable number of potential applications which suggests that they may find a niche 
in the assemblage of empirical tools used by health economists. Obviously, far more 
detailed practical application is required before a final judgement is pronounced. There 
is also a need for further conceptual analysis aimed at devising alternative measures and 
for research that elicits societal values of the equity-efficiency trade-off parameter, in 
this case possibly drawing on experimental methods. 
Finally, the thesis has shown that far greater attention should be given to the 
impact of measurement procedures on the degree of measured inequity. Distributional 
analysis in the field of health invariably involves the adoption of methods over which 
there is controversy (eg. the procedure for aggregating inequality, choice of equivalence 
scale, incidence assumptions, and so on). It may be that as was found for the 
intertemporal progressivity analysis, choice of methods has no noticeable impact on the 
conclusions that are drawn. However, it was also shown that health inequity estimates 
involving income as the reference distribution are particularly sensitive to equivalence 
scale relativities. This feature can lead to conflicting results when levels of inequity are 
compared across countries. Future studies should seek to replicate the sensitivity 
analyses carried out in order to better evaluate which type of methodological choices, 
and in what contexts, systematically affect inequity measurements. If it is found that 
some issues have a confounding influence on results, then there is a strong case for 
general adoption of the eclectic approach to measurement espoused in the thesis. 
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APPENDICES 
Appendix I 
An Exploration into the Modelling 
of Health Related Behaviour 
AM Introduction 
The thesis has been essentially concerned with examining inequalities in health 
and health care variables and their systematic association with inequality in the extent 
of choice over commodity bundles. These relationships have been examined in isolation 
because of their importance in establishing the degree to which health-equity has been 
attained. However, if the capabilities approach is adopted as the underlying ethical 
theory, measurement of health domain inequity must also consider the process whereby 
goods (eg. health care, education) are transformed into health functioning. This chapter 
explores how economic theory may help in that task. The research moves us beyond 
measurement of inequality in the distribution of particular attributes to explanation of 
how those distributions come about. It is important to note, however, that it is an 
integral part of the indicative approach to evaluating inequality in health capability sets 
adopted in the thesis (see Chapter 3). 
It was argued in Chapter 3 that the Sen framework has similarities with 
Grossman's (1972) model of the demand for health. Various authors have indeed 
suggested that the model may be used to analyse the persistence of health inequality, 
notably Culyer (1976), Maynard (1983), Williams (1984), Muurinen and Le Grand 
(1985) and Wagstaff (1986a). This appendix examines the suitability of Grossman's 
model for health-equity analysis and proposes an alternative specification that draws on 
suggestions by Muurinen (1982a, b) and Williams (1984). 
The organization is as follows. The economic approach to modelling health 
demand, associated with Grossman (1972), is presented in Al. 2. The following section 
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discusses various reasons why the model in its original form is not a suitable basis for 
considering the most important questions raised in the health inequality debate (Al. 3). 
Section AIA then goes on to present a model which is arguably more suited to the 
problem at hand. 
A1.2 Grossman's household production model 
Michael Grossman's (1972) model of the demand for health is often considered 
to be the major theoretical innovation to have emerged from the* sub-discipline of health 
economics (eg. Culyer, 1981). Prior to Grossman's study there were no satisfactory 
explanations of the production of health at the individual level; nor indeed of how 
important variables such as health status or education (seen as forming part of the 
exogenously determined "taste matrix" in traditional demand analysis) affected the 
demand for health care. Clearly, if health economics is to serve a useful purpose in 
evaluating policy alternatives the effects of shifts in variables other than price and 
income have to be predicted within a general health-decision framework. 
Grossman's model is built on the theory of household production pioneered by 
Becker (1965), Lancaster (1966) and Muth (1966). In this approach, individuals 
produce fundamental commodities such as recreation, travel or health by combining 
inputs of market goods and own-time within a full-wealth constraint of wage and 
non-wage income and the monetary value of non-market time. Health care is one of the 
inputs into the production of health and hence the demand for that good is essentially 
derived from the demand for health itself. 
Table Al. I sets out the fundamental equations of Grossman's theoretical structure 
which may be outlined as follows. The individual derives utility from being in good 
health (N) as well as from a composite of all other fundamental commodities (2ý). 
Health is demanded for two reasons: it yields direct increases in utility (consumption 
benefits, such as avoidance of pain and discomfort) and indirect increases, through 
more healthy time being available for activities such as consumption, working and 
leisure (investment benefits). The amount of healthy time produced is a function of the 
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individual's health stock (H), which he is endowed with at birth and depreciates with 
age. Additions to this stock can be produced using time and purchased goods and 
services (eg. medical care) as inputs, as well as through investment in human capital 
(eg. education) which is assumed to improve the efficiency of the production process 
in the non-market sector of the economy. The production of fundamental commodities 
other than health is also achieved in a similar fashion. Net investment in any particular 
period is that newly produced minus that which has depreciated from the previous 
period. The stock of health is, therefore, partially endogenous, leading to the oft cited 
argument that in Grossman's framework the individual chooses his time of death (ie. 
at time T when 1-4 = H., J. Life-time utility is maximized subject to the constraint of 
the present value of the individual's full wealth, which is a composite of the discounted 
money and time value of the resources available to the individual over his life-time. 
The optimality conditions for the total amount of health newly produced in each 
period imply that the present value of the marginal cost of producing health equals the 
present value of marginal benefits. This is shown in the following equation: 
aht 
Wt +( 
Uht 
(1 + r)t (r - Rt-I + 8) allt ýT) 
where Dh, / Dlý is the marginal product of the stock of health in the production of 
healthy time; Uh, is the marginal utility of healthy time; X is the marginal utility of 
wealth; Nt is the marginal cost of gross investment (= PtM, + WTH); and R, the 
percentage rate of change in marginal cost. 
The marginal benefits - shown on the left-hand-side of (1.1) - are composed of the 
two components coffesponding to the investment and consumption motives, which in 
turn lead Grossman to formulate two competing sub-models to be tested. What each of 
these implies can be seen by dividing both sides of (1.1) by N, I: 
c1h, W 
±h, Uh, 
(1 t r) 
+ 
allt I=r (1.2) 
Nt-, JVt-l 
When the first expression on the LHS is assumed to equal zero the pure consumption 
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model holds. By the same token, the pure investment model, which forms the basis of 
Grossman's empirical derivations, is based on the second expression on the LHS - the 
consumption benefits - being absent. 
Grossman goes on to derive the comparative static predictions separately for the 
two sub-models. One important difference which arises is that in the pure investment 
model wealth effects are not relevant since an increase in wealth, without analogous 
changes in the interest rate and the rate of depreciation does not alter the equality 
between the cost of capital and the rate of return on an investment in health. Despite 
this result, Grossman opts to base empirical analysis on the pure-investment model 
arguing that it generates equally powerful predictions from simple analysis and inocuous 
assumptions [Grossman (1972, p. 39). 
The effects of exogenous changes in the theoretical variables under the investment 
model are summarized in Table Al. 2. Although the predicted effect of wealth is zero 
it was included by Grossman in his empirical analysis in order to evaluate the predictive 
power of the two sub-models. Wealth was observed to have a positive effect on the 
demand for health care and a negative effect on the demand for health. These results 
were argued to be due to the correlation between high income and insalubrious health 
habits (eg. excessive eating or smoking) which lower the stock and flow of health and 
increase the need for medical treatment. 
The wage rate was included in Grossman's demand equations for two reasons: 
because it determines the value of the marginal product of health and because it enters 
into the calculation of the total cost of a unit of health capital. The predicted net effect 
of wages was to increase the demand for both health and medical care. In the demand 
for health, the wage rate operated to raise the marginal product of the health stock more 
than it increased the marginal cost of health investment, because time costs were only 
a portion of the total cost of health capital. This argument was supported by empirical 
evidence. In the derived demand for medical care, the argument was similar with one 
important addition - medical care and time devoted to health were assumed to be 
substitutes. That is, medical care is a less time-intensive method of producing health, 
vis-a-vis other methods such as adequate sleep, exercise and so on. The empirical 
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Table AI. 2: The Grossman model: Predicted and actual signs of the effects of 
exogenous variables on the demand for health and medical care 
Wealth Wage Rate Education Age 
Demand for health 
Predicted sign 0 
Observed sign + 
Demand for medical care 
Predicted sign ?+ 
Observed sign + 
Source: Muurinen (1982a, p. 14). 
results did not show the expected positive wage effect; instead it was negative (although 
statistically insignificant),, a result which Grossman attributes to measurement error. 
Rising education levels are postulated to increase the individual's efficiency in 
producing new health. Less time is required per unit production of health capital and 
therefore the marginal cost of health capital production falls with marginal benefits held 
constant. This enables identical increases in health to be produced from fewer inputs 
of both time and medical care than was hitherto the case. Therefore, more health and 
less health care are demanded in order to maintain equilibrium. Empirical evidence was 
found for the the first of these effects but not for the second, which should only hold 
if the elasticity of the marginal efficiency of health capital is less than unity. 
Finally, Grossman also considered the effects of age, assuming that as it increases 
so does the rate of depreciation on health. As a result, the marginal cost of producing 
healthy time increases, leading the production of health (and hence demand for health) 
to fall, in order to maintain equilibrium. Providing that the price elasticity of the 
demand for health is less than unity, individuals will offset part of the reduction in 
health capital by increasing gross investment. Since medical care is one of the inputs 
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in the health investment function the demand for health care will tend to increase. The 
actual signs revealed by empirical analysis tended to substantiate the theoretical 
predictions. 
A13 An appraisal of the Grossman model as a guide to health-equity research 
The model of health investment summarized above has undergone various 
extensions and generated a considerable number of refined specifications and estimations 
of the demand equations. ' Generally, this work has retained the underlying structure 
of the initial model and introduced only slight alterations. In this context, it makes 
sense to pose the question as to whether the original Grossman framework is indeed 
suited for studying the health-equity problem, as so many authors have claimed. 
An obvious starting point is to recognize that the model was not designed 
explicitly for analysing socio-economic differentials in health and health care, and much 
less for answering whether a particular distribution is equitable or not. Grossman's 
interest lay in understanding the relationship between health status, health care 
utilization, wage rates, education and age. Why then, one could ask, should the analysis 
be extended to study questions raised by the health inequity debate? It seems that two 
factors have inspired suggestions along such lines. Firstly, developments in the human 
capital literature. Early work in this area was directed at explaining how schooling 
choices affected labour supply and economic growth, but it was later applied with 
considerable appeal to the study of interpersonal distribution of income (cf. Rosen, 
1987; Becker and Tomes, 1978). This development has in all likelihood led health 
economists to accept that a similar course might be taken by models of the demand for 
health in the human capital tradition. 
By far the more important reason, however, has been the lack of rigorous and 
persuasive alternatives. Richard Berk (1987) has noted that human capital models are 
I See Grossman (1982) for a succint review up to that date, and Birch (1987: Chapter 1) for a 
more recent and detailed critique. 
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"effectively directed at the soft underbellies of other social-science disciplines" (p. 130). 
As the previous section showed, Grossman's model provides a coherent method of 
explaining individual behaviour with regard to health and health care. It yields 
predictions on the effects of independent variables such as the wage rate and education 
- which may be seen as components of a person's socio-economic position - 
thereby 
shedding light on the process by which differentials are generated. 
' Though it may 
seem a heavy-handed way of drawing rather unremarkable conclusions it has the 
advantage of being explanatory in character, thus lending itself to empirical verification 
or falsification to a greater extent than other approaches to the problem. Such a 
systematic analytical framework may be precisely what has been missing from the type 
of research reviewed by the Black Report (DHSS, 1980). 
Remarkably, however, virtually no empirical analyses of the health-equity 
relationship have sought to draw on Grossman's economic theory as a guide. It would 
be too easy to ascribe this state of affairs to communication barriers in the intellectual 
division of labour. Health economists, after all, have generally not based their own 
empirical studies of the equity problem on the model. That this is in part due to the 
unavailability of suitable data goes without question. But it may also reflect a certain 
uneasiness with regard to the assumptions and mechanisms underlying the theoretical 
model. 
All this goes to suggest that, whilst the Grossman framework reveals a 
comparative advantage over the largely ad hoc conceptualizations employed in 
health-equity research, attention should be paid to developing those aspects of the model 
that appear to preclude a satisfactory analysis of key questions raised in the debate. 
Three distinct disadvantages are suggested here. The aim is not to provide a systematic 
critique of Grossman's work, but rather to bring to the fore possible alterations to the 
basic model which render it more suitable for the task at hand. 
The first criticism has already been alluded to. It is that the pure investment 
' See Muurinen and Le Grand (1985) and Wagstaff (1986a) for informal expositions of how the 
framework provides an account of the causal mechanisms underlying health differences. 
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model is not particularly informative of the relationship between command over 
resources and health and health care, since individuals' choices about health investment 
at each moment in time are independent of their initial and current stocks of wealth 
(Muurinen, 1982a; Dardadoni and Wagstaff, 1987). Obviously, one could simply base 
empirical analysis on the pure consumption model, but this would mean abstracting from 
a major insight of the capabilities framework: that people combine the characteristics 
of goods fundamentally to produce human functionings (the investment benefits of 
health). If for any individual these functionings depend on inputs of own and goods 
characteristics, which are observable, then one is able to make equity comparisons. The 
direct utility consequences, on the other hand, are by no means straightforward, 
depending on a variety of emotional responses. Moreover, the pure investment model 
has dominated discussion of the Grossman framework, due to its clarity as a teaching 
aid and ability to yield sharp predictions from simple assumptions. 
There have been attempts in the literature to overcome the wealth neutrality 
inherent in the investment model. Dardanoni and Wagstaff (1987) suggest introducing 
uncertainty. They show that if individuals display decreasing absolute risk aversion, the 
wealthier among them will invest more in health than those with lower initial stocks of 
financial assets. Essentially, they do so because their larger stocks of initial wealth 
capital provide an incentive to invest in the riskier asset - health. The argument depends 
crucially on considering simply the uncertainty surrounding the flow from the health 
stock (ignoring, therefore, uncertainty on the return to financial capital as well as that 
surrounding the effectiveness of health inputs) and on the assumption of decreasing 
absolute risk aversion. 
Dardanoni and Wagstaff's analysis raises the spectre of complete certainty which 
has long been argued to be a major drawback in the Grossman model (eg. Dowie, 
1975), even though Grossman himself acknowledged that this assumption should be 
dropped in future work? However, in order to resolve the wealth neutrality problem 
one need not introduce uncertainty. Another possibility (accepted by Dardanoni and 
3 Several authors later took up the challenge, notably Phelps (1973) and Cropper (1977) on the 
uncertainty regarding future illness, and Dowie (1975) and Keeler et al (1977) on that concerning the 
impact of health inputs. 
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Wagstaff) is to assume imperfect markets, so that the rate of depreciation and/or the 
price of health investments are decreasing functions of health investment. The marginal 
cost of health investment would then be decreasing in wealth, so that the better-off 
would ceteris paribus choose higher values of health investment. 
There is, however a more straightforward approach which allows wealth to affect 
health decisions in a generalized investment framework while retaining the complete 
certainty construct. Muurinen (1982b) views the investment and consumption benefits 
of health as explicitly complementary, rather than as substitutes as Grossman's analysis 
seems to imply. Analytically, the separation of benefit types is retained in the 
alternative specification but they are treated as being produced from the same addition 
to the stock of wealth. Intuitively, this alteration seems correct since health is demanded 
simultaneously for its utility consequences (enjoying good health) and for what it allows 
in terms of functional capacity (better performance of social and economic tasks). 
Moreover, Muurinen's specification implies a richer interpretation of the investment 
benefits which is closer to Sen's capabilities analysis and contrasts sharply with the 
narrow view implied by the human capital model, where investment benefits are seen 
simply as increases in healthy time available for activities valued at the exogenous wage 
rate. The investment benefits of health are now "seen as increased capacity to perform 
one's tasks in the role of a producer (either inside the home or in the labour force), and 
the value of this as dependent on the characteristics of this participation, the individual 
in question, and his or her circumstances more generally" (Muurinen, 1982b, p. 7). 
A second drawback of Grossman's formulation is its handling of variables such 
as education, and so-called environmental variables like housing or work conditions. 
Consider first the case of education. In the Grossman model better education simply 
enhances the technical efficiency of household production. This implies that its role is 
dependent on the use of that specific approach to analysing health behaviour and, that 
the precise nature of the education-health relationship remains relatively unspecified. 
It overlooks, for example, the role of education as improving allocative efficiency in 
terms of choices between production processes. In the inequality in health debate it is 
this aspect which has attracted the greater attention. The better educated are seen as 
having greater awareness of the adverse health effects of particular activities and hence 
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choose more suitable health promoting behaviour. 
More recent studies have modelled the relationship in a different light, explicitly 
taking into account the allocative benefits of education. Muurinen (1982b), for example, 
defines the rate of depreciation on health as a function of the use of related variables. 
Education is seen as one such variable which redirects the choice of different production 
processes towards a life-style that is less use-intensive in terms of health. Whilst this 
approach has some appeal, it sketches over the precise relationship between health, 
education and other important variables such as work environment (Kemna, 1985) or 
cigarette consumption (Farrel and Fuchs, 1982). Education is not simply one amongst 
many factors which affect health depreciation, but itself largely determines consumption 
of those other goods and activities. Furthermore, it is likely to affect an individual's 
command over resources which in turn affects health decisions. Thus a more refined 
framework would view education as an investment activity involving opportunity costs 
in return for future benefits, very much in the same way as health. 
Muurinen's use-related depreciation concept does, however, seem pertinent for 
handling variables such as diet, smoking, exercise or even housing or work environment. 
The latter are commonly correlated with health and health care as evidence of inequality, 
without a rigorous explanation of the mechanisms by which differentials arise (cf., eg., 
the research reviewed by Whitehead, 1987). Viewing their effect as operating through 
use related depreciation on health provides such a rationale which is also altogether 
more appealing than Grossman's approach. He suggests (Grossman, 1972, Chapter 6) 
that these variables might enter the model as health production function inputs, in 
addition to medical care and time. This would lead, however, to highly aggregated 
functions and make the analysis of activities undertaken specifically to produce health 
(eg. medical care) more difficult. This is unfortunate given that public pronouncements 
on equity usually stress access to health care rather than other health-producing goods. 
It would also raise theoretical problems. On the one hand, the model would have to 
consider joint production for which theory has so far not produced adequate answers; 
and on the other, the assumption of positive health investment in all periods could not 
be sustained, unless benefical inputs were always greater than those that are harmful to 
health. 
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This brings us to the final major drawback of the Grossman model as a basis for 
undertaking explanatory health-equity research: its location within a household 
production framework and treatment of the wage rate as the value of time. Household 
production theory has drawn a number of significant criticisms in the literature, among 
them the unsatisfactory treatment of joint production, the reliance on constant returns 
to scale in the production functions, the disregard for transaction and adjustment costs, 
and the unfortunate feature of key variables being typically, or even in principle, 
unobservable (see, eg. Berk, 1987). Each of these is applicable to Grossman's 
specification. For instance, the additive nature of the time constraint ignores joint 
production in the use of household time, implying that sick time is totally unproductive, 
so that it may not even be used for utilizing health care. Yet health economists have 
generally been want to cast doubt on the household production construct itself. The vast 
majority of 'post-Grossman' demand for health models have retained the underlying 
structure and simply introduced slight alterations, the effects of which are then tested 
against data. 
On a practical level, Grossman's use of the wage rate as a universal measure of 
the marginal valuation of time creates various difficulties. In particular, it may 
overestimate the opportunity cost of work time lost due to illness/use of medical care, 
if institutional arrangements exist whereby employees suffer no loss in earnings during 
such periods. As Le Grand (1982) has argued, poorer income groups, who are often 
paid on an hourly rather than salary basis, are the more likely to experience reductions 
in income, and thus face higher opportunity costs of time. If this is the case, applying 
each persons wage rate as the measure of time would lead to biases in measurement of 
access cost and indirectly of other variables included in the model. 
The unsuitability of Grossman's approach is further compounded once it is 
realized that adequate empirical estimates of the wage rate are not readily available for 
the whole population. All those outside the labour force (eg. the unemployed, 
housewives, and pensioners) are effectively excluded from empirical analysis, even 
though there is evidence that they may experience higher rates of sickness and consume 
health care over-proportionately (eg. Andersen et al, 1975). Since these are also groups 
which generally reveal lower command over resources, it makes equity analysis based 
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on the Grossman model rather uninformative. Calculation of a reservation wage would 
go some way to resolving these problems but it is likely to involve new data collection 
and prove cumbersome (see, eg., Coffey, 1983). Moreover, most health data sources 
do not include, even for those in work, an adequate estimate of the wage rate, so that 
4 unreliable proxies have to be used. Given these drawbacks, the use of a model based 
upon household production theory can only be defended if there are strictly no suitable 
alternatives. 
In the following section an economic model of health behaviour is presented that 
may be seen as an extension of Grossman's investment framework, but which dispenses 
with the more problematic features identified above. The new specification draws on 
work by Muurinen (1982a, 1982b) and in particular on a model of health behaviour 
sketched informally by Williams (1988a). Since Williams' analysis reveals how many 
of the drawbacks in the Grossman formulation may be improved, it is described here as 
a prelude to mathematical specification. Its point of departure is that individuals are 
considered to hold, at any point in time, three distinct stocks of capital: namely health, 
wealth and "wisdom", confon-ning to the proverb "early to bed and early to rise, makes 
a man healthy, wealthy and wise. " Health behaviour, therefore, does not simply imply 
optimizing the flow from the health stock, but simultaneous optimization of the services 
arising from the three individual assets. 
Figure AM provides a schematic view of the Williams framework. ' The three 
stocks are capable of being augmented by suitable investment processes (row 1) and are 
each subject to time and use-related depreciation (rows 2 and 3). Health capital, for 
example, may be added to by use of health care or activities such as adequate sleep, 
exercise or shelter. It depreciates in time due to the natural ageing process 
(time-related depreciation) and the effects of individuals undertaking harmful activities, 
such as smoking, excessive drinking and working in a stressful environment 
(use-related depreciation). The wealth stock is augmented by financial (net saving) and 
4 Birch (1987) for example, uses occupational status as a proxy for the wage rate. 
5 In Williams' (1988a) article a slightly more elaborate diagram is presented, highlighting the 
various interrelationships and possibilities for substitution between the stocks. 
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Figure Al. l. Williams' schematic view of health behaviour 
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goods investments and is also subject to both types of depreciation. For instance, 
time-related depreciation may affect financial assets through inflation, while expected 
income-eaming possibilities are dependent on peoples' age (eg. age restrictions on 
access to the labour market). Use-related depreciation, on the other hand, involves such 
things as the intensity of use of consumer durables and capital consumption. The stock 
of "wisdom" is enhanced by investments in formal education and more pervasively by 
experience. It is subject to time related depreciation as an individual's mental 
capabilities diminish with age, and as knowledge and skills become obsolete because of 
changes in technology or the environment. There does not, however, seem to exist an 
analogue to use-related depreciation in the case of wisdom, unless one believes that 
intensively exercising the brain leads to its deterioration. 
Each of the stocks yields a flow of services (row 5). Health capital allows the 
individual to perform tasks free from pain, distress and disability; wealth capital gives 
rise to purchasing power; and the stock of "wisdom" yields a variety of services such 
as lifestyle possibilities, valuations and adaptive skills. Though at present it is not at 
all clear how the latter might be measured, it would be wrong, conceptually, to ignore 
this flow since it both widens the individual's ability to choose between production 
processes and enhances the benefit derived from those choices that are made. 
The remainder of the diagram shows how the flows from the three stocks enable 
individuals to engage in various activities, which then have consequences for the level 
of health capital they are able to achieve in the following period. For instance, quality 
adjusted time and energy allows the individual to participate in the labour market, 
household production and consumption activities, which in themselves may add or 
subtract from her health. But the other flows permit similar activities so that the 
individual may wish to trade-off investments in a particular stock with those in another. 
In this sense, health behaviour is explained by the simultaneous management of the three 
individual assets. 
In reality, this task is complicated by at least two factors. First of all, there is 
likely to be a time lag between activities and their effects on the capital stocks; and 
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secondly, all decisions are subject to risk and uncertainty. ' Nevertheless, there are 
important lessons to be derived from the Williams framework even within a complete 
certainty framework. From the point of view of equity it suggests that those with higher 
stocks of knowledge and wealth are able to offset deleterious effects upon their health 
stocks to a greater extent than other individuals. Furthermore, if the stocks are 
interchangeable, then it is reasonable to assume that all individuals will have some 
possibility to minimize the effects of price and opportunity constraints, so that the levels 
of their initial capital assets are the only constraints that are strictly beyond control. 
Since inequality in the initial stocks of health and "wisdom" are likely to be less than 
in the inherited stock of wealth, it would appear that initial holdings of wealth may have 
a determining role in the individual's life-time profile of health capital. The model 
developed below aims to explore these suppositions. 
AM An Alternative specification 
This section presents a formal model that could be used as a guide to empirical 
analysis. The model is set up with a specific research topic in mind - the relationship 
between socio-economic inequalities, health and health care. It aims to identify in a 
rigorous fashion the mechanisms by which these categories are related and, adjacently, 
to provide a bridge from Sen's normative analysis of equity to positive verification. 
Therefore, the framework should also provide guidance as to how equal opportunities 
for improvement of the functioning health might be achieved. 
At the same time, the model constitutes a development on previous economic 
specifications of health-related behaviour. In essence, all such models - including 
Grossman's and others that have drawn on the conceptual tools of the demand for health 
- are simplified versions of Williams' informal framework. Muurinen's (1982a, b) is 
perhaps the more general specification of the relationships suggested by Williams. ' The 
6 Zweifel (1989) has drawn particular attention to these aspects showing at the same time that 
there is likely to be positive correlation of stochastic shocks among all of the three assets. This results 
in a reinforcement of exposure to risk and may explain the prevalence of social - as opposed to private 
- insurance in the health care market. 
Its essential features were also later adopted by Wagstaff (1985). 
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present model goes a step further by introducing an independent stock of "wisdom", 
simplified to denote education capital. Whilst this refinement does not produce a 
fundamentally different equilibrium condition for health capital it permits a clearer 
understanding of the relationship between wealth and knowledge and of their impact on 
health and health care. Other alterations to existing models are minor and essentially 
determined by an attempt to facilitate the mathematical derivations. 
A strict adherence to Sen's capabilities framework would suggest that individuals 
should be represented as maximizing functionings such as 'healthy time'. In order not 
to depart from previous specifications of the demand for health, however, individuals 
in this model are assumed to be life-time utility maximizers. This assumption does not 
signify that the Sen and Grossman approaches cannot be combined, it merely states that 
the link from functionings to utility is viewed as unproblematic. 
A1.4.1. Assumptions and equilibrium conditions 
The representative individual is assumed to derive utility at each point in time 
according to 
U[h(t), Q(t)l 
where h(t) is the functioning healthy time, produced from the stock of health, H(t), by 
the following relationship 
h(1) = 4) [H(t)1, V>0, V' < 0. 
Q(t) is a composite functioning, that is, an aggregate of all other functionings from 
which utility is derived. The first partials of utility with respect to h(t) and Q(t) are 
assumed to be positive (ie. allldh(t) >0 and DUIDQ(t) > 0). 
At time 0 the individual inherits an initial stock of health capital, HO, which 
thereafter evolves according to the relationship: 
H(t) = I(t) [t, k(t), X(t)] H(t) 
This states that net investment in health, H(t), is equal to gross investment, I(t), less 8[. ], 
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the rate at which health capital depreciates. This depreciation is an explicit function of 
age t, the services of the individual's stock of education k(t) - defined below - and the 
vector X(t), representing all other relevant variables such as work environment. The 
latter are postulated to act as lifestyle selection factors so that those who work in safe 
environments experience lower rates of depreciation and hence choose healthier 
lifestyles. Conversely, individuals who smoke, eat excessively or hold hazardous jobs 
reveal a greater deterioration of their health stock. 
Gross investment in health, 1(t), is assumed in this model to be produced solely 
from activities which are undertaken primarily for health reasons. Institutional medical 
care is the obvious example, but other things such as self-care could just as well be 
included in this category. All those other activities which give rise to improvements in 
health enter the model via a negative effect on the rate of depreciation, thereby 
appreciating the existing stock of health capital. Further, it is postulated that the effects 
of I(t) on health are always positive. Whilst these are somewhat restrictive assumptions 
they are justified by the fact that the main object of the model is to analyse how the 
distribution of opportunities in achieving good health is conditioned by investment in 
the good which policy makers and the public in general associate with better health, 
namely health care. Furthermore, people make such investments because they generally 
believe it will do them some good. 
The services of the education stock are produced according to the following 
relationship 
k(t) = li [E(t)1,1.1 1>0, lift < 0. 
where E(t) is the stock of education, and k(t) may be seen as the lifetime possibilities 
and adaptive skills enjoyed by the individual. The education stock, itself, evolves from 
H. at time 0 according to: 
t(t) = L(t) -d [t] E(t) (1.7) 
where, L(t) is gross investment in education and d[j, the rate of depreciation on 
education. Thus, the forces determining the path of the education stock are similar to 
those postulated for the stock of health, with the exception that use-related depreciation 
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is not important in this case. 
The individual is also assumed to inherit an initial stock of wealth denoted by A0. 
Thereafter it evolves according to: 
A(t) = rA(t) + Y[h(t), I(t), k(t), Z(t)] 
- [PQ(t) Q(t) + PXt) I(t) + PL(t) L(t) I 
where r is a time invariant rate of interest; Y earned income, which is a function of the 
flow of health h(t), use of health-specific investment goods I(t) (given that income is lost 
in order to undertake such activities), the services of the education stock k(t), and other 
relevant variables, Z(t). Pcft), Pjt) and PL(t) are the exogenous prices of Q(t), I(t) 
and L(t) respectively. 
Given these expressions the individual's objective is to maximize discounted 
lifetime utility 
T 
Max fe -" U[ iý (H(t)), Q(t) ] dt 
0 
subject to (1.5), (1.7) and (1.8) and the required boundary and negativity conditions 
A(O) = A09 
E(O) = Eo, 
H(O) = HO, (1.10) 
A(I) 0, 
E(I) 0, 
il(t) 
where H(t) is the level of the health stock at which death occurs. In equation (1.9), 6-' 
is a time discounting factor where the rate of time preference is assumed to be equal to 
the rate of interest, r. It is also assumed that H(t), Q(t), I(t), Plt) and PQ(t) are 
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non-negative for all t. 
The problem has been set up in a form which permits its solution and analysis 
through the maximum principle in optimal control theory. Thus it is assumed that 
individuals are able to manipulate I(t), Q(t) and L(t) - the control variables - choosing 
optimal paths for the stocks H(t), A(t) and E(t) - the state variables. 
Maximization of the objective function subject to all the constraints gives the 
following Hamiltonian: 
U[4t(H(t)), Q(t)l + AH(t) (I(t) -8 [t, li(E(t)), X(t)] H(t)) 
IE(t) (L(t) - d[t]E(t)) + AA(t) frA(t) + Y[(ý(H(t)), l(t), VE(t), Z(t)] 
- [PQ(t) Q(t) + PXt) I(t) + PL(t) L(t) I) 
(I. 11) 
where %H(t), %E(t) and %A(t) are the costate variables of H(t), E(t) and A(t) respectively. 
A maximum requires that the folowing conditions hold: 
aA 
z- lH(t) + 'A(t) _ff- - pxt) al(t) 
ý 
al(t) 
aA e -n aU - 
XAM PQ(t) =0 
NO) NO) 
8A 
2'- 'E(t) - 'A(t) PL(t) 
CIL(t) 
OV) aA TH -(t) 
JH(t) 8 [t, II(E(t)), X(t)] (1.15) e-" 
aU 0 
all(t) 
'%A(t) 
ay 'aý (4 
all(t) 
282 
aA 
aE(t) 
AH(t) H(t) 
ap 
k W(t) 
- lzýt) d [t] + IA(t) ay a[' ( ali aE(t) 
(VO aA XA(t) 
aA(t) 
=r XA(t) 
plus (1.5), (1.7), (1.8) and the boundary conditions. 
In order to derive the optimal health investment strategy proceed as follows. 
Given that (1.17) is a first-order differential equation it follows that 
IA(t) = XA(O) e -. 
From (1.12) 
IH(t) 
'XA(t) 
ay(t) 
- pxt) 
( 
ai(t) 
Differentiating this expression with respect to time and defining C(t) = [Plt) - DY19I(t)] 
gives 
'A(t) C(t) + 'A(t) C(t) (1.20) 
Finally, substituting (1.19) and (1.20) into (1.15) and taking into account (1.17) and 
(1.18) one affives at 
au e- 
aH(t) [ay e8[t, 
g (E(t», X(t) +r- C(t) - Nb ( XA(O) DH(t) 
] 
C(t) 
(1.21) 
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Equation (1.21) is the equilibrium condition for health capital, stating that the 
marginal consumption and benefits of health must equal the user cost of health capital. 
The terms in this equation have the following economic interpretation: 
au 4 is the marginal consumption benefit of health; 
04 all(t) 
'A(O) 
[ ay 41 is the marginal production benefit of health; 5ý all(t) j 
XA(O) is the marginal utility of initial wealth; and, 
C(t) PAO -iy- 
is the effective marginal cost of new health 
investment (ie. money price and opportunity 
cost, in the form of lost income, of investment 
in goods aquired primarily for health reasons). 
The optimal wealth and education investment strategies are not analysed here, 
given that the model seeks only to describe health behaviour. Nevertheless, it is worth 
looking a little closer at condition (1.17), which provides the basis for the optimal 
allocation of lifetime wealth. Its solution, (1.18), suggests that wealth should be 
allocated so as to maintain the compounded value of the marginal utility of wealth 
constant over the lifecycle and equal to the number X(O). Under conditions of certainty, 
the individual regards the level of assets from previous decisions as given and 
effectively remaximizes the remaining lifetime utility at each point in time, thereby 
continuing on the same path as that selected at time 0 (see Heckman, 1976). Therefore, 
X(O) may be regarded as indicating the individuals permanent real wealth. 
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A1.4.2. Predictions of the model 
From the point of view of the health inequality debate there are three independent 
variables whose changes are of particular interest: namely wealth, education services 
and work environment. The procedure generally followed in models of health 
investment that adopt a dynamic optimization approach is to consider what effectively 
are parametric shifts in the lifecycle profile of the exogenous variable in question (see 
Cropper, 1977; Muurinen, 1982b, Wagstaff, 1985). Whilst this has the effect of 
abstracting from the essential dynamics of the relationships (see Forster, 1989) it permits 
the deduction of unambiguous predictions. 
The mathematical derivation of the predictions is not undertaken in this study. 
However, it should be noted that despite the introduction of the independent stock of 
education as a constraint in the model, the equilibrium condition for health capital 
(equation 1.21) is virtually the same as that derived by Muurinen (1982a, b). In both 
models the education variable influences the optimal health investment strategy through 
its impact on the depreciation of the health stock. If one assumes that the services of 
the education stock in the present model are positive at all points in time, then their 
effect is analogous to Muurinen's education variable, the only difference arising in 
empirical analysis. Hence, a more refined measure of what education does for people 
(possibly taking into account length of time since finishing formal education or the 
degree to which the work setting provides opportunities for enhancing the education 
stock), rather than simply "years of schooling", is warranted by the model suggested 
here. The wealth and work environment variables have an identical interpretation to that 
suggested in the Muurinen model. 
Consequently, it seems valid to infer Muurinen's results for the present framework. 
With regard to the three exogenous variables of interest, their impact on the demand for 
health and that for health-specific investment goods is as follows: 
(i) An increase in wealth increases the demand for health. This result is derived 
on the assumption that the initial stock of wealth is - in a complete certainty framework 
-a suitable indication of the individual's permanent real wealth. The size of the wealth 
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elasticity will depend on the composition of health benefits. The impact on the demand 
for health-specific investment goods (eg. health care) is also predicted to be positive. 
(ii) Larger education benefits arising from that capital stock also increase the 
demand for health, but reduce the demand for activities undertaken for health reasons. 
(iii) The impact of work environment is identical to that for education given that 
it enters the model as part of the X profile, similarly postulated to affect the rate of 
depreciation on health. Thus, those who work in safe environments demand more health 
and less health care goods and activities than those who work in hazardous conditions. 
A1.5 Conclusion 
Clearly, further conceptual groundwork is required before the alternative model 
can be used as a suitable guide to explaining unequal distributions in the domain of 
health. However, the exploratory analysis presented above does seem a promising line 
of research for this purpose. Demand for health models have obvious similarities with 
the normative approach adopted in Chapter 3, which it was argued presents the most 
suitable means currently available for understanding health-inequity. They are 
potentially useful in organizing and analysing hypotheses on differences in health states 
and health care utilization. The particular structure set out in AIA may be seen to 
remedy weaknesses in Grossman's specification which make it unattractive when 
studying the health-inequity issue. Ultimately, however, the predictions of the model 
must be tested against suitable data to examine the extent to which they are consistent 
with the evidence. Empirical work on explaining unequal levels of health status and use 
of services would indeed appear to be the most important future complement to the 
evidence on the extent of inequity produced in this thesis. 
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Appendix 2 
Geographical Delimitations in Portugal 
Districts 
1. V. Castelo 
2. Braga 
3. Porto 
4. Vila Real 
5. Braganga 
6. Aveiro 
7. Viseu 
8. Guarda 
9. Coimbra 
10. C. Branco 
11. Leiria 
12. Lisboa 
13. Santardm 
14. Portalegre 
15. tvora. 
16. Set(lbal 
17. Beja 
18. Faro 
t... 1 
0 &4 x- 
Appendix 3 
Summary of Indices used in the Thesis 
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Appendix 4 
Inequity in Health: Further Results 
Table A4.1: Distribution of morbidity by equivalent income quintile 
Actual distribution 
Indicator Approximate Income Quintiles 
I II III IV V Total 
Beddays 24.2% 36.9% 16.8% 13.0% 9.1% 100.0% 
Off-work days 24.7% 23.8% 24.2% 15.8% 11.5% 100.0% 
Restricted activity days 24.2% 30.8% 18.2% 15.3% 11.5% 100.0% 
Bedridden 24.3% 32.3% 17.8% 14.6% 11.1% 100.0% 
Offwork 23.6% 23.3% 22.5% 17.4% 13.2% 100.0% 
Restricted activity 23.6% 27.2% 19.1% 16.4% 13.7% 100.0% 
Illness 17.4% 30.5% 18.6% 18.9% 14.6% 100.0% 
Limiting Chronic 23.6% 27.9% 19.0% 16.9% 12.5% 100.0% 
Acute 20.4% 19.8% 22.0% 19.1% 18.7% 100.0% 
Chronic 19.6% 31.3% 18.8% 16.8% 13.5% 100.0% 
Circulatory 18.7% 35.3% 17.4% 16.0% 12.5% 100.0% 
Respiratory 18.2% 22.3% 22.5% 19.5% 17.5% 100.0% 
Digestive 19.9% 23.7% 20.5% 19.1% 16.8% 100.0% 
Muscoskcletal 22.5% 31.1% 17.9% 16.4% 12.1% 100.0% 
Injury and Poisoning 23.2% 21.6% 22.6% 19.7% 12.9% 100.0% 
Acute respiratory 18.4% 19.4% 23.6% 20.0% 18.6% 100.0% 
Chronic respiratory 16.2% 31.4% 20.2% 17.4% 14.9% 100.0% 
High blood pressure 19.7% 30.3% 17.4% 17.7% 14.8% 100.0% 
Population 19.9% 18.8% 20.9% 20.4% 20.0% 100.0% 
Average age (years) 35.4 49.6 34.6 35.9 37.2 38.3 
Sex distribution M 47.9% 44.0% 49.5% 48.1% 48.6% 47.7% 
F 52.1% 56.0% 50.5% 51.9% 51.4% 52.3% 
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Table A4.2: Distribution of morbidity by guivalent income quintile 
Age and sex standardized 
Indicator 
I 
Approximate Income Quintiles 
Il III W V Total 
Beddays 28.4% 25.5% 20.9% 14.7% 10.6% 100.0% 
Off-work days 25.3% 21.0% 24.5% 17.0% 12.3% 100.0% 
Restricted activity days 25.5% 21.2% 21.3% 17.3% 14.7% 100.0% 
Bedridden 27.1% 24.3% 20.9% 15.6% 12.1% 100.0% 
Offwork 23.3% 20.1% 22.7% 19.3% 14.5% 100.0% 
Restricted activity 24.1% 20.5% 21.5% 17.9% 16.0% 100.0% 
Illness 18.5% 20.9% 21.5% 21.5% 17.6% 100.0% 
Limiting Chronic 25.3% 22.1% 22.0% 17.7% 12.9% 100.0% 
Acute 20.9% 18.6% 22.2% 18.9% 19.4% 100.0% 
Chronic 21.7% 22.5% 21.9% 18.7% 15.2% 100.0% 
Circulatory 21.8% 22.3% 22.0% 18.7% 15.2% 100.0% 
Respiratory 18.9% 20.6% 19.4% 21.9% 20.3% 100.0% 
Digestive 21.2% 19.4% 21.9% 20.3% 17.2% 100.0% 
Muscoskeletal 24.3% 23.2% 21.0% 17.6% 13.8% 100.0% 
Injury and Poisoning 24.0% 20.2% 23.0% 18.4% 14.4% 100.0% 
Acute respiratory 18.8% 18.5% 23.8% 19.4% 19.5% 100.0% 
Chronic respiratory 20.0% 25.6% 20.6% 19.1% 14.8% 100.0% 
High blood pressure 20.7% 20.6% 21.5% 20.2% 17.0% 100.0% 
Population 19.9% 18.8% 20.9% 20.4% 20.0% 100.0% 
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Table A4.3: Morbidity concentration indices by age group 
Indicator Age Groups 
< 18 18-34 35-44 45-64 65+ 
Bed days -0.027 -0.179 -0.294 -0.205 -0.125 
Off-work days -0.088 -0.173 -0.198 -0.193 -0.068 
Restr. activ. days -0.055 -0.141 -0.170 -0.176 -0.102 
Illness 0.061 -0.039 -0.047 -0.061 -0.052 
Limiting chronic -0.035 -0.094 -0.136 -0.139 -0.109 
Acute 0.038 -0.036 -0.016 -0.045 -0.047 
Chronic 0.035 -0.046 -0.137 -0.092 -0.050 
Circulatory 0.388 -0.114 -0.332 -0.065 -0.044 
Respiratory 0.036 0.014 0.054 -0.044 -0.064 
Digestive 0.027 -0.029 -0.066 -0.058 -0.051 
Muscoskeletal 0.062 -0.189 -0.130 -0.148 -0.062 
Injury & poisoning -0.012 -0-159 -0.212 -0.102 -0.041 
Sample size 9312 7833 4456 9410 5991 
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Table A4.4: Statistical significance of the relationship between 
morbidity and equivalent income quintiles by age group. 
Chi-squared Tests 
Indicator 
< 18 
Age Groups 
18-34 35-44 45-64 65+ 
Bed days - 
Off-work days - 
Restr. activ. days - 
Illness - 
Limiting chronic - 
Acute - 
Chronic - 
Circulatory - 
Respiratory - 
Digestive - 
Muscoskeletal - 
Injury & poisoning - 
Not significant at acceptable levels 
Significant at p=0.05 Significant at p=0.01 
Significant at p=0.005 Significant at p=0.001 
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Appendix 6 
Health Social Welfare: Mathematical Derivations 
Population health welfare index 
In this appendix the terms h, and hj are substituted by their equivalent expressions 
g(y) and g(yj). Equation (8.8) gives the expected health welfare enjoyed by the 
representative individual with income yj 
Y, 
E [HW I g(yj)l f g(y) J%) dyj +f [g(y) [g(yj) - g(y, ) J(yj) dyj 
(8.8) 
0 Yj 
the solution of which is: 
Y, 40 m 
g (y) fJ Tyj) dyj +g (y, ) fJ Tyj) dyj fg Cyj) A yj) dyj +xg (y f fl, yj) dyj 
0 Yj Yj Yj 
m 
= 9(yi) - ic 
f 9(yj)jýyj) dyj + ic g(yi) [F(-) - F(yi)] 
Yd 
9(Yj) - r, 
f 9Cvj)flYj) dYj + 'K gCV) 
Yi 
From probability theory: 
a 
f g(yj) fl-vj) 4, =E Egi(yj)] = Ph 
0 
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fg (yj) Ayj) dyj +f g(yj) Ay) dyj = tL h 
Y, 
Y, 
f g(y) fly) dyj = lih -f gCvj) J%) dyj. 
Y, 0 
Now substitute back into solution: 
Y, 
g(yd - pl, -f g(yj)jltyj) dyjl + ic g(yi) [1- F(y)]. 
0 
Given that individuals are arranged in ascending order of their incomes the proportion of 
health enjoyed by persons with income equal to or below yi is given by the first-moment 
distribution function: 
Yj 
F, [gCv, )] =lf g(l) ftl) dY Efg(y)] 0 (8.9) 
Yj 
f g(l). Al) dY. 
11h 0 
It follows that: 
Y, 
f g(yj) flyj) dyj = ph F, [g(yi)]. 
0 
Substitution once again will give the following health welfare curve 
W(hi) = g(y, ) - lcph (1-F, [g(y, )] 1+ ic g(y, ) [1- F(y) ] (8.10) 
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If income yj corresponds to the 100pth percentile, then the health concentration 
curve is represented by Gh(p) = F, [g(yi)], where p= F(y) and 0 :5p :51. The 
following conditions also hold: 
if p=0, G, (p) =0 
(b) if p=1, Gh(P) =1 
Gh'(p) = 
dF, [g(yi)] [g(yi)] 
>0 
dF(yi) Ph 
Gh(p) =d2 
FI[g(yi)] g, (yi) 
.i->0. dF 2(y 
i) itý, 
ii5ý) 
Using these relationships in (8.10) yields the average health well-being enjoyed by an 
individual at the 100pth percentile. 
Recall (8.10): 
W(hi) = g(yi) - lcph {1-F, [9(Yi)] 1+ lc 9(Yi) [1- F(Yi) 1 (8.10) 
= g(y, ) - ic ph [I- Gh(p) I+ Ic g(y) [I-pI 
W(h) 
_ 
g(y) 
_ 
'K g(y) ICP g(yi) 
ic + ic Gh(p) + 
Ph Ph 11h 
G '(P) - ic + icG + lcGh'(p) - ic p Gh'(p) h h(P) Ph 
W(h) = W(p) = ph[ Gh'(p) (I +x- lcp) - ic + ic Gh(P) 1 (8.12) 
The area under this curve can be interpreted as the average health welfare enjoyed by 
society 
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II 
f W(p) dp ",, 2 ph 
f[ Ghl (p) + ic - icp) - r, + rGh(P) I dp 
00 
which on evaluating the integrals leads to: 
I111 
Ilk 
f Ghl(P) (1 + 10 4P - Ph 
f 
rp Ghl(p) dp - Ilk 
f 
lC 4P + Ilk 
f 
'CGh(p) dP 
0000 
Ph h(P) 
10 G Gh(p) dp + ic)G Ph 1C 
f 
hl(P) P 
4P - Ph lC 10 + Ph 
f 
00 
II 
+ Ph x [I -f Gh(p) dP Ph lK + Ph lC 
f Gh(p) dp 
00 
II 
gh I' +f Gh(p) dp - ic + ic 
f Gh(p) dp 
00 
Therefore: 
I 
Wjj= g)i[l-ic+2x 
f Gh(p)dpl 
0 
I 
Rjl-ic(1-2 fG h(p) dp) 
0 
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Health welfare by income groups 
The average level of health welfare of the poorest 100p, percent of the population 
is given by [taking into account equation (8.12)] 
Pl 
W(P1) =1f ýth [ Gl, ' (p) (1 +x- Kp) - r, + r, Gh(p) 1 dp 
Pi 0 
Pi Pi Pi Pi 
f Gh'(p) dp -f icp Gf lcdp +fr, G p) dp hA h( 
Pi o000 
Integration by parts leads to: 
Pi Pi 
Lh ( (I + r, ) Gh(p) I'PI rp Gh(p) I'P' - Gh(p)rdp K IP1 + KGh(p)dp'j 00f0f 
Pi 00 
PI Pi 
Lh ( (1 + r, ) Gh(P) - ic p, Gh(p) +f Gh(P) 4P Pl +f ic Gh(p) dp 
Pi 00 
pl 
5[ Gk(pl) + r, G. (pl) - r, pl GI, (pl) - rp, +2r, 
f 
r, G. (p) dp ] 
Pl 
Pi 
tih Gh(p) 
+ 
lC Ph Gh(P) 'CPI Ph Gh(P) Kpl 11h 
+ 
21cllh f Gh(p) dp 
Pi Pi Pi Pi Pi 0 
Given that Gh(PI) is the proportion of total health held by the poorest p, decimal fraction 
of the population, the mean level of health status of this group is given by: 
- 
VhGh(PI) 
Php. - 
PI 
- 
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Using this result, we can now write W(p, ) as follows: 
Pi 
2 r, Ph G W(Pl) = ghp, + 'K Php, - lCPI 11hp, - lC Ph +-f h(p) dp PI 0 
Pi 
2 ph 
Np, +KI Np, - PI 11hp, - llh '-f Gh(p)dp 
Pi 0 
P, 
24h 
Gh(p)dp 11hp, (Ph - 11hpl) + PI 11hp, -f 
PI 0 
Pi 
PI -2 
Ph 
Gh(p)dp h (11h - Php) + PI Vhp, 2f 
A Vhp, 0 
Pi 
= gAp, - 'C 
' (11h - Ithp) + PI IApý [I-2 
ph 
-f Gh(p)dp II 
2 Gh(pl) 0 A Ilh 
Pi 
Pi 
NPI (I'Lh - 11hpl) + PI 11hp, 112f Gh(P)dP 
p, Gh(pl) 0 
From Kakwani (1980, p. 336) it is clear that: 
PI 
2Gp (8.20) Chp, =1 jj- Gf h(p) 
d 
h(PI) 0 
is the health concentration coefficient for the poorest 100p, per cent of the population. 
It follows that: 
11 hp, hc - ICE 
(p - php, ) + PI Php, hpi 
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Appendix 7 
Health Social Welfare: Further Results 
Table AM: Micro-level statistics for five continental regions 
National Health Survey, 1987 
Indicator Portugal North Centre Lisbon Alentejo Algarve 
No. valid cases 
% of sample 
37002 
100.0% 
12695 
34.3% 
7675 
20.7% 
10545 
28.5% 
3769 
10.2% 
2318 
6.3% 
Average family size 3.6 4.0 3.5 3.4 3.2 3.0 
Average age 38.4 35.7 39.8 38.0 42.0 44.1 
Sex M 47.7% 47.9% 47.1% 47.6% 47.4% 49.0% 
F 52.3% 52.1% 52.9% 52.4% 52.6% 51.0% 
% with consultations 44.9% 43.1% 44.6% 47.9% 44.5% 42.9% 
Aver. no. consultations 1.13 1.07 1.13 1.22 1.11 1.07 
Mean equiv income 18795 17775 15441 22689 17154 20440 
Gini coefficient 0.346 0.351 0.335 0.316 0.288 0.310 
Notes: - Doctor consultations in a 3-month reference period. 
- Mean equivalent income on a per month basis in escudos. 
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Table A7.2: Social welfare associated with health in five portuguese regions 
Age and sex-standardized. Values of ic = 0,1,2 and 3. 
Portugal North Centre Lisbon Alentejo Algarve 
Prevalence of limiting chronic illness 
0.0 11.5% 11.3% 14.2% 10.0% 8.9% 14.0% 
Variation 100 98 123 87 77 122 
ic = 1.0 12.9% 12.5% 15.9% 11.4% 9.7% 14.7% 
Variation 100 97 123 88 75 114 
ic = 2.0 14.3% 13.7% 17.7% 12.8% 10.4% 15.5% 
Variation 100 95 123 89 72 108 
ic = 3.0 15.8% 14.9% 19.4% 14.2% 11.2% 16.2% 
Variation 100 94 123 90 71 103 
Prevalence of disability and Illness 
ic = 0.0 28.2% 27.2% 29.3% 27.1% 28.4% 34.5% 
Variation 100 97 104 96 101 122 
ic = 1.0 30.0% 29.0% 30.6% 29.3% 30.4% 36.0% 
Variation 100 97 102 98 101 120 
ic = 2.0 31.7% 30.7% 32.0% 31.6% 32.4% 37.5% 
Variation 100 97 101 100 102 118 
ic = 3.0 33.5% 32.4% 33.4% 33.8% 34.4% 39.1% 
Variation 100 97 100 101 103 117 
Number of sick days 
ic = 0.0 1.419 1.457 1.684 1.199 1.152 1.775 
Variation 100 103 119 84 81 125 
ic = 1.0 1.603 1.649 1.865 1.367 1.266 1.870 
Variation 100 103 116 85 79 117 
ic = 2.0 1.786 1.840 2.046 1.535 1.380 1.966 
Variation 100 103 115 86 77 110 
ic = 3.0 1.969 2.032 2.226 1.703 1.494 2.062 
Variation 100 103 113 86 76 105 
Note: The number directly below each computed value shows the variation around the 
national average. 
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Table A7.3: Average levels of morbidity and income indexed health inequality 
in five Portuguese regions 
Observed and age-sex standardized distributions 
Portugal North Centre Lisbon Alentejo Algarve 
Prevalence of limiting chronic illness 
% reporting 
Unstandardised 11.6% 10.5% 14.9% 10.0% 9.8% 16.1% 
Standardised 11.5% 11.3% 14.2% 10.0% 8.9% 14.0% 
Concentration coefficients 
Unstandardised -0.124 -0.105 -0.124 -0.137 -0.057 -0.088 
Standardised -0.124 -0.106 -0.123 -0.141 -0.084 -0.053 
Prevalence of disability and illness 
% reporting 
Unstandardised 28.5% 26.0% 30.5% 27.0% 31.0% 38.4% 
Standardised 28.2% 27.2% 29.3% 27.1% 28.4% 34.5% 
Concentration coefficients 
Unstandardised. -0.072 -0.068 -0.048 -0.089 -0.060 -0.081 
Standardised -0.063 -0.064 -0.047 -0.083 -0-071 -0.044 
Number of sick days 
Mean 
Unstandardised 1.42 1.35 1.76 1.19 1.24 2.02 
Standardised 1.42 1.46 1.68 1.20 1.15 1.77 
Concentration coefficients 
Unstandardised -0.133 -0.130 -0.117 -0.136 -0.070 -0.103 
Standardised -0.129 -0.131 -0.107 -0.140 -0.099 -0.054 
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